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Abstract
Milrod (2007) identifies persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients whose symptoms of
anxiety and avoidance have remitted. Through an analysis of the available theoretical and
clinical literature on agoraphobia, the psychological experience of emptiness, and the
development of the ego, I argue that agoraphobia is not an anxiety about “open spaces”
but, rather, about the boundaries between spaces. In agoraphobia, there is a pathological
persistence of the psychological processes of normal ego development. Recognition of
the usefulness of agoraphobic anxieties in the development of ego boundaries may help to
identify the point at which they persist beyond usefulness and into pathology, both
theoretically and clinically. Following Winnicott (1951, 1969), I argue that the analytic
frame – the setting of the analysis – has the potential to become a transitional object for
the analysand. The agoraphobic’s opportunity for new experiences with a transitional
object – if it can survive her destruction of it – allows the frame to be used in the
development of the ego’s boundaries.
Milrod suggests that a deficient Reflective Function (RF) may explain the persistent
emptiness she identifies in agoraphobia patients. Though Milrod’s patients may indeed
have a weak RF, I argue that assertions of emptiness in the clinical situation cannot be
causally attributed to this deficiency. Further, I contend that these patients’ assertions and
experiences of emptiness can be better explained by the presence of traumatic and
unmourned losses. I propose several explanations for why agoraphobia patients, in
particular, defend unconsciously against mourning. I argue that a clinical emphasis on
interpreting the transference may lead to an impasse in the relief of this emptiness insofar
as it may impede the development of free association. I contend that the agoraphobic
requires the freedom to be incoherent, afforded in the psychoanalytic clinic via the
distinctive method of free association, in order to define for herself the boundaries of self
and other, and to recognize in action – or, more precisely, in words; in the act of putting it
all into words – the limits of her affective life. Specifically, these boundaries limit the
agoraphobic’s fears of destruction of the object and annihilation of the ego.
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Introduction
They that live in fear are never free, resolute, secure, merry, but in continual pain…No
greater misery, no rack, no torture like unto it.
(Burton 1621; qtd. in Snaith 1968, p. 673)
Agoraphobia is commonly described as a morbid fear of open spaces. Psychiatrically, it is
defined according to two predominant symptoms: anxiety and avoidance. Research with
American populations finds a 12-month prevalence of 2.7% (American Psychiatric
Association 1995) and a lifetime prevalence of almost 5% (Kessler et al. 2006). In
Canada, 12-month and lifetime prevalence rates are 1.6% and 3.7%, respectively
(Government of Canada 2006). In moderate to severe cases of agoraphobia – which
affects an estimated 86% of sufferers (Kessler et al. 2006) – individuals may become
entirely or largely housebound. Along with severity, agoraphobia is also associated with
impairment (interfering with home management, work, social life, and personal
relationships) and comorbidity with other mental disorders (including other anxiety
disorders, mood disorders, and substance use disorders). These statistics indicate that
agoraphobia presents a significant social problem. While almost all sufferers seek out and
respond to some level of treatment, relapse is common after treatment ends (see, for
example, Wiborg & Dahl 1996; Kessler et al. 2006).
Relapse may be so common because of a third, more pernicious, symptom that
Milrod, one of the foremost contemporary theorists of agoraphobia,1 has recently
identified – “persistent emptiness”:
Although the flagrant symptoms of agoraphobia and accompanying panic remit
fairly readily with these treatments [CBT and pharmacotherapy], from the
perspective of clinical psychoanalysis some of these patients’ underlying inner
constriction is striking. This constriction affects ability to think independently and
to lead emotionally full and intellectually broad and stimulating internal lives. This
1

Milrod, along with colleagues, is one of the foremost innovators of outcome studies for panic focused
psychodynamic psychotherapy. Milrod et al.’s (1997) manual, Panic-Focused Psychodynamic
Psychotherapy, is recognized as a landmark achievement in the integration of psychodynamic approaches
with CBT and pharmacotherapy (Gassner 2004, p. 229). Milrod has led or participated in numerous studies
and individual psychoanalytic treatments of patients with panic disorder and agoraphobia (e.g., Klein et al.
2003; Milrod 1995; Milrod et al. 1996; Milrod 1998; Milrod et al. 2000; Milrod et al. 2001; Milrod et al.
2007; Rudden et al. 2003; Rudden et al. 2006).
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problem persists long after agoraphobic symptom remission. The overt difficulty
that these patients experience in venturing out of their magically designated safe
space in the real world, punctuated by overwhelming anxiety, parallels a difficulty
they often have in looking inward, reflecting on their lives or feelings, or permitting
themselves to experience their feelings at all. (Milrod 2007, pp. 1008-1009)
Milrod’s experience as a psychiatrist who works with a predominately psychodynamic
model has led to her familiarity with the advantages and limitations of both the
psychiatric and the psychoanalytic paradigms. It is from the psychoanalytic perspective
that Milrod notes the emergence of this persistent symptom in agoraphobia patients.2 She
refers to this phenomenon variously within her article as “emptiness” (p. 1007), “inner
constriction” (p. 1008), “internal vacancy” (p. 1009), and “subjective sense of
incompleteness” (p. 1010) without remarking on the very different meanings of each of
these terms. The complexities of the subjective phenomenological3 experiences of this
emptiness are evident from the connotations of these various terms: emptiness implies a
nothingness and a complete absence; constriction implies an intense anxiety; and,
incompleteness implies a something missing along with the presence of something else.
The nature of these “somethings” remains undefined, which results in the sense of unease
that is often emptiness’s affective companion. All of these meanings accord with
Milrod’s descriptions of her patients’ experiences at certain moments; however, Milrod’s
use of these various terms without clarification obscures her intended meaning, which
remains unclear throughout the article; or, rather, the complexity of the phenomenon she
encounters in her patients remains to be explicated. At the same time, my reading of her
article, which focuses on the meanings of patients’ assertions of emptiness, reveals
incompatibilities in Milrod’s arguments that undermine her suggestion that her patients’
persistent emptiness can be attributed to a developmental deficit in the form of a weak
reflective function. Milrod’s finding of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients has
2

This phenomenon of emptiness is anticipated, though not elaborated, in Morgan’s important overview on
the history of agoraphobia: “the impression conveyed by the phobic personality is of emptiness” (2003, p.
191). Morgan also notes the relevance of traumatic loss in some phobic patients (p. 196).
3
By phenomenological, here and elsewhere, I mean the subjective physiological and psychological
experiences of agoraphobia. I distinguish the phenomenological from the symptomatological, which I take
to refer, at least implicitly, to diagnostics; I maintain this distinction to indicate that the phenomenological
exceeds the symptomatological and that it remains, necessarily, beyond our ability to fully articulate an
objective definition of psychical experiences, in general, and of agoraphobia, in particular.
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important implications for the successful treatment of the disorder long-term, namely, the
need to address this emptiness in patients for whom panic symptoms have remitted. In
this thesis, I critique Milrod’s explanation for the persistent emptiness and propose an
alternative explanation with clinical implications. I also provide the theoretical
foundations for my critique, and provide an analysis of the theoretical implications of this
emptiness in agoraphobia patients specifically and in the development of psychical reality
generally.

0.1. The Universalities in Agoraphobia and Emptiness
There are two broad issues in establishing the framework for this thesis. The first issue
concerns the relevance of gender in agoraphobia. This first issue bleeds into the second,
which concerns the wide array of theoretical paradigms within which agoraphobia has
been considered. Much of the extra-psychoanalytic literature on agoraphobia –
psychiatric, sociological, psychotherapeutic, attachment, and cultural geographic –
focuses on the gender variance, namely, that agoraphobia is diagnosed in women much
more frequently than in men. Ultimately, I suggest that the universal experiences of
anxiety that are part of ego development and psychical reality tend to be overlooked in
favour of explanations of agoraphobia that emphasize this gender variance.4 In this thesis,
I focus on the unconscious elements of agoraphobia. Thus, while my thinking on
agoraphobia has been influenced by arguments from a range of disciplines, my arguments
strongly depend on the psychoanalytic literature on agoraphobia and emptiness.
Prior to World War I, agoraphobia was predominantly diagnosed in male patients.
Currently, it is diagnosed much more frequently in female patients. Statistically, the
percentage of women in research populations of at least 25 agoraphobics varies between
63% and 95%. (Bekker 1996, p. 129; see also Chambless & Mason 1986). There are two
main perspectives on this gender variance in agoraphobia. They can be summarized
4

Rey, a psychoanalyst, argues that, although more overt in women, the “claustro-agoraphobic syndrome
[...] is basic to both sexes; only certain manifestations of it are different” (1994, p. 9). I do not disagree with
those who argue that the differences between these manifestations are significant; however, the focus of
this thesis is what is, in Rey’s words, “basic to both sexes.” I consider Rey’s work in detail in Chapter Two.
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briefly as follows: agoraphobia is a “women’s syndrome”; it is both diagnosed and occurs
in females almost to the exclusion of males because of the socio-cultural conditions in
which we live. This perspective is exemplified by Seidenberg and DeCrow, who argue
that agoraphobia is “a paradigm for the historical intimidation and oppression of women”
(1983, p. 6). This misunderstanding, I suggest, of the psychological nature of agoraphobia
leads Seidenberg and DeCrow to – in my view, the rather absurd – conclusion that people
suffering from agoraphobia “have come to terms with their own sense of pride by not
setting foot on land that is deemed alien and hostile” (p. 7). Carter provides a succinct
critique of this perspective: “this approach seems to attribute to agoraphobia sufferers an
insight they don’t have. It risks discounting the suffering, the actual, chronically
debilitating unease” (2002, p. 209).
The second perspective on the gender variance in agoraphobia emphasizes that the
rate of diagnosis likely does not correspond to the rate of incidence. Bekker, for example,
in a review of the clinical psychology literature on agoraphobia and gender, critiques the
status quo of accepting agoraphobia as a “women’s syndrome” and argues that the
prevalence of diagnosis does not equal the prevalence of the disorder. The gap between
diagnosis and incidence, if it exists, has several explanations, most involving diagnostic
sex bias and/or socio-cultural etiological sex bias. These biases mean that agoraphobia is
diagnosed more in women because diagnosticians expect to find it in women, and/or that
the prevalence of the disorder is affected by socially constructed differences between the
sexes (namely, gender bias). Bekker suggests that men are more likely than women to
abuse alcohol to cope with severe anxiety, a hypothesis supported by the high rate of comorbid agoraphobia and/or social phobia among patients treated for alcoholism, a higher
rate of which are male (1996, pp. 130-131). As Bekker indicates, the rates of anxietyreducing substance abuse other than alcohol are not known. Although there has been
much research on this gender variance in agoraphobia since Bekker’s review (see, for
example, Foot & Koszycki 2004; McLean & Anderson 2009; Starcevic et al. 2007), the
statistics and concerns remain relatively unchanged. McLean and Anderson, for example,
find support for Bekker’s suggestion of a socio-cultural etiological sex bias, concluding
that “gender differences at each level of analysis are likely moderated by socialization
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processes that prescribe gender-specific expectations regarding the expression of anxiety
and the acceptable means of coping with anxiety” (2009, p. 503).
Reuter (2007a, 2007b) considers the contemporary prevalence of female
agoraphobics in a Foucauldian analysis, addressing the problematic socio-cultural
(psychiatric) narrative that has developed around the physiological symptoms of
agoraphobia (including tachycardia, chest pain, shortness of breath, etc.). Reuter critiques
the “normalizing” diagnostic criteria as a tool for ideological social order. She points out
that, along with the development of a psychiatric diagnosis, for many social theorists
agoraphobia became a metaphor for the alienation and social estrangement of modern
urban space.5 Reuter supports her critique of psychiatric methods as socially and
culturally determined with an analysis of other cultural shifts that coincided with World
War I. There is no doubt that cultural expectations of women shifted from the late
nineteenth century – when it was considered inappropriate for (bourgeois) women to
leave the house unaccompanied (“unchaperoned”) – to the late twentieth century when, as
Reuter puts it, “what was previously considered normal bourgeois behaviour […] became
something to see as pathological” (2007a, p. 250). Women’s resistance to the “freedom”
to move about in public spheres unaccompanied, Reuter argues, may account for part of
this shift. Reuter also suggests that the advent of “shell shock,” or war neurosis, as a
(masculine) diagnosis may have predominantly replaced agoraphobia as a diagnosis for
men with anxiety disorders. Reuter’s critique, then, accounts for both a diagnostic sex
bias and a socio-cultural etiological sex bias.
Much of the recent research on agoraphobia uses a framework of attachment
theory. Attachment theory proposes an evolutionary system of security based on
proximity and accessibility of care providers during development. A care provider that is
consistently available serves as a “secure base” (Bowlby 1988) for the child and repeated
experiences of availability result in a secure attachment. An inconsistently responsive

5

See especially Reuter 2007b, pp. 28-31. Reuter refers to Simmel’s argument that the modern city and its
various assaults on the individual in the form of “nervous stimulation” required the construction of a
protective “inner barrier” (see Simmel 1950). Reuter notes Benjamin’s addition of an external barrier in the
form of the home as a bourgeois private refuge (see Benjamin 1978). See also Carter (2002), who argues
that agoraphobia is a “realistic anxiety” of the expanse of modern urban space.
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secure base results in an insecure attachment, either avoidant or anxious-ambivalent.
Attachment researchers have investigated the relationship between agoraphobia and an
anxious-ambivalent attachment style; findings suggest that anxious-ambivalent
attachment is a risk factor for agoraphobia, but not exclusively. That is, anxiousambivalent attachment is a risk factor for a number of mental disorders in adulthood. De
Ruiter and van Ijzendoorn (1992) provide a review of this research; they also point to
several studies that suggest that early traumatic events (including death of a parent and
parental divorce) were related to the development of adult agoraphobia (de Ruiter & van
Ijzendoorn 1992, p. 377; see Tweed et al. 1989 and Faravelli et al. 1985). By contrast,
Fleischer-Mann (1995) finds that early traumatic events are not more common in
agoraphobics than in a control group of non-agoraphobics but that these events were
perceived more negatively by agoraphobics. Influenced by the development of the fourth
category of disorganized attachment that specifically concerns an individual’s response to
loss and trauma, Iddiols (2005) suggests that agoraphobia may follow from disorganized
attachment rather than from an organized anxious-ambivalent attachment. I discuss the
significance of traumatic events in agoraphobia in Chapter Three, but, as I am specifically
concerned with the unconscious aspects of agoraphobia that lead to experiences of
persistent emptiness, I do not consider in any detail the research on agoraphobia from an
attachment perspective, which is more applicable in research on the cognitive and
behavioural aspects of agoraphobia (see, for example, Liotti 1991; Sable 1994).
Social and cultural geographers with psychotherapeutic practices, notably Bankey
(2004), Bondi (2005), and Davidson (2000, 2001, 2003), consider the implications for
agoraphobia and space anxieties in psychotherapy. Davidson (especially 2000, 2001)
considers with a creative and astute analysis the ways in which cultural femininities shape
women’s experiences of themselves, their bodies, and others. There are important firstperson accounts of the lived experiences of agoraphobia sufferers in many of these
works, including also Capps and Ochs (1995) and McWatters (2013). Orr (2006)
provides an account of her own experiences of agoraphobia. These personal narratives are
integral to our broader conceptualizations of agoraphobia insofar as, as McWatters
emphasizes, theorizations about the social, cultural, and political dimensions of
agoraphobia must account for the agoraphobic’s suffering.
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In this thesis, I do not refute that agoraphobia, as currently diagnostically defined,
occurs more commonly in women than in men. The focus of this thesis is not, however,
an interrogation of agoraphobia’s diagnostic criteria, nor the sex variance in its
occurrence. While the development of psychiatric narratives is certainly an interesting
question, it is also not the focus of this thesis. I am particularly concerned with the
phenomenon – symptom – of persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) has identified in
agoraphobia patients whose symptoms of anxiety and avoidance have remitted. In this
thesis, I assume the validity of psychoanalysis as both a distinctive method in the
alleviation of mental suffering and as a framework for understanding the nature of mental
life. Unlike some projects (e.g., Busch & Milrod 2013; Busch et al. 2009; Milrod 1995;
Milrod et al. 1997; Milrod et al. 2007), this thesis is not concerned with demonstrating
the efficacy of psychoanalysis or psychodynamic psychotherapy in treating panic
disorder and agoraphobia; nor is it concerned with arguing what constitutes
psychoanalysis proper, or discounting particular treatments because they are not
psychoanalysis. Rather, in this thesis, I consider what Milrod’s (2007) finding of
persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients for whom symptoms of anxiety and
avoidance have remitted can add to our understanding of the nature of agoraphobia. I
argue that agoraphobic anxieties, the development of the ego, and the experience of
emptiness are all inextricably connected to the agoraphobic’s particular uses of language.
Although I do not wish to engage in the debate of what constitutes psychoanalysis, I do
argue that specific elements of the psychoanalytic process are more efficacious in the
relief of the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness than others, namely, the fundamental
rule: the analysand’s free associations and the analyst’s evenly hovering attention. This
argument follows from the theoretical and clinical additions I offer in this thesis to the
understanding of agoraphobia, the significance of emptiness and agoraphobic anxieties in
the development of the ego, and the particular way agoraphobia patients use language –
more specifically, narrative – as part of their experience of agoraphobia.
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0.2. Overview
I begin this thesis with theoretical considerations of agoraphobia in Chapters One and
Two in order to lay the foundations for the more clinical developments in Chapters Three
and Four. Broadly, I begin with a conceptual overview of agoraphobia, and then turn to
an analysis of agoraphobic anxieties and the experience of emptiness in the development
of the ego and psychical reality. I then engage directly with Milrod’s (2007) article, using
the theoretical arguments of the first two chapters to critique her conclusion that a
developmental deficit in the form of a weak reflective function can explain agoraphobia
patients’ persistent emptiness. Finally, I suggest a clinical counterpoint to Milrod’s
emphasis on interpreting the transference relationship within the psychoanalytic setting
and return to the fundamental psychoanalytic emphasis on language.
More specifically, in Chapter One I provide an analysis of the conceptualization
of agoraphobia, including its historical development, psychiatric delineations, and
psychoanalytic contributions. I review arguments about the “phobia” aspect of
agoraphobia, which indicate the theoretical and phenomenological distinctions between
agoraphobia and simple (aka: simple, true, discrete, or specific) phobias. This distinction
illuminates the nature of the disorder and clarifies both its profound disabling effect on
sufferers and its chronicity. The use of the term “phobia” to describe the disorder is
contentious in part because the fear is not, as originally described (and the psychiatric
definition notwithstanding), of an object (or space) that can be avoided, but, following
Weiss, a “mental registration of structural disorganization” (Compton 1992, p. 409). I
then review arguments about agoraphobia’s phobic object, to which “agora” is meant to
refer and I offer my own theoretical description of the unconscious motivation of the
anxiety embodied in patients with agoraphobia. Informed by Milrod’s (2007) addition to
the clinical picture of agoraphobia of persistent emptiness beyond the remittance of the
overt symptoms of anxiety and avoidance, I argue that agoraphobia involves a profound
anxiety about the boundaries between spaces, both physical and psychical. This anxiety is
fuelled – if not caused – by the inability to symbolize (or, more specifically, to engage in
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the creative process of symbolization6). The agoraphobic’s difficulty in putting her
feelings into words contributes, I argue, to the persistent emptiness Milrod describes. To
name is to define, and thus to delimit. Without the experience of these limits, the very
thought of engaging in life is overwhelming.
In Chapter Two, I expand on the issue of psychical space. Specifically, I address
the question of what is internal and what is external, the anxieties fuelled by the
navigation of these separated spaces, and, especially, the agoraphobic’s anxiety of
navigating between them – of crossing the threshold, so to speak – via an elucidation of
the development and functions of the ego. Following Freud and the psychoanalytic
tradition, I argue that the distinction between “normal” and “pathological” is a matter of
degree. In agoraphobia, there is a pathological persistence of the psychological processes
of normal ego development. Recognition of the usefulness of agoraphobic anxieties in the
development of ego boundaries may help identify the point at which they persist beyond
usefulness and into pathology, both theoretically and clinically. From an original unity, in
which no ego exists, the ego comes into being by distinguishing an internal reality from

6

In this thesis, I use the term “symbolization” in reference to the phobic “object” of agoraphobia;
specifically, I argue that agoraphobia indicates a fear of symbolization. While I anticipate that the meaning
of this argument will be clarified through the detailed arguments of this thesis, it is necessary to clarify here
what I mean by “symbolization.” My sense of symbolization is intimately connected to the concept of the
transitional object (Winnicott 1951, 1959, 1969) and to Lacan’s notion of the symbolic order (Lacan 1988,
1958/2006b, 2006d, 2006j). In this thesis, I refer to the individual engaging in the creative process of
symbolization; it requires the prior existence of an object (via Winnicott) or a linguistic symbol (via
Lacan), and it also requires the ability to create anew this previously existing object or symbol. The
paradox of these two simultaneous acts – the finding and the creating – is integral to an individual’s sense
of living his or her own life. I am primarily referring to the use of language as a system of symbols.
Engaging in a process of symbolization, here, simply means putting one’s thoughts and feelings into words;
however, the simplicity of this statement belies the extraordinary difficulty of the task. My use of the term
symbolization is connected to, but distinct from, much of the psychoanalytic literature on symbolism,
which tends to focus on objects as symbols of repressed ideas (whether conscious or unconscious, i.e., in
dreams) or on symbolic thinking (or symbolic equation) as what is more commonly referred to now as
concrete thinking, where the symbol is taken to be the object rather than understood as referring to the
object. Often, according to this literature, the function of symbol formation is to substitute for the loss of
the child’s “primary” objects, the maternal and paternal part objects. We can see the connection between
this understanding of symbolism and my use of the term symbolization, which merely requires an
extrapolation of the sense of “symbol” from an object to a word. As I note above, this extrapolation – for
me – follows primarily from the work of Winnicott and Lacan. For some notable examples within the
psychoanalytic literature on symbolism, see: Jones (1918); Klein (1923, 1930); Fenichel (1946); and,
Milner (1952).
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an external reality. For the agoraphobic, I suggest that something has gone awry in this
process of creative differentiation. The agoraphobic is not able to take for granted the
distinction between internal and external, and therefore cannot experience shared reality
as illusion. This illusion of shared reality is necessary for the creative uses of language.
Following Winnicott (1951, 1969), I argue that the analytic frame – the setting of the
analysis – has the potential to become a transitional object for the analysand. The
agoraphobic’s opportunity for new experiences with a transitional object – if it can
survive her destruction of it – allows the frame to be used in the development of the ego’s
boundaries, which can thereby be creatively inhabited, with all of the risks and rewards of
human vulnerability.
In Chapter Three, I argue that assertions of emptiness in the analytic situation
indicate the unconscious presence of strongly warded-off emotional or cognitive
experiences. The nature of these experiences must be explored with each patient, as they
will naturally vary among individuals. Specifically, however, the subjective experience of
emptiness in agoraphobia patients commonly indicates the presence of significant losses
that have yet to be mourned. I propose several explanations as to why agoraphobia
patients, in particular, defend against mourning. Further, I argue that a structural
emptiness exists in all individuals along with the pathological emptiness evident in
certain patients. Pathological emptiness, I argue, is a complex defense organization that
masks overwhelming unconscious material; for the agoraphobia patient, pathological
emptiness is a defense against one’s own aggressivity and the painful experience of
overwhelming loss. Structural emptiness, on the other hand, and as Winnicott argues, is
the basis for all learning; it is an aspect of the psychical apparatus that allows for the
possibility of new thoughts, feelings, and experiences. An understanding of structural
emptiness does not elucidate the particular meaning of pathological emptiness, but it does
provide a technical counterpoint to the therapeutic emphasis on the transference
relationship. Structural emptiness is a consequence of entering into a language system; by
following the psychoanalytic method of free association and abiding by the fundamental
psychoanalytic rule – the pact between the analysand and the analyst of complete candor
and complete discretion respectively – the analytic couple can make use of this structural
emptiness in order to elucidate the individual meaning(s) of pathological emptiness.
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In Chapter Four, I explore agoraphobia and the uses of language in the
psychoanalytic setting. Specifically, I consider three main themes: coherence as
resistance; the analyst’s over-reliance on interpreting the transference as an impediment
to the development of free and freer associations; and, the concept of Nachträglichkeit
and the logic of the unconscious. These themes are all connected to the concepts of
psychoanalytic truth and psychical reality, which provide the frame within which I
develop my arguments. There is little consensus on what constitutes psychoanalytic truth.
As I am here concerned with psychical coherence – and, relatedly, psychical reality – I
follow Faimberg’s concept of psychic truths, which “are the consequence of the psychic
work resulting from the demands of reality that are fashioned by the unconscious wish
and the unconscious fantasy” (1997, p. 449). This definition is consistent with my
arguments in Chapter Two, namely, that psychical reality is created through the ego’s
mediation of external reality; both the facts of external reality and the ego’s mediation –
or, better, modification – of those facts is clinically pertinent. Indeed, it is precisely the
ego’s modification of external reality that is the concern of psychoanalytic work and is
the realm of that work’s influence.
I argue that the tasks of trying to be coherent and trying to say everything involve
different processes and therefore have different results; likewise, the task of listening
differs between trying to make sense of what is being said and waiting to see what sense
emerges. It is not that incoherence in itself is preferable to coherence, but that when
coherence is demanded, fewer feelings and thoughts are possible; when incoherence is
tolerated, new and unanticipated feelings and thoughts can develop. The agoraphobic is
unable to tolerate incoherence: she either produces narratives that are too coherent or she
produces empty narratives. The agoraphobic suffers from a restricted unconscious
freedom in addition to the restrictions she places on her freedom of mobility. Following
Bollas (1995), I argue that there are two aspects of mental health: the ability to construct
coherent narratives and the freedom to explore the feelings that precede coherence. The
agoraphobic, I suggest, uses narrative to stave off the overwhelming emotions that
accompany incoherence. An analytic emphasis on interpreting the transference colludes
with the agoraphobic’s ego in the resistance of incoherence, inhibiting the development
of free association. Focusing on narrative coherence forecloses the emergence of the
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unconscious in the gaps revealed by language, gaps which must emerge in order for new
thoughts and feelings to be possible. The psychoanalytic invitation “try to say
everything” provides the space for these gaps to emerge and the opportunity to explore
them.
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Chapter One: The Concept of Agoraphobia
The dictionary definition of agoraphobia depends on the literal significance of its parts;
that is, agoraphobia is defined as the fear of open spaces: from the Greek agora, meaning
“an assembly; hence, the place of assembly, especially the marketplace”; and, phobia,
meaning “fear” (“Agoraphobia” 2014). However, the theoretical understanding of both
elements of the psychological disorder “agoraphobia” – agora and phobia – is
contentious. It is evident from agoraphobia’s theoretical and conceptual history that the
nature of the disorder still eludes our understanding. In this chapter, I first provide an
overview of the conceptualization of agoraphobia, including its historical development,
psychiatric delineations, and psychoanalytic contributions. I then review arguments about
the question of the “phobia” aspect of agoraphobia, which indicate the theoretical and
phenomenological distinctions between agoraphobia and simple (aka: simple, true,
discrete, or specific) phobias. This distinction illuminates the nature of the disorder and
clarifies both its profound disabling effect on sufferers and its chronicity (that is,
resistance to long-term efficacious treatment). The use of the term “phobia” to describe
the disorder is contentious in part because the fear is not, as originally described (and the
psychiatric definition notwithstanding), of an object (or space) that can be avoided, but,
following Weiss, a “mental registration of structural disorganization” (Compton 1992, p.
409). I then review arguments about agoraphobia’s phobic object, to which “agora” is
meant to refer (if not describe) and I offer my own theoretical description of the
unconscious motivation of the anxiety embodied in patients with agoraphobia. Informed
by Milrod’s (2007) addition to the clinical picture of agoraphobia of persistent emptiness
beyond the remittance of the overt symptoms of anxiety and avoidance, I argue that
agoraphobia involves a profound anxiety about the boundaries between spaces, both
physical and psychical. This anxiety is fuelled – if not caused – by the inability to
symbolize (to engage in the process of symbolization). This difficulty, I argue,
contributes to the persistent emptiness Milrod describes.
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1.1. Definitions: Historical, Psychiatric, and Psychoanalytic
For several years patients have repeatedly come to me with the peculiar complaint that it
is impossible for them to go into open spaces and down certain streets, and because of
this fear their freedom of movement is disturbed. They yearned for an explanation of the
nature of their affliction, and I believed I could form the word agoraphobia (from the
Greek “agora”), dread of outside places, for it.
(Westphal 1871; qtd. in Boyd & Crump 1991, p. 80)
The term agoraphobia was first coined in 18717 by Westphal, a neurologist and
psychiatrist, to describe three male patients for whom the experience, or contemplation,
of walking through certain streets was accompanied by a “dread of anxiety” (p. 12; qtd. in
Snaith 1968, p. 673). Westphal reports that his patients indicated “that they might be
laughed at or considered to be insane due to the peculiarity of the matter” and that they
had “no idea what cause[d] the fear, as if it were a fear of fear” (Westphal 1871/1988, p.
59; p. 62; my emphasis). Their “fear of fear” seemed to be accentuated by the fear of
being perceived as insane, or otherwise embarrassed.8
Snaith, in his study “A Clinical Investigation of Phobias” (1968), draws attention
to Benedikt’s article, “Über Platzschwindel,” published in 1870, in which Benedikt
suggests the term Platzschwindel, meaning “dizziness in public places,” for the
symptomatological experience Westphal describes. Although the medical community
adopted “agoraphobia” as the preferred term, Snaith suggests that the connotations of
each are significant and that Platzschwindel may more accurately describe the experience
of agoraphobia:

7

For a review of historical references to “irrational fears” causing extraordinary anxiety and avoidance
prior to the development of a medical description of phobias, see Snaith, who includes, among others,
Hippocrates as having noted the presence of what we would now call phobias (1968, p. 673). Knapp
references Errera’s historical review of the concept of phobia and also indicates Hippocrates’s treatment of
phobic patients (1988, p. 37). The disorder, then, profoundly predates its nomination.
8
Mr. P, Westphal’s third patient, “is simultaneously frightened by the thought that his condition could
attract attention” (1871/1988, pp. 70-71). This patient also reports fear in crossing the Dirschauer Bridge:
“during the times he had to cross it, a great feeling of anxiety overcame him, combined with the fear that he
could become insane and would jump over the bridge during such a condition. When asked, however, if he
had the urge to do so, he denied it vehemently” (pp. 71-72). This vehement denial points to unconscious
factors, which I address in detail in Chapters Two and Three.
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The word Platzschwindel places stress upon the somatic and autonomic
accompaniments of the symptom at the expense of the psychic experience; and
indeed, direct questioning of these patients often reveals that unpleasant somatic
sensations may be a great deal more distressing than the psychic experience of
anxiety. (1968, p. 673)
However, Westphal specifically addresses Benedikt’s article and dismisses the proposed
Platzschwindel precisely because the experiences of his own patients could not be
described as dizziness or vertigo, but anxiety. Westphal emphasizes the distinction
between a physical (specifically, ocular) impairment, which Benedikt suggests, and a
cerebral (psychological) cause, which Westphal emphatically favours. At Westphal’s
request, each of his patients underwent an independent ophthalmological examination,
which revealed no evidence of ocular impairment that would cause such dizziness, thus
supporting his conclusions (1871/1988, pp. 74-79).9 Furthermore, distinguishing between
the psychic and the somatic experiences of anxiety, as Snaith attempts, may be
impossible.10 Indeed, attempting to distinguish between the psychic and the somatic is
one of the ongoing central issues in theorizing and treating agoraphobia. Although
Westphal chose the term “agoraphobia,” he indicated that the term was “not entirely
exhaustive,” given that the fear was “related to certain other situations” (1871/1988, p.
59) in addition to walking through certain streets. Indeed, opposed to the common-place
and initial conception of agoraphobia as a “fear of open spaces,” perpetuated in part by
the literal translation of the word, the actual symptomatology of the disorder as currently
understood refers to a ranging severity of anxiety reactions concerning space.
The “other” anxiety reaction concerning space, claustrophobia, was introduced
sometime between 1878 and 1879. Its precise origin is contested, but credit is accorded to
Ball and his article, “On Claustrophobia” (1879) (“Claustrophobia” 2014). However,
Westphal refers to claustrophobic anxieties in his patients, beginning “as soon as they
were together with many people in closed rooms” (1871/1988, p. 74). A contemporary

9

The first complete English translation of Die Agoraphobie was not published until 1988, so it is possible
that Snaith was not familiar with this aspect of Westphal’s article; it is not cited in his study.
10
Studies of psychosomatic processes, and the mutual effects of so-called psychological and physical wellbeing or illness, are sharply on the rise, especially in the field of psychoneuroimmunology. See, for
example, Karren, Smith, and Gordon (2013).
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commentator, Webber (1872), supported Westphal’s use of the term agoraphobia if its
definition included what is now called claustrophobia: insofar as “agora means not only a
market place, but also an assembly of people, the term agoraphobia would seem
appropriate for the dread of crossing a square, or dread of being in a crowded room” (qtd.
in Knapp 1988, p. 31). White, an American contemporary, suggested that agoraphobia
and clithrophobia – a form of claustrophobia specifically referring to a morbid fear of
being locked in – be considered in the same category, “as in both cases the characteristic
symptom is that the patient cannot by any means form an accurate conception of his
surroundings” (1884, p. 1140).
These early speculations on agoraphobia eventually gave way to the standardized
definitions effected by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) via their compilation
of the Diagnostics and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), first published in
1952.11 The DSM-IV-TR (4th edition, text revision) provides the psychiatric definition –
or, “diagnostic features” – of agoraphobia:
The essential feature of Agoraphobia is anxiety about being in places or situations
from which escape might be difficult (or embarrassing) or in which help may not
be available in the event of having a Panic Attack [separately defined] or paniclike symptoms. […] The anxiety typically leads to a pervasive avoidance of a
variety of situations that may include being alone outside the home or being home
alone; being in a crowd of people; traveling in an automobile, bus, or airplane; or
being on a bridge or in an elevator. (APA 2000, p. 395)
There are some changes in the recently published fifth edition of the manual (DSM-5,
APA 2013) in the criteria and description for agoraphobia. Notably, in DSM-IV-TR,
within the main category of Anxiety Disorders, there are three codable disorders12: Panic
Disorder Without Agoraphobia; Panic Disorder With Agoraphobia; and, Agoraphobia
Without History of Panic Disorder. Neither Agoraphobia nor Panic Attack, though
delineated, is considered codable outside of these three diagnoses. In DSM-5, panic

11

For a critique of the development of the DSM and, in particular, the diagnostic criteria for agoraphobia,
see Reuter (2007b) (especially Chapter 5, pp. 95-160). For a history of the classification of panic disorders
from Freud to (at the time, forthcoming) DSM-IV (1994), see Frances et al. (1993).
12
Codable disorders are discrete diagnosable conditions, as opposed to delineated symptoms; the
symptoms, defined, contribute to the diagnosis, but are not diagnoses in and of themselves.
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disorder and agoraphobia are unlinked: panic disorder and agoraphobia are separate
diagnoses with separate criteria. In panic disorder, the fear or anxiety is about the panic
attacks themselves; the phobic object in agoraphobia is considered to be “a variety of
situations” (APA 2013, p. 219).
In DSM-IV-TR (APA 2000), there are three specific criteria for agoraphobia:
briefly, anxiety typically about situations that include being outside the home alone
(Criterion A); avoidance of the anxiety situations, which may include enduring the
situation in the presence of the phobic companion (Criterion B); and, Criteria A and B are
not better accounted for by another mental disorder (Criterion C).13 In DSM-5, there are
more – and more specific – criteria for agoraphobia: intense fear or anxiety triggered by
the real or anticipated exposure to variety of situations (Criterion A); upon exposure,
thoughts that something terrible might happen (Criterion B); fear or anxiety occurs upon
nearly every exposure (Criterion C); the feared situations are actively avoided (Criterion
D); fear or anxiety is out of proportion to the actual danger posed by the situations
(Criterion E); fear or anxiety is persistent (Criterion F); and, it causes clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other areas of functioning
(Criterion G) (APA 2013, pp. 218-219). A significant addition to the DSM-5 is the note
that either real or anticipated exposure to the phobic situation can cause marked anxiety.
Evident in these criteria is the limited or absent capacity of the agoraphobic to locate a
specific phobic object, despite the delineation of five specific agoraphobic situations (I
describe these situations below, in Agora-).
The underlying phenomenological experiences of the agoraphobic are generalized
within the psychoanalytic literature beyond the diagnostic criteria used psychiatrically.
Frances and Dunn, practicing psychoanalysts, describe the clinical situation of
agoraphobia patients as follows: “patients suffering from these space phobias have a
disturbing degree of background anxiety punctuated by attacks of panic when they leave
a safe space” (1975, p. 435). Capps and Ochs suggest that “avoidance in response to this
13

Some examples regarding Criterion C: Specific Phobia might better account for avoidance limited to a
single situation like elevators; Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder might better account for avoidance of dirt in
someone with an obsession about contamination; or, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder might better account for
avoidance of stimuli associated with a severe stressor.
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fear is the central feature of agoraphobia” (1995, p. 3). Agoraphobia is the other side of
claustrophobia and its onset, as Westphal and his contemporaries noted, is often a
response to a claustrophobic panic. Paradoxically, “agoraphobic persons often describe
feeling trapped by an ever-present threat of panic and their belief that they cannot risk
leaving safe havens such as home” (Capps & Ochs 1995, p. 3).14 The co-presence of
agoraphobic and claustrophobic fears in individuals diagnosed as agoraphobic continues
to be noted today: “multiple and seemingly incompatible fears (closed places and open
spaces) are regularly found in agoraphobic patients” (Compton 1992, p. 405).15 Bion,
within the psychoanalytic tradition, describes this limitation of the psychiatric delineation
of agoraphobia:
If a patient presenting such symptoms is investigated psycho-analytically we find
an extremely complex personality; this in itself is of no significance but for the
fact, relevant to this discussion, that I am soon unable to use the term
agoraphobia in a way that is meaningful: the conjunction is not of the elements
that first appeared to compose it nor are they constant. I need to continue using
this term, and with it the term ‘claustrophobia.’ [...] In analysis it appears that the
patient has terrible feelings when he is in open spaces or if he feels shut in. (1965,
p. 123; emphasis added)16
One of the difficulties in understanding and delineating the specific characteristics of
agoraphobia is the wide variety of experiences agoraphobia sufferers describe. The
motivation of the DSM is precisely to be as specific as possible about the diagnostic
criteria for psychological disorders. Its authority, however, is belied by its constant
revisions and new editions. It has practical uses, but is theoretically limited. The
psychiatric definition also does not include the important characteristic of a high degree

14

Two agoraphobia sufferers describe their experiences: “I was never housebound, but I did find the world
was getting smaller”; and, perhaps more typically, “I wouldn’t go outside the door. I wouldn’t even go to
the backdoor to empty the bin” (Davidson 2000, p. 33).
15
For a clinical example, see Matte-Blanco (1940), who presents a case vignette from the psychoanalysis of
a patient with severe agoraphobia and claustrophobia.
16
Ferro, a contemporary Italian psychoanalyst practicing in the Bionian tradition, indicates this same
diagnostic hesitation. Although he makes an initial and basic diagnosis of agoraphobia and claustrophobia
in his patient, “Carla,” he generally “avoid[s] in-depth diagnosis, for fear of imposing an excessively rigid
pattern on the material observed and its elaboration” (1996, p. 997). Ferro acknowledges the risk of
operating according to any established diagnostic framework without an awareness of the reductionist
structure it implicitly imposes on complex realities.
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of free-floating anxiety,17 which likely contributes to the “variety” of “situations” that
form the phobic object, as well as the disorder’s chronicity.
Weiss contributes the important observation that “agoraphobia often develops at a
particular phase in [the patient’s] life when he is required to take a step forward in the
direction of independence” (1935, p. 65). Weiss explains its onset as follows: “If he
succumbs to agoraphobia at such a time it indicates that his capacity for adapting himself
to reality has broken down before his necessity for emancipating himself” (1935, p. 65).
A step towards independence would also be – consciously or unconsciously – perceived
as a step away from the family of origin, which the agoraphobic might perceive as an act
of aggression against her family (primarily, in most cases, her mother). Compton (1992)
draws attention to this observation, though Weiss himself did not emphasize its
relevance, and points to Ruddick’s (1961) similar observations that the onset of
agoraphobia in his three case studies was related to marriage and parenthood. Jackel
(1966) offers several clinical examples of patients (not frankly agoraphobic18) who, upon
interruptions to the analytic treatment (for example, notification of summer vacation or
the need to cancel a session), expressed a conscious or unconscious (namely, in dreams or
symptoms) wish for a child. He interprets this wish for a child as the conscious
representation of the unconscious wish to have someone who would not (be able to) leave
the patient; this wish is a defense against the pain of separation, and of separateness.
Jackel suggests that this wish derives from the pre-oedipal narcissistic wish “to establish
a mother-child relationship in which the patient is both mother and (by identification)
child”; thereby, the patient “can never be deserted and […] is never alone” (1966, p.
733).19 Milrod develops this theme by exploring the pregnancy fantasies of two panic
patients, suggesting similarly that these fantasies become “important dynamic organizers
17

“Background anxiety” has also been identified as “general,” “free-floating,” and “pessimistic expectant”
anxiety and refers to patients’ level of anxiety when they are in their “safe space.” These terms are used
interchangeably to refer to an individual’s level of anxiety when he or she is not confronted with the phobic
object: for an agoraphobic, his or her anxiety while at home in a “safe space.”
18
That is to say, these patients would not be diagnosed with agoraphobia. However, and as I argue in
Chapter Two, agora-claustrophobic anxieties are part of each individual’s psychical structure; therefore, in
circumstances that threaten the defenses against these anxieties, agoraphobic moments arise. For patients
who are frankly agoraphobic, I mean that agora-claustrophobic anxieties are not primarily unconscious
structures, but predominate and are conscious influences in their psychic lives.
19
Jackel reports this wish in both male and female patients.
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of their panic experience [...] because of the way they permit the avoidance of real,
painful separations by means of a fantasy restitution, and foster regression through
identification with the baby” (1998, p. 675).20 There seems to be an unconscious paradox:
a step towards apparent independence, such as marriage or parenthood, can also be a
narcissistic step away from autonomy.21

1.2. -phobia
With this general description of the agoraphobic experience in mind, I turn to the
meanings of agoraphobia’s specific aspects, namely “phobia” and “agora.” Snaith (1968)
provides a study comparing the symptomatology of patients suffering primarily from
agoraphobia with that of patients suffering primarily from “other” phobias (that is, more
discrete and circumscribed fears, such as thunderstorms, eating in public, spiders, etc.22).
For the purposes of his study, Snaith considers patients “agoraphobic” if their most
prominent fears are of leaving home and being in the open.23 His findings suggest that
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Milrod (1998) discusses the presence of pregnancy fantasies in both male and female patients. Davidson
(2001) explores the connection between pregnancy and agoraphobia from a different perspective,
emphasizing the bodily aspects and instability of bodily boundaries of both. All (15) of the agoraphobic
women Davidson interviews had experienced pregnancy and most of them linked the experience of
pregnancy and the onset or increase in their agoraphobic anxieties (p. 291). Further, it is not just the
experience of pregnancy but also the subsequent responsibility of caring for an entirely dependent infant
that appears to be connected to agoraphobic anxieties.
21
Others have suggested that the marriage relationship is the significant precipitating factor, rather than the
marriage event, though Arindell (1987) finds no support for this hypothesis. I suggest that the relationship
is not irrelevant insofar as all dependency (which agoraphobia can surely be described as) is mutually
enacted. In this vein, see Symonds (1971). I discuss this element of dependency in more detail in Chapter
Three in my critique of a clinical emphasis on interpreting the transference.
22
Perhaps following the diagnostic codes of the DSM, Snaith includes fear of crowded places in the
category of discrete phobias. By contrast, and following many theoretical and clinical descriptions, I argue
that such a fear is intimately connected to agoraphobia.
23
Snaith excludes from his study those patients suffering primarily from schizophrenic or depressive
psychotic illnesses. The exclusion of such patients from so-called scientific studies of mental disorders is
required in order to arrive at any statistically significant results; this exclusion reduces the complexity of
phenomena being studied, necessarily, for the study’s purposes, but also significantly limits our
understanding of the complexities of mental life. Milrod’s (2007) finding of persistent emptiness in
agoraphobia patients for whom panic symptoms have remitted connects agoraphobia, psychiatrically
defined, and agora-claustrophobic anxieties, psychoanalytically delineated, with a range of other disorders,
including borderline disorders (see, for example, Fonagy 1991; Kumin 1978, LaFarge 1989; and, Singer
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agoraphobia is significantly different from discrete phobias and are highlighted by
Frances and Dunn: agoraphobia is “more gradually developed, more generalized, less
demonstrably related to conditioning, more resistant to treatment and more likely to
involve extensive character pathology [than specific phobias]” (Frances & Dunn 1975, p.
435). Agoraphobia is distinguished, then, from what might be called true phobias, insofar
as its characteristics are so distinct from the shared characteristics of specific phobias.
Snaith argues, in fact, that the agoraphobic’s high level of generalized anxiety24 “is
directly responsible for the occurrence of the uncommon fears of the agoraphobic
constellation” (1968, p. 692). Paradoxically, avoidance is one of agoraphobia’s central
features and yet there is no object to avoid. This paradox distinguishes agoraphobia from
the simple phobias and partly accounts for the suffering it causes. A discrete phobia,
ironically, provides relief from anxiety by circumscribing it to a particular object that can
be avoided. The object-less nature of agoraphobia induces its own specific kind of
anxiety, which searches, so to speak, for an object in the attempt to define and limit it.
Hence, “the onset of a state of generalized anxiety tends to increase the patient’s
sensitivity to all common fears” (Snaith 1968, p. 692).25
Phillips (1993), writing on phobia, conflates discrete phobias (or, phobias
generally speaking) with agoraphobia; in so doing, he unwittingly provides us with some
ideas about the particular nature of agoraphobia. Phillips makes three points about
phobias that do not pertain to agoraphobia: 1) “one can only become phobic by believing

1977a, 1977b), psychotic disorders (see, for example, Ellonen-Jéquier 2009), and, as Rey (1994)
demonstrates, in psychical states between borderline and psychotic. Likewise, many descriptions of
borderline and psychotic patients’ psychological complexes include agora-claustrophobic anxieties.
24
Again, the agoraphobic’s high level of generalized anxiety distinguishes agoraphobia from specific
phobias; individuals suffering from specific phobias tend to experience very low anxiety as long as their
phobic object is not present. If, for example, a person suffers from arachnophobia (fear of spiders), he or
she may have a panic attack when confronted with a spider but is not likely to be anxious otherwise. An
agoraphobic individual may have a panic attack when he or she leaves the house, but will also tend to have
significant levels of anxiety at home, in their “safe space.” See also infra note 17.
25
Cf. Phillips, who provides a different comparison of the relative comfort offered by phobic objects: “A
phobic situation, broadly speaking, one can choose to avoid, but a phobic object can turn up unexpectedly”
(1993, p. 19). Nevertheless, his suggestion that “a person who imagines that his hate could turn up at any
moment, like an unwanted guest – who has to live in a state of continual internal vigilance to ensure that he
will always be fair – might choose an object rather than a situation” (p. 19) coincides with my argument
that agoraphobia might follow precisely from this inability to “choose an object.”
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that there are an external and an internal world that are discrete” (p. 24); 2) “it is part of
the developmental project to find a phobia, to localize the impossible in oneself
elsewhere” (p. 25); and, 3) “if one can tolerate some of one’s badness – meaning
recognize it as yours – then one can take some of the fear out of the world” (p. 25). None
of these three points describe the agoraphobic’s experience, which tells us three important
qualities of the agoraphobic’s psychical reality: 1) she does not, on a profound level,
believe in discrete internal and external worlds; 2) she has not been able,
developmentally, to find a specific phobia; the impossible, therefore, remains (internally)
unlocalized; and 3) she is unable to recognize and tolerate her own “badness,” and is
therefore unable to take any of the fear out of the world.
The developmental issues we can tease out of Phillips’s description of phobias is
evident in Freud’s Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy (1909), the case of
“Little Hans,” which, I argue, can be read as a description of Hans’s struggle to achieve a
phobia.26 Freud identifies Hans’s anxiety as a phobia – with the phobic object as the
horse, that a horse will bite him, and of the street – but specifically chooses not to
consider it a case of agoraphobia; Friedman, by contrast, refers to Hans precisely as an
example of a case of agoraphobia (1985, p. 529), as does Morgan (2003, p. 181). This
diagnostic discrepancy is partly explained by the ongoing uncertainty, both theoretically
and clinically, about the distinctions between agoraphobia and discrete phobias. Further, I
suggest that Hans is struggling, through the course of the analysis, to achieve a specific
phobia and avoid the more pervasive and disabling experience of agoraphobia. Rather
than detail a complete analysis of this case study, I wish to draw out the distinction
between true phobias and agoraphobia via the development of Hans’s symptoms: Hans’s
father writes to Freud, concerned about his son’s fear of being bitten by a horse in the
26

Midgely (2006) provides an analysis of the theoretical and clinical issues in Freud’s analysis of Little
Hans, as well as the subsequent analyses of Little Hans by Freud himself (who revisited the case in 1926’s
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety), Klein, Bowlby, and Lacan. Midgley indicates the primary theoretical
concerns of Klein’s, Bowlby’s, and Lacan’s re-readings of Little Hans – primitive anxieties, separation
anxiety due to real attachment experiences, and anxiety about Little Hans’s movement from imaginary
oedipal triangulation (mother-child-phallus) to symbolic oedipal quaternity (mother-child-phallus-symbolic
father) and argues that the case of Little Hans, with all of its re-readings, provides a framework for
understanding how psychoanalytic theory has changed and developed – without, of course, providing any
sort of “truth” about the development of Little Hans’s (agora)phobia. See Chapter Four, below, for my
discussion of historical, narrative, and psychical truths.
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street. Freud connects the onset of Hans’s anxiety with an increased affection for his
mother, which Hans represses; thereby, this (perhaps overwhelming) affection is
expressed as anxiety. The primary meaning of Hans’s dislike of streets, prior to fixating
on the horse as the phobic object, is, Freud suggests, that he missed his mother and
preferred to be near her. When Hans was upset, his mother would comfort him; this
comfort reinforces the unconscious association between the repression of his desires
(which cause anxiety) and satisfaction (his mother comforts him when he is anxious); in
Freud’s words, “his affection for his mother triumphantly achieved its aim” (1909, pp.
139-140). However, a pathological anxiety ensued, when the attainment of his longed-for
object (his mother) did not extinguish his anxiety of the street. As Freud emphasizes in
his discussion of the case, “his anxiety was no longer reconvertible into longing” (p.
114).27 Thus, the anxiety must find an object, which, for Hans, became the horse. Yet,
what might have been a simple phobia was somehow compounded into an anxiety
neurosis more closely resembling agoraphobia.
The phobic object, which is a substitution for reality, covers up, so to speak, the
loss of reality – the mother as object of desire – in the two-phase development of the
neurosis.28 Because of Han’s ambivalence towards his father – that is, the co-occurrence
of affection and hostility – his wish for intimacy with his mother is transformed into fear,
and the original wish is repressed. Freud describes this ambivalence and its effect on the
phobia’s development:
Hans’s anxiety had two constituents: there was the fear of his father [a result of
Hans’s libidinal desire for his mother, which his father thwarted] and fear for his
father. The former was derived from his hostility towards his father [for
27

I expand on the relation between anxiety and longing, loss, and emptiness in Chapter Three. For now, I
will say that longing is a very painful state, perhaps more painful, or less bearable, than anxiety, for there is
nothing to do to relieve it. Anxiety is relieved by repression or, in the case of phobias, by avoidance. In
agoraphobia, there seems to be no relief of anxiety or of longing, compounding the suffering this disorder
causes.
28
Freud describes this process in “The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis.” Briefly, “the ego, in the
service of reality, sets about the repression of an instinctual impulse. This, however, is not yet the neurosis
itself. The neurosis consists rather in the processes which provide a compensation for the portion of the id
that has been damaged – that is to say, in the reaction against the repression and in the failure of the
repression” (1924, pp. 185-187). Repression is never complete and unqualified: this failure of repression,
not repression itself, results in neurosis.
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preventing the satisfaction of his libidinal desire for his mother], and the latter
from the conflict between his affection, which was exaggerated at this point by
way of compensation, and his hostility. (1909, p. 45)
The movement of the analysis demonstrates the diffusion of anxiety, which begins with
no known cause (but is actually due to the – always incomplete – repression of a
forbidden libidinal desire for the mother), to the phobic object, horses (which is explained
by Hans’s experiences of horses combined with his phantasies about them and about his
father29), and then to a fear of going out into the street (where a horse might be
encountered any time). As the analysis progresses, the connection is made between the
anxiety-instigating scene with the horse, who fell down and “made a row with his feet”
(p. 50), and Hans’s own habit of stamping his feet when he is angry; that is, he is anxious
about his own aggressive impulses as much as his libidinal ones; or, better, he is afraid of
the interplay between the two.30 His identification with the horse is supported by an
account of playing “at horses” with some other children, when they would take turns
pretending to be the horse (pp. 58-59). There are times when Hans is afraid a horse will
come into his room and bite him, indicating the internal source of the fear and the
diminishing “safe space,” as he realizes he cannot escape from his psychical reality.
I discuss these developmental aspects of agoraphobia, and the complex relation of
internal and external realities, in detail in Chapter Two, but they are also relevant to the
particularly agoraphobic phenomenon of the “phobic companion” (Frances & Dunn 1975,
p. 435).31 Freud suggests that he would have identified Hans’s phobia as agoraphobia
except that he does not present with the symptom of the phobic companion; that is, his
anxiety about horses – which is exacerbated while he is in the street as it is more likely he
will there encounter a horse – is not entirely relieved by the presence of his mother, who
would otherwise have been considered the phobic companion. However, Freud perhaps
overstates this characteristic of agoraphobia, suggesting that locomotion “can always be
29

I detail in Chapters Two and Four the ways in which the development of psychical reality is a
consequence of the interdependence of historical, or real, experiences and unconscious fantasy.
30
I will note here that Hans most often stamps his feet in anger when he must stop playing in order to use
the bathroom, or “lumf,” as Hans says (Freud 1909, p. 54; p. 95). Furthermore, Hans’s father indicates the
difficulty Hans has always had with his stools, requiring frequent aperients (laxatives) and enemas. Later in
the analysis, the connection is made between “lumfs” and the birth of Hans’s little sister.
31
The phobic companion is DSM-IV’s Criterion B for a diagnosis of agoraphobia. See also Deutsch (1929).
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easily performed” with the phobic companion (1909, p. 115; my emphases).32 Even at the
earliest stages of agoraphobia’s conception, Westphal notes this phenomenon, indicating
that his patients “experienced great comfort from the companionship of men or even an
inanimate object, such as a vehicle or a cane” (1871/1988, p. 12; qtd. in Snaith 1968, p.
673). Frances and Dunn clarify the centrality of the phobic companion to experiences of
agoraphobia, which is an alternative protective measure that fluctuates along with the
degree of necessary avoidance. Some agoraphobics are “afraid to go out of the house at
all”33; others can leave the house with their phobic companion (who can variously be
only one particular person, or almost any other person); sometimes a sort of safety object
is employed to tolerate feared situations, which might include a cane or vehicle (as
Westphal indicates of his patients), or “carts, kittens, and dark glasses” (Compton 1992,
p. 409). The phobic companion, a consistent – though not universal – aspect of
agoraphobia, is unique among phobic disorders; the relief the phobic companion offers to
the agoraphobic individual further suggests that this is no simple phobia. The task of
disambiguating the fear of the external world from the fear of leaving the supposed safety
of the home, and the fear of being alone (without the companion) from the fear of others
is a formidable one, again pointing to the complex relation of internal and external
realities, a relation with which the agoraphobic struggles.
Freud describes the behaviour of a man with agoraphobia as that of “a small
child” insofar as a child is taught to avoid the dangers of the street unaccompanied by an
adult and the agoraphobic patient “will in fact be saved from his anxiety if we accompany
him across the square” (1917, p. 400). Freud makes the same distinction as Snaith
regarding the specificity of “phobias,” which are psychically bound and symbolically
attached to particular objects or situations, and anxiety neurosis, which is characterized
by “free floating anxiety” and a “tendency to an expectation of evil” (p. 398). However,
in contrast to Snaith’s later findings, Freud includes agoraphobia in the group of specific
(and, he finds, inexplicable) phobias. Freud suggests, in fact, that “people whose whole
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Fenichel argues that the phobic companion is not an essential feature of agoraphobia, occurring only
variably (1944, pp. 314-315).
33
Frances and Dunn suggest that, for these housebound agoraphobics, the house itself has become their
phobic companion (1975, p. 438).
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existence is restricted by agoraphobia may be entirely free from pessimistic expectant
anxiety” (p. 400).34 He seems to have made the common error of considering the specific
phobia rather than addressing the general anxiety experience.
Agoraphobia’s unique character, in comparison to true (that is, discrete and
specific) phobias, supports Snaith’s argument that the use of the term “agoraphobia” is, at
best, inaccurate and, at worst, misleading resulting in errors in both the conceptualization
and treatment of the disorder.

1.3. AgoraFear itself cannot be wrong, even if it is difficult to find out where it fits.
(Phillips 1993, p. 13)
DSM-5 lists the following five “situations” as specifically agoraphobic: 1) using public
transportation (e.g., automobiles, buses, trains, ships, planes); 2) being in open spaces
(e.g., parking lots, marketplaces, bridges); 3) being in enclosed spaces (e.g., shops,
theaters, cinemas); 4) standing in line or being in a crowd; and, 5) being outside of the
home alone (APA 2013, p. 217). These examples are “not exhaustive” (p. 218), but at
least two of them must cause marked anxiety in any one patient for a diagnosis of
agoraphobia.35 This attempt to list the various, and often conflicting, agoraphobic fears
points to the historical contention surrounding it and also indicates the difficulty in
theorizing it.
Freud defines agoraphobia as the “anxiety to walk along a street or cross a square
in his own familiar home-town” (1917, p. 399) and identifies the phobic object as “the
square” or the “open street.” The phobic object, according to early psychoanalytic
theorizing (including those of Abraham 1913/1979, Deutsch 1929, Fenichel 1944, and
34

Although Deutsch follows the Freudian paradigm otherwise, she suggests that agoraphobic patients “must
always have a tendency to anxiety, which breaks out under certain conditions associated with the street”
(1929, p. 69).
35
I note the inclusion of claustrophobia (“being in enclosed spaces”) as one of the agoraphobic situations.
In DSM-IV-TR, claustrophobia is coded as a simple phobia but it is excluded entirely (as a distinct disorder)
from DSM-5.
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Freud 1909, 1917, among others), is a symbolic substitution for conflicting instinctual
demands, the manifestation of repressed desires. The temptation of the street arises out of
the danger of, and desire for, a sexual relationship characterized by prostitution, as well
as a “danger to exhibitionistic impulses” (Deutsch 1929, p. 69). It is considered a
derivative of castration anxiety. In the same vein, Freud indicates that the agoraphobic’s
anxiety of being left alone is ultimately “an endeavour to avoid the temptation to engage
in solitary masturbation” (1926, p. 128). Compton (1992), in a contemporary review of
the psychoanalytic understanding of agoraphobia, indicates the ongoing issue of
identifying the content of agoraphobic anxieties given the variety of fears agoraphobia
patients articulate (for example: going crazy, losing control, wide streets, narrow streets,
stores, bridges, tunnels, open spaces, closed spaces, etc.). Furthermore, the content of
agoraphobic anxieties are not always explored in the literature, at times identified only as
“street fear” (Compton 1992, p. 413).
Freud makes a particular point in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) about
defining the symptom of a neurosis: in the case of Little Hans, it may have seemed
obvious that the symptom from which Hans suffered was a fear of horses; however,
Freud emphasizes the importance of the unconscious specificity of the symptom, which
leads to the identification of the fear that a horse was going to bite him. The “nucleus” of
the symptom, however, is still further repressed. The neurotic character of Little Hans’s
phobia is defined by the displacement of his fear of his father onto a horse (Freud 1909,
p. 103). The repression of the specific meaning of the fear is part of the work of the
neurosis as it removes the content of the fear from consciousness and replaces it with an
“undefined phobia in which only the anxiety and its object” appear (p. 101). In the case
of agoraphobia, we must be careful to avoid overstating our knowledge of the symptom,
which has been indicated, but perhaps not emphasized (as I have suggested above) in the
literature. Rather than a “fear of sexual temptations” (invariably connected to castration
anxiety) (Freud 1909, p. 109), Deutsch suggests a more profound and disturbing
experience: “a genuine dread of death”; or, “put into words, […the feeling that] ‘I shall
suddenly die’” (1929, p. 51). The displacement of the fear from an unconscious fear of
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death onto a “variety of situations” is not surprising and, as with Little Hans’s phobia, the
displacement is the symptom.36
Compton, referring to Weiss’s extensive discussion on agoraphobia in
Agoraphobia in the Light of Ego Psychology (1964), suggests that the fear of an internal
danger is the paradigmatic characteristic of agoraphobia. The perception of this “internal
danger” precedes the overwhelming anxiety and includes: “a profound sense of being ill,
loss of feeling of identity (depersonalization, loss of ‘ego feeling’), derealisation,
dizziness, fainting sensations, loss of orientation” (Compton 1992, p. 408) and amounts
to “an unbearable feeling of ill-being” (Weiss 1964, p. 3; qtd. in Compton 1992, p. 408).
Weiss’s characterization of agoraphobic anxieties does not exclude Deutsch’s similar
characterization, “a genuine dread of death” (Deutsch 1929, p. 51), though Weiss adds
that “it is an actual process of destruction, emanating from the patient’s own deathinstinct” (1935, p. 81). To emphasize, this “dread of death” is a far cry from the commonplace notion, and literal definition, of agoraphobia as a fear of open spaces, and also has
quite different implications than both the DSM-IV and DSM-5, and current clinical
understanding as a fear of leaving a safe space. These various fears may actually
characterize agoraphobia insofar as they may be part of the conscious phobic “object,”
but they do not approach the nucleus of the anxiety. 37 Weiss is the first theorist to suggest
that the agoraphobic’s feeling of ill-being is “a direct mental registration of structural
disorganization, rather than representing a meaning” (Compton 1992, p. 409).
Specifically, rather than a symbolic fear, agoraphobia indicates the fear of symbolization
itself.38 The persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) describes, along with the agoraphobic’s
inability to limit her anxiety by locating a specific phobic object, are indicative of this
inhibition of symbolization. To anticipate briefly my arguments to follow in Chapter
Two, agoraphobic anxieties are more accurately described as residing in the boundaries
of spaces, both internal and external, and are related to Klein’s (1940) theories of
36

Displacement, generally, refers to “a shifting hither and thither of various affects and conflicts” (Katan
1951, p. 43). Katan provides a clinical example of the role of displacement in agoraphobia.
37
If we consider the case of Little Hans, we can say that he truly was afraid of horses, but horses became
the phobic object to account for his startling anxiety in order to avoid the heart of his fear, his own internal
desires and, thus, of punishment for his desires in the form of castration.
38
Snaith notes that agoraphobic “fears” do not depend on the mechanism of symbolism, as true phobias do
(1968, p. 692).
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primitive anxieties and Winnicott’s (1974) theory of the fear of breakdown. The
agoraphobic is unable to creatively inhabit the spaces between and, instead, defends
against all of the vulnerability and possibility inherent in them.
Davidson argues that “agoraphobia can be characterized as a disorder that
problematizes sufferers' experiences of bodily boundaries” (2000, p.31). Based partly on
individual interviews and self-help group discussions, Davidson draws attention to two
important issues: the first, which I discuss above, is that the agoraphobic experience often
includes claustrophobic anxieties; and, secondly, that the anxiety about “space” has more
to do with other people in the space than the space itself.39 Davidson’s description of the
agoraphobics’ boundaries includes both physical and psychical space, explicating
agoraphobics’ very distressing experience of derealization, or depersonalization. I agree
with Davidson’s thesis, and similarly argue that agoraphobia is not merely an anxiety
about space but more specifically about the boundaries between spaces, including the
boundaries between psychical spaces. This focus on the boundaries between spaces
follows from the qualities of agoraphobia that distinguish it from true phobias and,
further, from Milrod’s (2007) finding of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients for
whom symptoms of anxiety and avoidance have remitted.40
Agoraphobia confounds absolutely the boundary between inside and outside.
Although it may seem a simple question of what is external and what is internal, the
agoraphobic is not able to take this separation for granted. The ill-defined boundary
between spaces, both physical and psychical, leads to the constant anxiety of the
confrontation between self and other, forcing the agoraphobic to diminish her external
world41 and also, as Milrod (2007) indicates, the freedom she experiences in her internal,
39

Cf., for example, Carter (2002), who argues that agoraphobia is a “realistic anxiety” caused by the
expanse of modern urban space.
40
I address Milrod’s (2007) article in detail in Chapter Three.
41
This diminution is partly explained by the theory of reinforcement, which, as Snaith explains, leads to the
strengthening of the phobic person’s fears “every time he escapes from the situation he dreads” (1968, p.
680). Furthermore, anxiety exacerbates this reinforcement, indicating that “a patient is more likely to form
conditioned fear responses (‘phobias’) if he is already suffering from an anxiety state” (Snaith 1968, p.
680). See also Katan 1951, p. 45: “She fought her anxiety by far-reaching, self-imposed restrictions,
gradually gave up her profession and her social life, until finally the anxiety attacks also befell her within
the confines of her home, so that she felt dislodged from her last refuge and, at last, came into analysis.”
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or psychical, world. This is not to say that the agoraphobic entirely lacks a sense of
externality and internality, or that she lacks the ability to differentiate between her own
self and others. What the agoraphobic (unconsciously) lacks, then, more precisely than
the boundary between self and other, is a sense of what belongs to the self and what does
not, and thus of the limits of the self. There persists a confusion of what it means to be
individuated, hence agora-claustrophobic anxieties’ forceful irruption around the events
of marriage and (impending) parenthood, and the phenomenon of the phobic companion.
For the agoraphobic, this confusion does not result in (frank42) paranoia – although
paranoid expectations are evident – but in a sense of helplessness and an unconscious
refusal to become independent.43 As Freud states, a person with agoraphobia resembles,
in some way, “a small child” (1917, p. 400), a description which accords both with
Milrod’s sense of her patient, Deborah, and with Deborah’s description of herself (2007,
p. 1012). The shrinking external world increases the claustrophobic impingement of the
internal world from which the agoraphobic cannot escape, fuelling an ever-tightening
spiral of avoidance. As I argue in Chapter Four, the analytic method of free association
affords the agoraphobic patient the opportunity to risk exploring the boundaries of her
world, which leads to more established boundaries and also to the development of the
capacity to creatively inhabit the emptiness of the spaces between, “out of which all new
things emerge” (Winnicott 1974, p. 106).
42

As above (see infra note 18), frank refers to an overarching mode of being in the world and is opposed to
the paranoia that is part of each individual’s psychic development that occasionally emerges in moments of
particular stress, but also is part of the unconscious psychic structure: blatant, rather than underlying,
paranoia.
43
Frances and Dunn draw attention to the similar psychical processes at work in agoraphobia and paranoia:
“The defences involved in phobia and paranoia – repression and denial, projection, symbolization and
avoidance – are essentially the same. Both patients externalize internal conflicts, find the world diffusely
threatening and avoid. The more purely phobic individual, however, has a safe place and a safe object
relationship, a haven in a frightening world. The more paranoid person has no safe place or person and is
more ambivalent and distrustful about attachment to any possible source of dependency gratification. It
follows that the paranoid’s symptoms drive people away rather than capture a partner. It is as if the
paranoid’s fears of dependency and/or dedifferentiation render him unable to project out of the dyad the
dangerous hostile impulses” (1975, p. 437). I have two comments on Frances and Dunn’s comparison:
firstly, I suggest that they overstate the safety of the agoraphobic’s “safe place”; secondly, and of more
relevance here, I suggest that, unlike true phobias, agoraphobia results from a failure of symbolization. I
agree that the difference between these two disorders likely develops due to the state of the individual’s
aggressivity, which, as I discuss in Chapter Three, is predominately repressed in the agoraphobia patient.
For the paranoid individual, rage is likely more conscious than in the agoraphobic.
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1.4. Conclusion
Agoraphobia is not, then, a phobia as traditionally understood. It is distinguished from
simple, or discrete, phobias by the sufferer’s high levels of background anxiety, the
phenomenon of the phobic companion, and by the nature of the phobic “object,” which
resists description, both clinically and phenomenologically. The adoption and retention of
the term “agoraphobia” is significant because it influences theoretical formulations and
has implications for treatment.44 For example, Seidenberg and DeCrow’s (1983) politicosociological argument is derived from the claim that the object of agoraphobia anxieties
is the marketplace. John Bowlby, by contrast, suggests that “all workers now agree [that]
the central symptom of the condition under scrutiny [agoraphobia] is fear of leaving
home” (1973, p. 299; my emphasis). Of course, Bowlby’s views on agoraphobia, derived
from attachment theory, depend on this symptom.45 It is clear that Bowlby overstates the
level of consensus on this issue. The tension between the etymology of the term – and
definitions that follow the etymology, including clinical descriptions that take its
definition for granted – and the subjective experiences of the disorder create a conflict in
the theoretical understanding of agoraphobia. Accepting the etymological significance of
“agoraphobia” as exhaustively descriptive of the phenomenological experiences of the
disorder, or even as a basis for an argument concerning the nature of the disorder, is
clearly a misrepresentation of the situation, leading to errors in both the conceptualization
and treatment of the disorder.

44

Boyd and Crump (1991) also draw attention to the manner in which terminology has likely influenced
theoretical, conceptual, and clinical developments in understanding agoraphobia.
45
However, Bowlby is one of the few theorists to emphasize the relation between agoraphobia and
depression (or “bereavement”), which I take up in Chapter Three. Although Compton (1992) points to
Bergler’s (1935) important observation of the association between agoraphobia and depression, he implies
that this association has been integrated into the psychoanalytic literature. Furthermore, Compton suggests
that the “alternation of depressive states with anxiety states is so regular that it should be included as a
descriptor of the agoraphobic syndrome” (1992, p. 415). However, while some analysts write of alternating
depression and agoraphobia, there is no consistent indication in the subsequent analytic literature that
depression is part of the agoraphobic syndrome. Mention of depressive symptoms in agoraphobia patients
are, when indicated, noted only in passing, without any analysis of the meaning between them.
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Chapter Two: Realities: Internal, External, and Intermediary
In Chapter One, I argued that agoraphobia is distinguished from discrete phobias in part
due to the nature of the phobic object. In discrete phobias, the phobic object is easily
identified, limited, and determined on the basis of symbolization and conditioning. In
agoraphobia, by contrast, the phobic object is ambiguous; it resists description, both
clinically and phenomenologically. Rather than a fear of ‘open spaces’ or a ‘variety of
situations,’ I suggested that agoraphobic anxieties are more accurately described as
manifesting in the boundaries between spaces, both internal and external. The
agoraphobic’s anxiety at the frontiers of space – in the internal as much as in the external
world – indicates, as many others have argued,46 issues with separation-individuation or,
in Lacan’s terms, the transition from the “spectral-I” to the “social-I” (2006f, p. 79).
Mahler indicates the importance of the threshold in the normal process of individuation,
noting the toddler’s arrest and return to mother upon first reaching the threshold, then a
significant pause and assessment before crossing the threshold, and, finally, an eager
preference for the other playroom, “which had so much more diversification”
(1975/2000, p. 27). For the agoraphobic, as Phillips describes, “[t]he threshold between
this one moment and the next is aversive” (1993, p. 14). The agoraphobic never arrives at
the normal toddler’s eager preference for “so much more diversification,” preferring the
safely limited and relatively known space of the original ‘playroom.’47
In this chapter, I expand on the question of what is internal and what is external,
the anxieties fuelled by the navigation of these separated spaces, and, especially, the
agoraphobic’s anxiety of navigating between them – of crossing the threshold, so to
speak – via an elucidation of the development and functions of the ego. Following Freud
46

See, for example: Bowlby (1973); Fairbairn (1941, 1952); Fonagy (1991); Frances and Dunn (1975);
Guntrip (1961); Rey (1994); and, Sable (1994).
47
Rey describes the schizophrenic’s double-bind of claustro-agoraphobic-philia, where the aversive
threshold is the only space inhabitable, as both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are overwhelming. There is no escape
from one’s own internal reality: “One [schizoid patient] dreamt that he was quite happy inside mother. He
then felt he wanted to find out about outside, so he got out and started enjoying himself sexually and also
doing aggressive things. He then became anxious as he felt some people might be angry with him, and that
he was outside in the open and unprotected. So he got back inside mother. Unfortunately, he realized that it
was not much safer because he could do things to his mother from inside that would put him in danger just
the same” (1994, p. 26).
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and the psychoanalytic tradition, I argue that the distinction between “normal” and
“pathological” is a matter of degree. In agoraphobia, there is a pathological persistence of
the psychological processes of normal ego development. Recognition of the usefulness of
agoraphobic anxieties in the development of ego boundaries may help identify the point
at which they persist beyond usefulness and into pathology, both theoretically and
clinically.
From an original unity, in which no ego exists as such, the ego comes into being
by distinguishing an internal reality from an external reality. For the agoraphobic, I
suggest that something has gone awry in this process of creative differentiation. The
agoraphobic is not able to take for granted the distinction between internal and external,
and therefore cannot experience shared reality as illusion. This illusion of shared reality is
necessary for the creative uses of language.48 Following Winnicott (1951, 1969), I argue
that the analytic frame – the setting of the analysis – has the potential to become a
transitional object for the analysand. The agoraphobic’s opportunity for new experiences
with a transitional object – if it can survive her destruction of it – allows the frame to be
used in the development of the ego’s boundaries, which can thereby be creatively
inhabited, with all of the risks and rewards of human vulnerability.

2.1. In/Sanity
The distinction between nervous health and neurosis is [...] reduced to a practical
question and is decided by the outcome – by whether the subject is left with a sufficient
amount of capacity for enjoyment and of efficiency.
(Freud 1917, p. 457)
There is, from the psychoanalytic perspective, only a tenuous divide between sanity and
insanity – or, health and pathology. This divide is at the same time, as Freud discovers
and reiterates, also a relative correspondence; that is to say, the same psychical processes

48

I consider the agoraphobic’s (pathological) uses of language resulting from this absence of illusion in
Chapter Four. Briefly, I argue that without this illusion, the agoraphobic is unable to tolerate incoherence:
she either produces narratives that are too coherent or she produces empty narratives.
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are evident in both healthy and pathological individuals.49 Rather than a difference in
kind, pathology occurs when “the logical processes underlying ‘normal’ human
experiences [...] degenerate into symptoms” (Kristeva 2001, p. 8). Winnicott reminds us
that “every detail of the insane person’s insanity” points to a universal phenomenon, even
though not every individual is overwhelmed by their underlying insanity (1974, p. 103).
Klein indicates the fluidity between the normal and the neurotic, suggesting “that in all
human beings at some time or other neurotic anxiety has been present in a greater or
less[er] degree” (1923, p. 79). Within the psychoanalytic paradigm, the pathological is, in
fact, prior to the normal. The priority of the pathological is evident in the normal
development of the infant, which proceeds from pathological (excessive) process to
mature psychic (dynamic) structure.
Frances and Dunn imply the priority of the pathological in their parenthetical
addition of “the normal infant” to their description of the agoraphobic’s psychic process:
The agoraphobic (and the normal infant) protects the integrity of the bond to the
partner (mother) by projecting what is threatening to that bond out of the dyad and
on to the outside world. The dyad is preserved and its boundaries delimited at the
expense of the creation of a frightening outside world. (1975, p. 437)
The agoraphobic’s aggressive impulses are threatening to the dyad’s cohesion. The
agoraphobic’s feelings of hate, rage, and an unconscious wish to destroy the partner (or,
phobic companion) are projected into the external world; thus, experiences of the outside
world are sacrificed to maintain the (phantasy50) dyad. Projection, as Frances and Dunn
indicate, is a necessary part of healthy ego development; the inability to project hostility
outward results in paranoia. However, the extent to which the agoraphobic adult projects

49

Freud discusses the relative correspondence of neurotic mental life and normal mental life in a number of
places. For example: “no sharp line can be drawn between ‘neurotic’ and ‘normal’ people – whether
children or adults – [and] our conception of ‘disease’ is a purely practical one” (1909, pp. 145-146). And:
“it is not scientifically feasible to draw a line of demarcation between what is psychically normal and
abnormal; so that that distinction, in spite of its practical importance, possesses only a conventional value”
(1938, p. 195).
50
While “fantasy” refers to conscious mental processes, like daydreams, and suggests a degree of conscious
fictionalization, “phantasy” refers to primarily unconscious mental content, which may or may not become
conscious.
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is pathological.51 As I argued in Chapter One, the agoraphobic is unable to recognize and
tolerate her own “badness” – namely, her own aggressive impulses – and is therefore
unable to take any of the fear out of the world.
Writing on emptiness, Kumin includes a comparison between the schizoid patient
and the infant similar to the comparison Frances and Dunn make between the
agoraphobic and the infant:
It is thus that experiences of emptiness, for the schizoid patient as well as for the
infant, are essential stages in the ultimate constitution of self in the world. The
loss of the mother by the infant through repetitive experiences of cold, hunger,
frustration and separation, which must be experienced by the infant as
excruciating emptiness and annihilation, is a necessary precursor of introjections
of the maternal imago and the development of internalized object relations, which
strengthen the process of separation-individuation and the formation of the self.
(1978, p. 214; my emphasis)
Evident in schizoid patients, the experience of emptiness is essential to ego development.
The experience of emptiness is thus essential to all individuals, including the
agoraphobic. The excessive projection of the agoraphobic, when ‘relieved’ of her
symptoms, reveals, as Milrod (2007) finds, a persistent emptiness,52 which we can posit
is a result of an excessive splitting of the self similar to the emptiness of the schizoid
patient.
Recalling Klein’s primary positions (paranoid-schizoid and depressive), the
agoraphobic has been unable to move successfully through the paranoid-schizoid position
and is therefore unable to develop the capacity for relating in new non-anxious ways. The
paranoid-schizoid position is characterized by splitting and persecutory anxieties.53 For
51

Kristeva describes the pathological and normal manifestations of projection: “On the one hand, projective
identification describes pathological states, particularly states of manic-depressive psychosis or
psychosomatic illness. On the other hand, however, the endless game of projection and introjection
constitutes what Florence Guignard calls a veritable ‘psychic exhalation’ because its underpinnings reveal a
sort of normalcy, even universality” (2001, pp. 70-71).
52
I explore this phenomenon of emptiness, in both its pathological and developmental facets, in detail in
Chapter Three.
53
The mechanism of “splitting” referred to here as a fundamental aspect of the paranoid-schizoid position
is anticipated by Freud in his short discussion of fetishism: “there is a splitting of the ego” in all psychoses
as well as the neuroses. The behaviour of fetishists is “simultaneously expressing two contrary premises.
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the infant, the breast becomes a “bad” object because of the (inevitable) experience of
deprivation; further, “the baby projects its own aggression” on to it (Klein 1940, p.
262).54 The infant’s projection of his own aggression causes the bad objects to become
also dangerous, as “persecutors who [the baby] feels will devour…” him (p. 262). These
dangerous objects cause “quite little children [to] pass through anxiety-situations (and
react to them with defence-mechanisms), the content of which is comparable to that of
the psychoses of adults” (p. 262). When the infant reaches the developmental stage where
he is able to integrate the good and bad objects – that is, when total rather than partial
incorporation of the object occurs – he realizes that the bad breast that he has attacked
and destroyed in phantasy is the same good breast that has loved him and that he has
loved; he is thus beset by depressive anxiety. The depressive position is characterized by
the guilt resulting from ambivalence, followed by feelings of regret, remorse, and the
wish for reparation. The movement from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive
position is in itself threatening. In the former, the infant fears annihilation; but, in the
latter, the infant fears that he has destroyed his good object. The possibility of the loss of
the good object is terrifying. This terror is especially salient from the perspective of the
paranoid-schizoid position, where the good object protects against the threat of the bad
object. If the good object is destroyed, the threat of the bad object is overwhelming.55
These earliest object-relations set the stage for adult experiences. Although the
paranoid-schizoid position precedes the depressive position developmentally, both are
primary positions and neither is ever ‘overcome,’ psychically speaking. In health, both
positions remain active in psychic life and as the infant grows into an adult, she vacillates

On the one hand they are disavowing the fact of their perception – the fact that they saw no penis in the
female genitals; and on the other hand they are recognizing the fact that females have no penis and are
drawing the correct conclusions from it [that they, too, could be castrated]. The two attitudes persist side by
side throughout their lives without influencing each other. Here is what may rightly be called a splitting of
the ego” (1938, pp. 202-203; original emphasis).
54
Kristeva adds that the infant projects not only his aggression but “bits of the baby [himself] as well (his
organs – the mouth, the anus, and so forth – as well as his bodily products)” (2001, p. 63).
55
Scott (1981) writes on the development of a zest for life when we can have faith in our ability to mourn. I
understand him to mean that we develop an enthusiasm for life when we have faith that we will not be
annihilated by our bad objects once we have destroyed our good objects; rather, we will ‘humanize’ our bad
objects by destroying our good objects, which have, in fact, been limiting our experience of life. I discuss
this further in Chapter Three.
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between them. In health, the individual develops more kinds of relating than persecutory
and depressive anxieties, although various object relations and traumatic experiences will
inspire these anxieties anew. Klein chooses the term “position” to emphasize the
association between the child’s early developmental anxieties and the adult’s psychoses
(Klein 1940, pp. 275-276, ft.). For the agoraphobic, the entire outside world becomes the
“bad,” and therefore dangerous, object. The agoraphobic has not been able to integrate
the good and bad objects; thus, the bad object – namely, the outside world – remains both
dangerous and terrifying. She fears the outside world as it threatens the integrity of her
ego with the possibility of annihilation.56 She is also terrified of destroying her good
internal objects with her aggressive impulses, which would leave her vulnerable to the
threat of her bad internal objects. Following Fairbairn (1941, 1952) and Guntrip (1961), I
argue that insofar as agora-claustrophobic anxieties are a necessary structuring
experience for the development of the infant’s psychic life, they are not pathological57;
however, the inability to move beyond primitive anxieties in adulthood becomes
pathological. As a corollary to the movement from pathological to normal, I suggest we
can also construct the inverse movement, from a “normal” experience of agoraclaustrophobic anxieties that occur, for example, as part of the mourning process, which I
describe in Chapter Three, towards a better understanding of what might go wrong in that
process that becomes pathological.
Rey (1994) develops the implications of the structuring aspects of agoraphobic
and claustrophobic anxieties, which he calls “claustro-agoraphobia.” He identifies the
pervasive and yet hidden claustro-agoraphobic anxieties in his work with
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Many researchers have noted a common experience of annihilation anxiety among patients with
agoraphobia, borderline, and psychotic disorders. See, for example: Hurvich (1989); Hurvich et al. (1993);
and, Levin & Hurvich (1995).
57
In her clinical illustrations of Rey’s claustro-agoraphobic syndrome, Catan draws attention to Fairbairn’s
and Guntrip’s recognition of agora-claustrophobic anxieties in normal development, “originating,” as she
notes, “in the phase of ‘transitional’ or ‘quasi-independence’, between infantile and mature dependence.
[…F]ailure to separate and develop age-appropriately as a distinct individual drives the child back into a
state of secondary infantile dependence, a re-identification with the maternal object and a longing to return
to the security of a merged, undifferentiated state – the ‘safe inside policy’. While enabling a regressive
escape from the demands of maturity and independence, such dwelling in safe-seeming maternal space
remains inherently vulnerable to the threat of annihilation as an individual” (2011, p. 244). See also infra
note 58.
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schizophrenics.58 This identification also points to the limits of diagnostic categories,
insofar as Rey’s psychoanalytic work with patients with schizophrenia “reveal claustroagoraphobic basic fears not in the least evident when their behaviour is assessed from a
purely phenomenological psychiatric approach” (1994, p. 21). As Milrod (2007) finds
with her agoraphobia patients, the psychiatric diagnosis does not approach the nucleus of
a very painful and persistent disturbance. The similarities and differences between the
claustro-agoraphobia of ‘schizoid’ patients and that of ‘agoraphobic’ patients remain to
be elucidated but are beyond the scope of my thesis59; however, several connections are
instructive here. Firstly, Rey argues that “the emergence of depression, as well as a
developing capacity to think and experience mourning and reparation” (1994, p. 85) was
extremely useful for these patients; secondly, that “claustro-agoraphobia-philia not only
concerns objects and their domains but also words and their domains” (p. 2); and, thirdly,
he argues for an extension of “the claustro-agoraphobic syndrome from a specific
syndrome to a basic universal organization of the personality” (p. 24). As I argue in
Chapter Three, the persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) identifies in her patients indicates
the presence of traumatic and unmourned losses; as with Rey’s patients, I suggest that the
“emergence of depression” (in the sense of the depressive position and the affects
associated with facing and mourning loss60) would be extremely useful for Milrod’s
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Fairbairn notes this same claustro-agoraphobic feature of schizoid patients, connecting it to the conflict
of both a desperation for and an extraordinary reluctance to move beyond infantile dependence: “During
the course of analysis, such an individual [a schizoid patient] provides the most striking evidence between
an extreme reluctance to abandon infantile dependence and a desperate longing to renounce it; […] the
patient, like a timid mouse, alternately creep[s] out of the shelter of his hole to peep at the world of outer
objects and then beat[s] a hasty retreat” (1941, p. 261). Fairbairn continues with the following description,
particularly resonant of the agoraphobic’s dilemma: “In the absence of such evidence [that he is loved by
his parents and that his parents accept his love] his relationship to his objects is fraught with too much
anxiety over separation to enable him to renounce the attitude of infantile dependence” (p. 261).
59
I might only tentatively suggest here that agoraphobia is a defense against a further breakdown towards
schizophrenia. This suggestion accords with LaFarge (1989), who suggests that the empty states of her
borderline patients are a consequence of a severe strain on the borderline organization of the personality,
and are a defense against further regression to a psychotic state.
60
I repeat here and in Chapter Three Steiner’s important note about the use of the word “depression” and
the distinction between the depressive position and depressive illness: “It is confusing that the word
depression has been applied both to the state that accompanies mourning and to that which results from the
defences mounted against mourning. The path that leads towards facing the loss, and mourning it, is
associated with painful depressive feelings, involving guilt, regret, remorse, and a wish to make reparation.
These feelings were thought by Klein [1952] to represent the depressive position and are very different
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patients. As I argue in Chapter Four, the method of free association particular to
psychoanalysis is called for to aid agoraphobia patients in the relief of their emptiness
insofar as it affords them the freedom to approach words (and thus affects) previously
anxiously avoided. And, as I argue in this chapter, the psychical apparatus is inherently
neurotic and agoraphobic anxieties, specifically, are both necessary and pathological, but
they are not inevitably pathological. Agora-claustrophobic anxieties are a necessary
structuring experience for the development of the infant’s psychic life. Recognition of the
usefulness of these anxieties helps to identify the point at which they persist beyond
usefulness and into pathology, both theoretically and clinically.61 The developmental and
the clinical thus overlap insofar as something gone astray in the developmental project is
manifested in the clinic as symptom.

2.2. The Development and Functions of the Ego
The boundaries between ego and external reality develop out of an original state where,
psychologically, there are no boundaries and therefore there is no distinction between
the two.
(Loewald 1951, p. 14)

from those observed in depressive illness. Although mixed states are common, severe depressive illness or
melancholia results from defences against loss and hence against all those feelings associated with the
depressive position. The clinically depressed patient is likely to suffer anxiety and persecution, to harbour
grievance, and to deploy manic and obsessional defences that aid in denying the reality of the loss” (2011,
p. 151). I discuss mourning and melancholia in agoraphobia patients in Chapter Three.
61
Further similarities between Rey’s and Milrod’s patients are evident in Rey’s descriptions of his patients’
experiences of emptiness. Rey writes of one patient: “One remarkable example [of pathological splitting]
was a man who suffered from the worst claustro-agoraphobic syndrome I have ever come across. He
complained of hypochondriacal sensations in his body, and although very intelligent was amazingly devoid
of phantasies. On a very rare occasion, he remembered one dream of himself with a sort of bubble coming
out of his mouth. It was like the bubbles in children’s comics that contain the words that people in the
drawings are speaking. However, the bubble was empty; there were no words in it” (1994, p. 143). Of
another schizophrenic patient, Eva, he writes: “She always discussed the same subject – of not being able to
receive from her mother what she was missing. At first it was mainly that the giving part of mother was
giving nothing good, which was causing a kind of emptiness inside her that was characterized by something
negative” (p. 158).
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2.2.i. Creative Differentiation
The question of what is external and what is internal is deceptively simple. The challenge
emerges upon recognition that one cannot assume a shared reality; frequently,
pathological thinking is apparent in a mistaken assumption about the existence of a
shared internal reality. As we will see, however, there is little theoretical agreement upon
what is meant by internal and what is meant by external. Freud suggests that what is truly
external and truly internal can only be theoretically posited:
The unconscious is the true psychical reality; in its innermost nature it is as much
unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as incompletely
presented by the data of consciousness as is the external world by the
communications by our sense organs. (1900, p. 613)
For all that, internal and external are no less real, and each brings its own significant
weight to bear on the individual’s experience of the self in the world.62
The ego’s primary “task” is “self-preservation” (Freud 1938, p. 145). This task
depends on the ego’s capacity to mediate between internal and external excitations:
As regards external events, it performs that task by becoming aware of stimuli, by
storing up experiences about them (in the memory), by avoiding excessively
strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through
adaptation) and finally by learning to bring about expedient changes in the
external world to its own advantage (through activity). As regards internal events,
in relation to the id, it performs that task by gaining control over the demands of
the instincts, by deciding whether they are to be allowed satisfaction, by
postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favourable in the external
world or by suppressing their excitations entirely. (Freud 1938, pp. 145-146)
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Hallucination is one phenomenon that arises from confusion between internal and external, specifically,
when “internal reality succeeds in passing for external reality” (Green 1999, p. 170). I do not discuss
hallucination here, as it is beyond the scope of my thesis. I briefly consider negative hallucination, where an
external stimulus is not perceived in internal reality, in Chapter Three. For some thoughts on hallucination
as a psychical process, see Bion (1958, 1965), De Monchaux (1962), and Garma (1946, 1969). Ferro offers
this useful insight, which supports my argument that the analyst can function as a transitional object for the
analysand: “The discriminating function of the analyst, for the patient, seems to me to be that of precursor
of the formation (activation) of the ‘contact barrier,’ which enables him or her to distinguish between
conscious and unconscious, between external and internal reality” (1993, p. 390).
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The ego is a portion of the id that has adapted to the pressures of external reality and, in
that adaptation, comes into conflict with itself, to which it must also adapt. The ego
develops through conflicts: firstly, between the id and the world; and, secondly, through
conflicting instinctual demands. Instinctual demands only come into conflict with one
another once the ego begins to accommodate the pressures of the external world. The ego
is a process that structures the individual’s id experiences (instinctual impulses) and
external experiences. It is the fact of the ego’s organization and the ego’s capacity to
make judgements (about, for example, danger-situations) that allows (or causes) the ego
to produce anxiety. So, although the id cannot have, so to speak, anxiety, “it very often
happens that processes take place or begin to take place in the id which cause the ego to
produce anxiety” (Freud 1926, p. 140), viz., a conflict of libidinal impulses, or a conflict
between a libidinal impulse and the demands of reality. The ego is also, as Lacan (1988)
argues, one among many of the subject’s internal objects. The contact between the ego
and the subject’s other internal objects is equally as fraught for the agoraphobic as the
spaces between the ego and the world. The conflict that gives rise to, or motivates,
anxiety, is thus located at the points of contact between the ego and the world, and the
ego and its objects. It is important to note that, as I argue, the agoraphobic “object” of
anxiety is this contact, which occurs in the spaces between self and other.
The construction of the ego’s boundaries involves, as Rey describes, the creation
of internal and external spaces, as well as personal and universal spaces:
[T]he infant, by taking in and putting out ‘objects’ from his body, has also created
an internal space inside himself bounded by his body surface. The other boundary
is the boundary between his personal space and the universal space created by the
displacement of himself and of his objects. (1994, p. 167)
The ego distinguishes internal from external in a process of creative differentiation. That
is, the process involves both identification of what is internal and what is external and the
creation of a uniquely individual internal reality at the same time. This task is vital, for
the inability to do so leads to the ego’s own annihilation. The agoraphobic has only a
tentative ability to distinguish internal from external, mine from not-mine. Significantly,
her anxiety is not a mere fear of open spaces but a signal of the realistic danger of
annihilation if this tentative ability disintegrates. Anxiety about the ego’s vulnerability as
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it is constituted as both subjective process and object in the world mobilizes agoraphobic
panic.
The ego must define itself against the world, but it must also locate itself as an
object in the world. Lacan emphasizes the impossibility of this task insofar as the ego
“fragment[s]” the subject (1988, p. 177). The impossibility of this task – the ego’s task to
both define and locate itself – is the central problematic of psychoanalysis. The nature of
psychical reality is thus of critical importance to psychoanalytic work. It is no wonder,
then, that the nature of psychical reality has been much debated.63 And yet, as Lacan
points out, the term that has been taken for granted – namely, “reality” – is used “in such
a careless way” (1997, p. 36).64 Zachrisson (2013), a contemporary psychoanalyst
working in the tradition of object relations, suggests that much of the theoretical
confusion surrounding the nature of reality stems from an imprecise use of the term
“object.”65 He suggests three terms to clarify different types of object relations: “internal
object” to refer to the more traditional notion of the object in object relations, which is to
say, the object as it exists in psychical reality distinct from external reality; “actual other”
to refer to another subject when the otherness of that subject is recognized; and, “external
object” to refer to the projection of an internal object onto an individual in external
reality. This third term carries with it the greatest possibility for confusion, as it is the
externalization of an internal object. The otherness of the “actual other” is not recognized
insofar as its qualities are assumed; curiosity is not possible, as the “external object” is
already known, so to speak (Zachrisson 2013, p. 261). These terms always refer to the
63

Much of this debate has focused on the use of the term “phantasy.” For a seminal explication of the
development of the term “phantasy” and its relevance in psychic life, see Isaacs (1948). For both Klein and
Lacan, as Leader points out, phantasy is “that which organizes one’s reality, rather than that which is
opposed to it” (1999, p. 93). Parsons argues that external reality can be used defensively to avoid attending
to psychical reality; in such cases, “the analyst must work all the harder to hold a position within psychic
reality, knowing that that is where analytic work is done” (2000, p. 173). I return to the question of
psychical reality in Chapter Four.
64
Rey also notes that, in the analysis of borderline and psychotic patients, the assumption of external reality
(and the external object) as given “is wrong” (1994, p. 35).
65
Although Zachrisson frames his article in terms of internal and external realities in general, his clinical
example is of a man whose character is marked by separation anxiety and the inhibition of aggression.
These characteristics are also found in those patients who might be, in different clinical settings, diagnosed
with agoraphobia, thus indicating that the question of reality is particularly relevant in patients with these
characterological disturbances.
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object relations of a particular subject, so that two individuals’ object relations are never
the same. This basic point bears repeating: even when one is referring to an “actual
other,” it is only ever more or less free from the influence of internal objects; thus, the
“actual other” of one subject never corresponds exactly to an “actual other” of a second
subject even when the relations are with the same third subject. Zachrisson’s explanation
of the term “actual other” brings us back to Lacan: “every object relation can only be
infected with a fundamental uncertainty by it” (1988, p. 169). Lacan employs his
trademark dramatic flair to counter the ego’s pressure to cover up this “fundamental
uncertainty,” which is so hard to bear consciously. I emphasize this important point:
within a relationship between two “actual others,” there is always a fundamental discord
based on the impossibility of an unmediated experience of the other.
There is no possibility of an unmediated experience of the other; there is only a
mediated experience of the other. This mediated experience depends on the determination
of internal and external, which is required for an individual to have an object relation
with, in Zachrisson’s terms, an “actual other.” Without this determination, all object
relations can only be with external objects, which are, as we recall, projections of internal
objects onto individuals in the external world. As we also recall, projection dominates the
agoraphobic’s psychical processes; she is unable, therefore, to have an experience of an
actual other or an experience of an actual other world, a world of curiosity and
possibility.
There is an original instinctual impulse to (r)eject all that the ego judges bad and
to introject everything that is good: “What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is
external are, to begin with, identical” (Freud 1925b, p. 237).66 Firstly, the ego judges
whether a thing is good or bad. If the ego judges a thing to be good, then it is internalized;
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Fairbairn prefers the terms “satisfying” and “unsatisfying” objects to “good” and “bad” objects (1944, p.
83). He argues that the unsatisfying object is internalized prior to any other in order for the infant to bring it
under his control; the infant internalizes the satisfying object to help manipulate the unsatisfying object.
Fairbairn indicates two aspects of the unsatisfying object: the desired, alluring aspect and the frustrating
aspect. It is bad, or unsatisfying, precisely because it contains both of these two aspects. The infant has
internalized the unsatisfying object to attempt to bring it under his control but in doing so has transformed
an external conflict into an internal one. Fairbairn suggests that the infant deals with this internal conflict
utilizing aggression in the service of repression.
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it becomes an object in psychical reality. If the ego judges a thing to be bad, than it is
rejected from the internal world. Secondly, the ego must judge the reality of the good
internal objects; the ego must judge if each internal object also exists in the external
world. Freud writes: “It is, we see, once more a question of external and internal. What is
unreal, merely a presentation and subjective, is only internal; what is real is also there
outside” (1925b, p. 237; original emphasis). The ability to move beyond the first
judgement, of whether a thing is good (and therefore to be introjected) or bad (and
therefore to be ejected), to the second judgement of whether a thing is real, is a
developmental accomplishment based on intellectual activity; or, rather, based on the
mutual cooperation of affective and intellectual capacities. The “precondition” for this
development – the ability to determine the objective reality of an object; the refinding of
the internal object in the external world – “is that objects shall have been lost which once
brought real satisfaction” (Freud 1925b, p. 238). Loss, then, is the precondition for the
development of the capacity for reality-testing, which is basic to the ego’s ability to
differentiate between internal and external in the process of creative differentiation.
As I develop in Chapter Three, there are two possible responses to any kind of
loss: mourning or defending against mourning. Defending against mourning includes
denying the very fact of loss. There is a difference between the loss of an object in
Freud’s sense here – in the process of reality-testing during which the object can be
refound in external reality – and the loss of an object in the sense of death – in which the
object cannot be refound as it no longer exists in external reality – only insofar as the
mourning called for in response to the latter is based on the developmental process of the
former. There is not a difference in kind, as even if in the process of development a
child’s object is lost in external reality, it can be refound if the loss of the object is talked
about by others. The object itself is not refound in external reality, but the fact of the
object’s existence in external reality is reaffirmed insofar as others acknowledge the real
loss of the object. I explicate this significance for the agoraphobic in Chapter Three and,
further, argue that it cannot just be loss that leads to the development of this capacity;
mourning one’s losses – suffering one’s losses – is required. The agoraphobic’s basic
limitation in this ability to differentiate between internal and external indicates her need
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for a greater capacity for mourning.67 A greater capacity for mourning leads, in turn, to a
more secure sense of what is internal and what is external.
Loss of the external object, then, is one precondition for this process of creative
differentiation; as we will now see, destruction of the internal object is another. Echoing
and expanding on Freud’s formulation of negation, Winnicott emphasizes the movement
of the destructive drive, which “creates the quality of externality” (1951, p. 93). As I
detail below in my discussion of transitional objects, the internal object must be
destroyed, in phantasy; if the external object survives, the individual gains a greater sense
of what is internal and what is external, and consequently a greater capacity for object
use. Ogden indicates the persistence of this process of destructive creation:
Externality is not created once and for all by a single act of ‘destruction’
(renunciation) of the internal object. The pull of the primitive tie to the internal
object must be consistently resisted. In psychological terms, the internal object
must be constantly destroyed in unconscious fantasy, thus continually making
room for the rediscovery of the external object. (1986, pp. 199-200)
If the individual is unable to mobilize her aggression, unconsciously, to destroy the
internal object, the question of what is internal and what is external must be continually
confronted without resolution. The resolution would not be, as Ogden points out, a
singular act of renunciation; but the repeated acts of renunciation lead to an unconscious
faith in the internal versus the external. The distinction, and the fact of a distinction, can
be taken for granted. The inability to effectuate this renunciation is profoundly disabling,
as the object can then never be used. Winnicott distinguishes between object-relating and
object-use in these terms of internal and external realities insofar as object-relating, as
Winnicott understands it, “is an experience of the subject that can be described in terms
of the subject as an isolate” (1969, p. 712). In Zachrisson’s terms, as described above,
object-relating concerns an internal object or, perhaps, an external object. Object-use, on
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Reeder, in an article on Lacan’s concept of symbolic castration and das Ding, comments on Freud’s
words: “Freud's train of thought here seems to imply that a primordial loss appears in conjunction with the
symbolic function of representations: the object is lost when the child begins to form thoughts independent
of its immediate perception of the surrounding world” (2012, p. 38; original emphasis). Loss and the
capacity to symbolize thus go hand-in-hand; an inhibition of symbolization and unmourned losses are thus
also expected to occur coextensively. I discuss the implications of this point in Chapter Three.
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the other hand, requires that the object “be real in the sense of being part of shared reality,
not a bundle of projections” (Winnicott 1969, p. 712).68 In Zachrisson’s terms, object-use
requires that the object in question be an “actual other”; that is, that the otherness of the
object is recognized.
If the distinction and the relation between inner and outer realities – variously
termed internal and external, subjective and objective, psychical and real – appear
nebulous, it is, as Hämäläinen (2009) suggests, perhaps unavoidable. Hämäläinen brings
to the foreground of our attention the difficulty, both terminological and conceptual, of
evaluating ‘objective’ reality insofar as it is impossible to observe beyond our subjective
reality. Returning to Freud’s declaration that our “innermost nature [...] is as much
unknown to us as the reality of the external world” (1900, p. 613), Hämäläinen provides
this reminder:
This distinction, in which a situation is observed either externally or internally, is,
however, only clear in a theoretical sense. In practice and at the level of the
experiential world it is more ambiguous, due precisely to the impossibility of
observing another from inside and the impossibility of being objective with regard
to one’s own boundary either. Nor is external perception of another objective,
because we cannot with certainty say, for instance, where the boundary of
another’s illusion lies because our own experience is also subjective. (2009, p.
1286)
Hämäläinen argues that we rest on our understanding of what constitutes internal and
external without examining too closely what we mean by these terms because to do so
would be, in Winnicottian terms, to question the paradox that sustains our illusion of
shared reality. Winnicott refers to shared reality as the third area of experience and
suggests that it is characterized by the same paradox as the transitional object: the infant
creates the transitional object and the object existed waiting to be created by the infant.
To ask the question, is it created or is it found, destroys the paradox necessary to sustain
it as a transitional object. As with the transitional object, the question of whether shared
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I return to Winnicott’s concept of a capacity for object-use below in relation to transitional phenomena
and the analytic frame. For now, I remain with the question of internal and external realities and the ego’s
process of creative differentiation.
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reality is created or found must not be asked. The illusion of shared reality, as
Hämäläinen notes, depends on this paradox:
A consequence of separateness is that individuals do not actually share an
experiential world nor, as a result, do we share any area where we would know for
certain that we share an other’s experience. And yet we need the illusion of a
shared world, and in everyday life this illusion is not necessarily challenged.
(2009, p. 1281)
I amend Hämäläinen’s statement slightly: we share an experiential world but it is not the
same world for each individual. In health, we share the illusion of a more or less similar
shared experience. In order to sustain this necessary illusion, there needs to be some
space and time in which, as Milner states, “it will not be necessary for self-preservation’s
sake to distinguish clearly between inner and outer, self and not-self” (1952, p. 192).
Paradoxically, the agoraphobic needs the opportunity to develop this necessary illusion of
a shared world. She needs the illusion as illusion instead of as terrifying reality, which
will only become possible once she has a clearer sense of what is internal and what is
external. As I argue below, the agoraphobic needs a new experience of a transitional
object that can survive her destruction of it and thus demonstrate the non-correspondence
between internal and external objects; the analytic setting, including the frame and the
analytic stance maintained by the analyst, can potentially become this transitional object.

2.2.ii. Original Unity
There is neither world nor ego, psychologically speaking, for the newborn infant.
Loewald (1951) addresses the development of the complicated relationships between the
ego and the world and the ego and its objects by returning to the theoretical “original
unity.” As we will see, the agoraphobic attempts to preserve this unity, which is, as I
explain below, the ego’s phantasy of unity, at the expense of more experiences – more
pain and more joy – in the outside world. In Mahler’s terms, as I refer to above, the
agoraphobic is developmentally stuck, so to speak, at the threshold between the infant
room with the mother and the toddler room, “which ha[s] so much more diversification”
(1975/2000, p. 27). As Mahler suggests, “[s]tanding on the threshold would seem to be
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the perfect symbolization of conflicting wishes – the wish to enter the toddler world away
from the mother and the pull to remain with mother in the infant room” (1975/2000, p.
96). The agoraphobic shies away from the threshold and from diversification, as she is
not confident that she can survive all that she may encounter; likewise, she is not
confident that she will be able to return to the mother in the infant room if she finds that
the toddler room – the outside world – proves overwhelming. The agoraphobic fears that
her preference for the outside world will destroy the mother; indeed, it will, insofar as
their dyad will become more complex, altered permanently by the increasing
diversification of experiences. She does not have the experience of the mother surviving
destruction, the experience of which, as I have noted, would demonstrate for her the noncorrespondence between the internal and external worlds. I consider this process in detail
below in my discussion of transitional objects.
To begin with, Loewald argues, the ego and the outer world are undifferentiated:
“The relatedness between ego and reality, or objects, does not develop from an originally
unrelated co-existence of two separate entities which come into contact with each other,
but on the contrary from a unitary whole which differentiates into distinct parts” (1951, p.
14). It is not that the yet-to-be ego experiences a unity with the environment; rather,
everything belongs to the ego. There is not a world in which or to which the ego belongs,
but a world that belongs to the ego. The only way we can know the world is via the ego’s
relation to it; therefore, from the ego’s perspective, the ego precedes the world. The
difference between these two belongings, so to speak, is apparent in the fantasy of
omnipotence that characterizes the early stages of the child’s psychic life: because the
world belongs to the ego, or, to be more accurate, because the infant perceives everything
external to her as her own creation, the infant or young child believes in her omnipotent69
control over the world.70 Thus, the young child – and the agoraphobic – unconsciously
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Ogden’s definition of “reality” (as part of a reality-fantasy dialectic) indicates the significance of this
original state out of which reality and fantasy develop: “The term reality is used here to refer to that which
is experienced as outside of the realm of the subject’s omnipotence” (1986, p. 216).
70
An understanding of the fact of the child’s earliest fantasies of omnipotence is vitally important to the
development of many psychoanalytic ideas. As early as 1926, Ferenczi emphasizes the movement from
omnipotence to conditional potency paralleling the movement from the pleasure principle to the reality
principle: “before it has assumed its first disappointments a child believes itself to be unconditionally
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believes that her aggressive impulses are powerful enough to destroy the world. As
Winnicott will emphasize, the presence of the mother’s breast, which satisfies the infant’s
hunger, helps to maintain the fantasy of wholeness; the absence of the mother’s breast,
necessarily repeated over time because in reality it cannot always be present, leads to the
concurrent development of an ego and a world against which the ego defines itself.
Loewald expands on Freud’s characterization of the ego as “a coherent
organization of mental processes” (1923, p. 17). He argues that the essential organizing
function of the ego is to maintain the original unity – which is always already lost in
order for the ego to exist – “on more and more complex levels of differentiation and
objectivation of reality” (1951, p. 14). Unity refers to the phantasy of the original
libidinal relationship with the mother; although the unity is not entirely fantastical, it is
the ego’s phantasy insofar as the ego does not exist prior to the fragmentation of that
unity. The ego’s essential defensive function is not against a threatening reality, but from
the threat of reality’s loss, which is to say, the loss of differentiation from the original
unity. The threat of reality’s loss encroaches from two positions: the paternal castration
threat of being cut off from objects and the maternal womb threat of engulfment, of
boundary loss between ego and reality. The ego can be annihilated either by being cut off
from the world or by being reabsorbed into its unity. If each threat is as strong as the
other, the ego is protected from both insofar as the one protects the ego from the other.
The psychic struggle against these threats continues through normal oedipal development,
and constitutes an ongoing process of maintaining both individuation and object relations.
Lacan (2006f) revisits the question of an original unity – which he will describe as
belonging to the imaginary dimension – via his concept of the mirror stage; he describes
the earliest formation of the ego as the infant’s response to his mirror image.71 To
reiterate, the agoraphobic is stuck somewhere between this original unity and the
development of a differentiated ego. Her experience of the world, then, reflects the

omnipotent, and further […] it clings to this feeling of omnipotence, even when the effectiveness of its
power in the fulfillment of its wishes is bound up with the observance of certain conditions” (p. 312).
71
Lacan (2006f) refers to the analytic term “imago” to designate the series of unconscious identifications
that constitute the ego. Lacan’s argument here is that the individual’s (unconscious) assumption of various
imagos is based on the specular image, namely, what is reflected.
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qualities of the imaginary dimension: the imaginary precedes the mirror stage (and, as we
will see, the symbolic). Fink describes the qualities of the imaginary dimension:
Prior to the advent of the symbolic, the delimitation of myself (ego) is not clear;
there is no essential barrier between what I call me and what I call you (egoʹ),
because I perceive and construct who I am only on the basis of what I see in you,
and I perceive and construct you only on the basis of my own self-perception and
self-construction. (2005, p. 560)
The imaginary relation depends on what is seen; hence, the imaginary: emphasis on
“image.” The self is apprehended via the image of the other; the other is seen as a self,
like my self, but not my self; that is, the other is not radically other from the self, only
more or less similar to the self. Fink argues that, for Lacan, this otherness is constituted
by size: the other is either bigger and stronger or smaller and weaker than the self.72 Size
is fundamentally linked to aggression insofar as the imaginary relation is used to ascertain
the threat of the other or the possibility of being the other’s aggressor: “The question here
seems to be that of domination or submission: Either the other is a threat to oneself or is
not, but there is no recognition of the other as possibly operating on altogether different
principles than one’s own” (Fink 1995, p. 554). Fink emphasizes the lack of limits in the
realm of the imaginary; there are no limits to the threat posed by the other’s aggression
towards oneself and no limit to the damage the self can do to the other: “There are no
innate limits here to what can be done in the course of the struggle for survival” (1995, p.
557). And it is a question of survival. The agoraphobic does not have a secure sense of
the limits between herself and her objects, her self and the world. The agoraphobic
experiences the threats of the imaginary dimension in their unlimited state, unimpeded by
the symbolic order (which I return to below). Her survival, therefore, is always in
question.
Strikingly, the agoraphobic is not able to rest in “the mirage of a unity” (Lacan
1988, p. 169); instead, the threat of unity – namely, ego annihilation – is always looming.
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In his discussion of Little Hans’s analysis, Freud remarks: “The ego is always the standard by which one
measures the external world; one learns to understand it by means of a constant comparison with oneself”
(1909, p. 107). Little Hans expresses this standard by his concerned comparison of the horse’s “widdler”
with his own, and of his own with his parents’.
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As I note above, Lacan reiterates the necessary discord between objects (including the
ego as one of the subject’s objects) that the subject masks with illusions of unity:
This disarray, this fragmentedness, this fundamental discordance, this essential
lack of adaptation, this anarchy, which opens up every possibility of displacement,
that is of error, is characteristic of the instinctual life of man […]. If the object is
only ever graspable as a mirage, the mirage of a unity which can never be grasped
again on the imaginary level, every object relation can only be infected with a
fundamental uncertainty by it. (1988, p. 169)
In so many words, Lacan returns to Milner’s proposition: that the individual needs to be
able to rest, so to speak, in the “mirage of a unity.” To reiterate: the existence of the ego
depends on differentiation; at the same time, the ego needs to be able to take this
differentiation for granted so that it is not always necessary – for the sake of the ego’s
survival – to be effectuating it. The question of survival can fade into the background of
experience so that curiosity about the world can develop.
For Winnicott, the mother provides the infant’s first mirror, reflecting back to the
infant “an image of himself that accurately derives from his inner experience: if he is
distressed, she soothes him, and in doing so provides him through a changed inner
experience with a self that matches her own tranquility” (Bollas 1995, p. 241). This
characterization of the infant’s mirrored experience is starkly different from Lacan’s, a
difference that is reflected in their distinctive views on trauma (which I return to in
Chapter Three; for now, I only point out that, for Winnicott, the “good-enough” mother is
both ideal – in the sense of satisfying the infant’s needs in the process of development –
and also normal, in the sense of not being an unusual or outlying phenomenon. Trauma,
for Winnicott, is not assumed.). Rather than disarray and fragmentation, Winnicott
emphasizes the child’s psychical processes within the mother-child dyad. For Winnicott,
it is not that the infant experiences an original unity with the mother; rather, there is a
single psychological entity comprised of the mother-infant unit. The mother experiences
the original unity as much as the infant does. Winnicott describes this state, for the
mother, as “primary maternal preoccupation” (1956, p. 304). Winnicott theorizes that the
mother’s preoccupation with her infant creates the phantasy of the original unity for the
infant until the infant is developmentally mature enough to bear the frustrations of
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separation. Despite the differences, the mirror function for both Winnicott and Lacan
provides the infant with the illusion of coherence. While Lacan concerns himself
primarily with the paternal law, language, and symbolization (which I return to below),
Winnicott emphasizes the importance of the maternal environment in which the
infant/child develops. Ogden indicates the paradox that Winnicott postulates is the
mother’s role: “the mother must shield the infant from awareness of desire and
separateness, and the mother must safeguard the infant’s opportunity to experience desire
and the accompanying knowledge of separateness” (1986, p. 175).73 For Winnicott, the
mother creates the illusion of unity; and, she gradually allows the infant to become aware
of the fact that it is illusion. The satisfaction of this paradox is what Winnicott calls
“good-enough mothering.”74 If we recall Mahler’s description of the child poised to cross
the threshold from the infant room to the toddler room, we can suggest that the
agoraphobic’s mother anxiously draws the toddler’s attention to all of the potential
dangers rather than confirming for the child that some combination of curiosity,
eagerness, and caution is appropriate, with the assurance that mother will be waiting in
the infant room if comfort is required. We can speculate that the agoraphobic mother has
not, to repeat Ogden’s words, “safeguard[ed] the infant’s opportunity to experience desire
and the accompanying knowledge of separateness” (1986, p. 175).
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Green emphasizes the temporal dimensions of this process, which necessarily accompany the spatial
considerations in the establishment of self and other. Referring to Winnicott’s work, Green writes: “If the
response [from the mother/object] is immediate, without delay, symbiotic omnipotence sets in, depriving
the infant’s ego of the possibility to say no to the object and therefore yes to itself. […] On the other hand,
when the delay is too great, it is despair, stamped by the experience of pain, which makes one say no to
everything (including oneself)” (1999, pp. 272-273). Milner also draws attention to the importance of the
temporal aspects of this process: “I suggest that, if, through the pressure of unsatisfied need, the child has to
become aware of his separate identity too soon or too continually, then either the illusion of union can be
what Scott calls catastrophic chaos rather than cosmic bliss, or the illusion is given up and premature egodevelopment may occur; then separateness and the demands of necessity may be apparently accepted, but
necessity becomes a cage rather than something to be co-operated with for the freeing of further powers”
(1952, p. 192).
74
Green (1999) and Kristeva (2001) draw attention to the fact that good-enough mothering is also badenough mothering.

53
2.2.iii. Trauma in the Process of Creative Differentiation
Freud insists “that the ego owes its origin as well as the most important of its acquired
characteristics to its relation to the real external world” (1938, p. 201). In the
development of neuroses, “demands from within, no less than excitations from the
external world, operate as ‘traumas,’ particularly if they are met halfway by certain innate
dispositions” (Freud 1938, p. 184; my emphasis). The development of neuroses and the
development of the ego
is made possible by hereditary disposition; but it can almost never be achieved
without the additional help of upbringing, of parental influence, which, as a
precursor of the super-ego, restricts the ego’s activity by prohibitions and
punishments, and encourages or compels the setting up of repressions. We must
therefore not forget to include the influence of civilization among the
determinants of neurosis. (Freud 1938, p. 185)
“The influence of civilization” includes parental influence and traumas from the external
world. Traumas from the external world – real events, as it were – must not be neglected
any more so than the neurotic traumas of phantasy. We can extrapolate and emphasize
this important point: all trauma, like all object relations,75 is both externally and internally
effectuated. Trauma is a psychical event connected in some way to an external event; the
nature of this connection may be contentious,76 but the trauma itself necessarily involves
both the external event and the psyche’s response to that event.
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See, for example, Opdal 2013, p. 3: “we must acknowledge that the object is related both to external and
to internal reality.”
76
On trauma, Fairbairn writes: “Frustration of his desire to be loved and to have his love accepted is the
greatest trauma that a child can experience; and indeed, it is the only trauma that really matters from a
developmental standpoint” (1941, p. 261). Lacan disagrees, suggesting rather that “there is something
originally, inaugurally, profoundly wounded in the human relation to the world” (1988, p. 167). Klein’s
position can be found between these two, as she argues that “the capacity for love and happiness which
develops in the child is [not] in direct proportion to the amount of love afforded him” (1930, p. 336). If the
individual has “little capacity to tolerate frustration, and if aggression, fears and feelings of guilt are very
strong, then the actual shortcomings of the parents […] may become grossly exaggerated and distorted in
the child’s mind” (Klein 1930, p. 339). As I discuss in Chapter Three, I agree with Winnicott (following
Fairbairn) that a failure of the maternal holding environment to provide a good-enough mothering
experience for the mother-infant dyad surely leads to some level of trauma. At the same time, I agree with
Lacan (and Freud, as above) that there is something “profoundly wounded” in the very fact of being a
human in the world. Both levels of trauma, I contend, must be addressed.
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As I describe above, the psychical structure is inherently neurotic – or, more
accurately, it is initially comprised of psychotic processes. In the development of a
mature psychical structure, the individual moves from pathological process to mature
psychic (dynamic) structure. Part of that process is, as I also note above, the experience
of emptiness. The psychical experience of emptiness is derived from the physical
experience of hunger. The infant will necessarily experience hunger; the very experience
of hunger’s emptiness, no matter how temporary, is perceived as a deprivation. The
experience of emptiness stimulates aggression and leads to the further development of the
ego.
Winnicott refers to the need for emptiness prior to learning, which includes the
potential for new experiences, and developing one’s ego and new object relations; to wit,
“[t]he basis of all learning (as well as of eating) is emptiness” (Winnicott 1974, p. 107).
Without the experience of hunger (emptiness) and the resulting aggression, the individual
is unable to experience satisfaction or love. When emptiness is defended against, and/or
when aggression is repudiated, there are many consequences, one of which is the
inability to achieve ambivalence and therefore, as I describe above, the inability to
progress from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position. The world turns
monstrous and, as the agoraphobic shows us, intolerable. The ego’s vulnerability, then,
and the capacity to utilize that vulnerability for growth, is ironically repudiated in
agoraphobia patients who are commonly characterized, and commonly characterize
themselves, as childlike and unable to care for themselves in a manner appropriately
corresponding to their actual age.77
For Winnicott, the infant experiences some level of trauma if the mother imposes
on the infant the fact of his or her separateness before the infant is developmentally
capable of bearing that reality, or if the mother forecloses the possibility of the infant’s
recognition of their separateness.78 Winnicott suggests a distinction between trauma and
“nothing happening when something might profitably have happened” (1974, p. 106). If
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See, for example, Milrod (2007, pp. 1012, 1020).
Ogden adds that there may be some “breaches in,” rather than failures of, the facilitating environment,
such as an infant’s severe or chronic illness (2014, p. 210, n. 5).
78
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“nothing” happened, then “emptiness needs to be experienced, and this emptiness belongs
to the past, to the time before the degree of maturity had made it possible for emptiness to
be experienced” (p. 106). For these patients, emptiness “turns up as a state that is feared,
yet compulsively sought after” (1974, p. 106). Winnicott relates the experience of
emptiness – as both feared and compulsively sought after – with the fear of breakdown in
certain individuals. As a constituting experience, emptiness is related to primitive
anxieties.79 The term “breakdown” refers in the first instance to the failure of a defence
organization; which is to say, it refers to a failure of the ego’s functions. Recalling
Loewald’s explanation of the ego’s organizing and defensive functions, “breakdown”
refers to “a reversal of the individual’s maturational process” (Winnicott 1974, p. 103).
The two most relevant of the primitive anxieties Winnicott lists are a return to an
unintegrated state and loss of the capacity to relate to objects, which Maizels (1985)
understands as forming the basis of agoraphobic and claustrophobic anxieties.80
Winnicott contends that psychotic illness is a defence organization in relation to a
primitive anxiety, the fear of which is overwhelmingly unthinkable. This contention
implicitly refers to Klein’s concepts of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions,
which are always already, or at least, in the first instance, psychotic anxieties.
Subsequently, the defence-mechanisms that correspond to the infantile anxiety situations
form, as Klein argues and I discuss above, “the basis of the most severe psychoses”
(1940, p. 262). The anxiety is overwhelmingly unthinkable precisely because, Winnicott
79

Although Winnicott refers to these anxieties as “agonies” to impress upon us their painful profundity, I
will maintain the more common terminology of anxiety without losing sight of the severity of the
experience. Along with the infant’s anxieties, Ogden adds the mother’s inevitable narcissistic wounds of
not knowing “what it is her baby needs and whether it is within the power of her personality to provide it
even if she somehow could discover what he ‘wants’” (1989, pp. 202- 203). Ogden’s addition deepens our
understanding of the connection between pregnancy (and/or impending parenthood) and the onset or
exacerbation of agora-claustrophobic anxieties, which I discussed in Chapter One.
80
Maizels (1985) proposes a model of psychological conflict based on two opposing tendencies: the first
tendency, similar to Freud’s conceptualization of the death instinct, moves toward non-conflict and is
accompanied by the unconscious fantasy of a return to the mother’s womb; the second tendency moves
towards autonomy and the capacity to exert oneself in the overcoming of frustrations. He identifies
agoraphobic and claustrophobic anxieties as the “two ‘basic’ anxieties” (p. 188) corresponding to these
tendencies and offers a clinical example of a patient who exhibits the fluctuations between them, indicating
an inability to tolerate either situation (either being protected in the womb or being independent of the
womb) and therefore an inability to move freely between forays towards independence and moments of
intimacy and comfort.
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argues, it is the fear of a breakdown that has already been experienced.81 The fear of
breakdown refers to Loewald’s original unbounded state, in which the ego did not exist
because it had not yet differentiated itself from the world. In the sense that the ego was
relatively undeveloped, the individual did not experience the breakdown in the past. The
individual needs to experience intellectually what they are only affectively aware of in
order to organize her realities. Winnicott refers to experiences that occur prior to the
development of the ego, and, as such, no subject existed, so to speak, to have the
experience (in order to organize it) (1974, p. 104).82 I add to this description experiences
for which the subject has no words. The problematic insufficiency of (some particular
element of) language persists beyond ego development. Therefore, the subject may
experience a debilitating anxiety perceived to be future-oriented but caused by a previous
experience that the subject is unable to put into words. This argument is anticipated by
Rivière: “The worst disasters have actually taken place; it is this truth that [the patient]
will not allow analysis to make real, will not allow to be ‘realized’ by him or us” (1936,
p. 312).83 The agoraphobic’s emptiness that Milrod (2007) describes suggests this
possibility.
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In Chapter Four, I discuss the relevance of this anxiety in the analytic situation via the concept of
Nachträglichkeit. C. Winnicott provides a clinical example of Winnicott’s theory of the fear of breakdown,
linking her patient’s unconscious fear of breakdown – which was inhibiting her capacity to function in the
world – with the patient’s early experiences of trauma. The patient relays a recurring dream relatively early
in the analysis in which she is in a “vast empty sandy space” (1980, p. 352; original emphasis). This
emptiness is linked to the patient’s disavowal of a part of herself that is a terrified and utterly alone little
child. Significantly, and as I explore in more detail in Chapter Four, the patient remarks of her relationship
with her analyst: “‘You don’t press me into any kind of shape. You give me elbow room and space to move
around in.’” Her analyst comments that she [the patient] “felt that the space included me [the analyst] – it
was the space between [them], and this was different than emptiness – the emptiness of the desert” (p. 353).
82
Ogden considers that Winnicott’s (1974) article, likely written in the year before his death and
posthumously published, is unfinished. Ogden works to clarify some of its ambiguities and, to that end,
suggests that each of the primitive agonies that Winnicott lists “is an agony only because it occurs in the
absence of a good enough mother–infant bond” (2014, p. 210; original emphasis).
83
See also Freud 1914b, p. 151: “We have learnt that the patient repeats instead of remembering, and
repeats under the condition of resistance”; and, Freud 1937, p. 268: “The transposing of material from a
forgotten past on to the present or on to an expectation of the future is indeed a habitual occurrence in
neurotics no less than in psychotics. Often enough, when a neurotic is led to an anxiety-state to expect the
occurrence of some terrible event, he is in fact merely under the influence of a repressed memory (which is
seeking to enter consciousness but cannot become conscious) that something which was at that time
terrifying did really happen.”
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Winnicott’s emphasis on the mother-infant dyad and the maternal holding
environment indicate that he considers the effects of real experiences on psychical
development. Winnicott’s theory of the fear of breakdown, I suggest, can also refer to
experiences for which the subject has no words, which leads to Lacan’s clinical emphasis
on the symbolic. As Bollas (1995) and Fink (2004) point out, this clinical emphasis
requires the articulation of real traumatic experiences. Ogden implies this potential
connection between Winnicott and Lacan, noting that “Winnicott points to a theory of the
psychopathology of the symbolic function [...] that remains to be completed” (1986, p.
214).84
As I gesture towards above, the inauguration of the subject into the symbolic
order – the development of the ego as object – divides the subject from himself: the
“subject [is] fundamentally fragmented by this ego” (Lacan 1988, p. 177). The
unconscious, “excluded from the system of the ego” (p. 58), comes into existence as the
limitless drives of the imaginary are repressed. The unconscious, according to Lacan,
“has the radical structure of language,” which is to say that “a material operates in the
unconscious according to certain laws, which are the same laws as those discovered in the
study of natural languages [langues] – that is, languages [langues] that are or were
actually spoken” (1958/2006b, p. 496).85 The murderous, unbounded rage that exists in
the imaginary register is limited by the internalization of the Law, the superego, le nom
du père (the Name of the Father, the No of the Father) – which takes place as the
individual enters into the symbolic register and becomes part of discourse, a part of the
chain of signification. The symbolic intervenes in the murderous rage of the imaginary;
the word intervenes in the image. As the symbolic introduces limits into the imaginary,
84

Luepnitz draws an explicit comparison between Winnicott and Lacan, suggesting that “Winnicott and the
Middle Group [are] a corrective to Lacanian abstraction, and turning back to Lacan [is] a corrective to the
absence of reflection on language in Winnicott” (2009, p. 962). Luepnitz indicates a further difference, the
significance of which will become more evident in Chapter Three: “[f]or Winnicott, the central drama will
turn around the infant’s loss or feared loss of maternal connection. For Lacan, […] something even more
profound is at stake – the lack built into subjectivity by the mere existence of the unconscious” (p. 964).
See also infra note 76.
85
See also Lacan 1997, p. 32: “We only grasp the unconscious finally when it is explicated, in that part of it
which is articulated by passing into words. It is for this reason that we have the right – all the more so as the
development of Freud’s discovery will demonstrate – to recognize that the unconscious itself has in the end
no other structure than the structure of language.”
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the boundaries of the ego are created. Speech draws attention to our vulnerability, as it
can never be complete, never whole. As we speak, our words slip along the signifying
chain, always missing the mark. And yet, speech relieves the vulnerabilities inherent in
instinctual life:
The power of naming objects structures the perception itself. The percipi of man
can only be sustained within a zone of nomination. It is through nomination that
man makes objects subsist with a certain consistence. […] Naming constitutes a
pact, by which two subjects simultaneously come to an agreement to recognize
the same object. (Lacan 1988, p. 169)
Lacan’s formulations are instructive here, as the symbolic order is that which interrupts
the imaginary and introduces limits, both to the ego as object of the subject and to the
ego’s attribution of limits to others.86
The agoraphobic’s emptiness that replaces her symptoms of anxiety and
avoidance, which Milrod (2007) describes, indicates her particular difficulty in, not just
entering but, inhabiting the symbolic. The symbolic dimension is part of Winnicott’s
third area of (cultural, shared) experience and thus has the qualities of a transitional
object, which I describe in detail below. Like all individuals, the agoraphobic is born into
a language system, but she is unable to make it her own; she finds language, but does not
create it. Of course, the agoraphobic is not the only type of patient for whom
symbolization is fraught; it is, on the contrary, one of the features of psychoanalytic
practice that the process of putting it all into words is resisted. However, the
agoraphobic’s specific complaint of emptiness upon remission of anxiety and avoidance
indicates the need for the analyst to emphasize and encourage the use of symbolization
via the psychoanalytic method of free association, which would thus stabilize the
agoraphobia patient’s psychical experience of limits: of her ego’s limits and the limits of
others.87
Lacan’s development of the symbolic dimension and his clinical emphasis on
language cannot be read as dismissing the effects of reality – Freud’s “influence of
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Similarly, Bacon suggests that “phobias may well arise in the absence of the name, or metaphor [of the
father], in an attempt to make good the loss or absence” (2003, p. 158).
87
I expand on this aspect of clinical technique in Chapter Four.
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civilization” – on an individual’s psychical reality. To the contrary, Lacan, as Bollas
writes, specifically accounts for the real dimension and provides some thoughts with
which to think through the question of internal and external realities clinically:
The psychoanalytical insistence on the priority of the imagined – juxtaposed, if
necessary, to the happened – is understandable, if regrettable. […] Lacan,
however, ascribes powerful influence to the real. It is there. It may evade
representation but the fact is, reality happens to one, and there is a kind of
categorical memory of its nature. So, according to Lacan, we do not remember the
actual event that happened to us, because our perception of reality is disqualified
by our own subjectivity – guided as it is by its imaginative capacity and the latent
rules of the symbolic order – but we do recall the categorical moment, if one can
put it that way. We recall that something happened from the real (not the
imaginary or the symbolic) that profoundly affected us. (1995, pp. 103-104)88
Bollas continues:
The analyst must return to the patient’s presentation of his or her facts of life not
because they bear some meta-truth in themselves that will displace the patient’s
projective constructions of an internal world, but because the patient is entering
the intrinsically traumatic in the process of analysis, unconsciously asking that
the trauma of things done be addressed. (1995, p. 113; original emphasis)
The nature of agoraphobia in particular, characterized by an unconscious confusion of
self and other and the boundaries between, requires a theoretical perspective that takes
into consideration real – that is, external – experiences and the patient’s representation of
these experiences. The patient represents her experiences primarily via language, which
is, as Green articulates, both a perception and a representation: “it represents the relation
between things and the relations of thought relations making it possible for the latter to be
perceived” (1999, p. 197). In Lacan’s words, the symbolic order (the order or dimension
of natural – spoken – language) “preexists the infantile subject” and it is in “accordance
with [this symbolic order that] he has to structure himself” (1958/2006b, p. 497). A
clinical emphasis on language – as opposed to narrative, which implicitly demands
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See also Freud 1914b, p. 149: “There is one special class of experiences of the utmost importance for
which no memory can as a rule be recovered. These are experiences which occurred in very early childhood
and were not understood at the time but which were subsequently understood and interpreted.”
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coherence89 – provides the opportunity to consider the patient’s perceptions, or real
experiences, and representations, or phantasies. Lacan’s emphasis on language, then, is a
clinical one, and maintains the unconscious at the forefront of psychoanalytic practice.
The demands of the analytic situation pressure the ego to relinquish its familiar
and neurotic organization in favour of a more painful but ultimately more satisfying
mediation of internal and external pressures.90 Resistance is a defence that arises, in
particular, in response to these demands. Resistance is the work of the ego struggling to
maintain its coherent and familiar self, to not admit conflicts into its being. As I argue in
Chapter Four, the agoraphobic is too coherent; she is unable to tolerate incoherence,
which thus restricts her unconscious freedom in addition to the restrictions she places on
her freedom of mobility. For Lacan, resistance indicates the real dimension and provides
evidence of its dominant quality: the real is “the domain of that which subsists outside of
symbolization” (2006g, p. 324).91 More pointedly, “the real resists symbolization” (Fink
2004, p. 172, n. 24; original emphasis). The subject does not resist; rather, the real resists.
The real resists discourse, resists symbolization. The real is that which resists
symbolization and, thus, resists the analytic process. Fink clarifies the qualities of the
real, as Lacan conceives it, in terms of resistance in the clinical situation: “Lacan wants
us to consider the idea that it is not the patient who is in any way willfully resisting the
therapeutic process; rather, it is the very nature of the job that the patient is faced with
that is fraught with resistance” (2004, p. 172, n. 24).92 The real resists symbolization; but
only through the symbolic dimension can the real be apprehended, again underscoring the
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In Chapter Four, I consider the movement between coherence and incoherence in psychical life.
See Bion (1979) on the pain of living and Scott (1981), who amends Bion’s account with his particular
emphasis on mourning, and faith in our capacity to mourn as contributing to “making the best of this sad
job” of life.
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See also, Lacan 2006g, p. 324: “what did not come to light in the symbolic appears in the real” (original
emphasis).
92
Fink describes resistance in relation to the imaginary: “Now the analysand cannot help but fall back into
the imaginary realm of defenses and resistance when the real that she is trying to put into words (trauma
and other experiences that have never before been articulated by the subject) resists symbolization” (2004,
p. 25). Further: “The real that the analysand is up against always resists symbolization” (2004, p. 26). The
real is that which resists symbolization, but the imaginary is the realm of resistance; that is, in the act of
resistance and defending against the real, the analysand uses the imaginary, i.e., the ego. Lacan is not
unique in identifying the ego as the agent of defenses; see, for the most prominent and influential example,
A. Freud (1937/1966/1993).
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clinical use of language (rather than, for example, a clinical focus on the therapeutic
relationship as the mechanism of change). In Lacan’s words: “we have no means of
apprehending this real – on any level and not only on that of knowledge – except via the
go-between of the symbolic” (1988, p. 97).93 A clinical emphasis on coherence, as I argue
in Chapter Four, is a kind of resistance to the analytic process insofar as it is complicit
with the ego’s struggle to maintain its familiar (neurotic and unsatisfying) coherence; an
intolerance of incoherence impedes the work of analysis, which needs to include a
destabilization (and subsequent re-ordering) of the ego’s organization. For the
agoraphobic, something has gone wrong in the process of ego development; I argue in
Chapter Three that, for the agoraphobia patients Milrod (2007) describes, persistent
emptiness indicates the presence of unmourned traumatic losses. As I suggest above in
my description of the process of reality-testing, the fact of the lost object’s existence in
external reality is reaffirmed insofar as others acknowledge the real loss of the object.
The analyst must, I argue, return to these real experiences of loss in order to address the
agoraphobic’s emptiness. Only when these real losses are symbolized will the
agoraphobic be able to develop clearer boundaries between the internal and the external,
and create the world that is waiting outside for her to find.

2.3. Transitional Phenomena and the Analytic Frame
Language, in my view, is the heir to the first transitional objects.
(Green 1975, p. 11)
As a particular element of shared reality, language is characterized by the paradox of the
transitional object, which precedes it developmentally. The use of a transitional object –
an external object that the infant does not yet fully recognize as belonging to external
reality – is a necessary aspect of psychic development. As I gesture towards above on the
question of internal and external realities, the infant both finds and creates the transitional
93

See Miller on extimité, or “extimacy,” a term Lacan uses to denote the real in the symbolic (1994, pp. 7487). The term denotes, as Miller explicates, that that which is “most interior – [which is to say, that which is
intimate] – has, in the analytic experience, the quality of exteriority” (p. 76). Further, “[e]xtimacy is not the
contrary of intimacy. Extimacy says that the intimate is Other” (p. 76).
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object; this object aids in the process of reality testing and creative differentiation. Ogden
writes: the relationship with the transitional object is “a reflection of the development of
the capacity to maintain a psychological dialectical process” (1986, p. 213). This
dialectical process is paradoxical, referring to the movement between unity and
individuation, or individuation within unity and unity with individuation. The transitional
object is the hinge of this dialectic, of “separateness in unity, unity in separateness”
(Ogden 1986, p. 212).
The transitional object, as hinge, attaches to the gap between the experiential –
that is, external – world and the internal world. Green draws attention to this gap, noting
that the emptiness localized in the “potential space between the self and the object” is
“essential to psychic development” (1975, p. 18). This potential space depends on the
vitality of the transitional object, which contains the paradox of interconnected
separateness. As I note above, one does not ask the question of the child’s transitional
object: did you find it or did you create it? To do so would destroy the illusion that covers
up the paradox. I propose that the analytic frame has the potential to become a
transitional object for the analysand.
The analytic frame is the setting of the analysis; it marks off the space – physical,
temporal, and psychical – from everything outside of it. Aspects of the frame include, for
example: the position of the couch and chair, the room in which the analysis takes place,
the time at which a session starts, and its duration. The two participants – analyst and
analysand – agree to an absence of physical contact and the payment of the analyst’s fee.
Further, the analyst commits to maintaining confidentiality, the analysand agrees to try to
say everything, and the analyst agrees to try to listen. The frame is a physical setting, a
set of behavioural conventions, and a psychical space.94 The qualities and aspects of the
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In a discussion on the analyst’s use of a home office, Maroda (2007) explicitly connects the analytic
frame with the analyst’s boundaries, specifically the boundary the analyst maintains between analyst-asprofessional and analyst-as-private individual. Although I disagree with much of Maroda’s argument,
particularly her views on self-disclosure, she draws attention to the importance of the question of internal
and external, or, more specifically, what belongs to the analyst and what belongs to the analysand. Again,
the answers to these questions are not as straightforward as one might think. Indeed, as Bromberg argues,
“it is only because the line between ‘personal’ and ‘professional’ is permeable rather than hard-edged that it
is possible for the therapeutic relationship we call psychoanalysis to exist in the first place” (1998, p. 13).
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frame have been the subject of much debate.95 Discussions about the frame tend to
connect it to the phenomenon of transference insofar as it is assumed that the frame
demarcates a particular space distinct from outside of the analytic setting wherein the
illusion of transference may develop.96 Some analysts – for example, Busch (1995) and
Opdal (2012) – consider the method of free association to be the distinguishing aspect of
the analytic frame. I return to these considerations below.
I argue that the frame can be used in the creation of the ego’s boundaries insofar
as it offers the analysand the possibility of new experiences with a transitional object.
When the individual has participated in the creation of his ego boundaries, the potential
space between the self and the object can thereby be creatively inhabited, with all of the
risks and rewards of human vulnerability. Green, following Winnicott, implies this
possibility: “[Winnicott] supplements through verbalization the lack of maternal care in
order to encourage the emergence of a relationship to the ego and to the object, until the
moment is reached when the analyst can become a transitional object and the analytic
space a potential place of play and field of illusion” (1975, p. 17). I add that the frame
itself, and not just the analyst, can become a transitional object. For the agoraphobia
patient, the analytic frame may be more accessible, so to speak, than the analyst in
becoming a transitional object. The agoraphobic is already acutely aware of the
significance of crossing the threshold between spaces. While each analysand requires a
certain psychical dexterity in order to traverse the threshold from the outside world into
the analytic room, to put oneself onto the couch as the analysand and accept the position
of the seated, out-of-sight analyst, for the agoraphobic this crossing is particularly
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For a recent debate on the nature and function of the frame in psychoanalytic work, see: Bass Anthony
(2007a, 2007b, 2008); Bromberg (2007); Federici-Nebbiosi (2007, 2008); Gabbard (2007); HernándezTubert (2008); Laor (2007); and, Tubert-Oklander (2008). Despite a number of clinical, theoretical, and
pedagogical disagreements, the conclusions of this debate suggest a general consensus that the analytic
frame is an integral aspect of psychoanalytic work that is co-created by analyst and patient, and that
negotiations to the frame, whether initiated by the analyst or the patient, must be attended to as part of the
analytic work, with particular attention to the unconscious meanings implicit in frame negotiations and
associations thereof.
96
See, for example, Freud (1913) and Milner (1952). Sabbadini (1989) also connects his discussion of the
frame with the development of the transference, but he uniquely emphasizes the threshold experiences,
arguing for the necessity of interpreting the events that occur immediately preceding and following an
analytic session.
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fraught. Like the distinction between internal and external realities, the agoraphobia
patient cannot take the integrity of the analytic frame for granted. She may, however, be
capable of performing “minor frame violations” (Holmes 1997, p. 244) to experiment
with the developing frame and, along with the frame, her developing sense of her own
capacities and limitations.97
In order for the analytic frame to become a transitional object for the analysand, it
must survive the analysand’s destruction of it, just as, paradoxically, the child must
destroy the object (in fantasy) and the object must survive its destruction. This
destruction is part of the transition from object-relating to object-use. The object is
valuable because it survives the subject’s destruction of it; now, having survived, it can
be used. The object’s survival in external reality demonstrates to the individual the
imperfect correspondence between internal and external; thereby, the distinction between
internal and external becomes clearer.98 The subject begins to be able “to live a life in the
world of objects,” but at the same time must accept “the ongoing destruction in
unconscious fantasy relative to object-relating” (Winnicott 1959, p. 90). The child creates
and destroys the transitional object; the object exists prior to the child’s creation of it and
survives the child’s destruction of it. This survival of destruction is an unconscious
paradox but, on a conscious level, is clear and easily understood, as Winnicott clarifies
that “to survive” means to “‘not retaliate’” (1969, p. 714).
Clinically, the analyst, analytic technique, and the analytic setting must all survive
the analysand’s destruction. Fromm indicates the significance of this process for the
establishment of usable boundaries:
[T]he treatment environment must be tested and used fully and survive in a vital
working way for the patient to finally and securely achieve these differentiations,
97

Ferro notes: “As Bleger (1966) writes, breaches of the setting by the analyst may ultimately be useful and
inevitable, but can by no means be perpetrated on purpose” (1999/2006, p. 6; my emphasis). The analyst
has the responsibility of maintaining the integrity of the analytic frame. Adler and Bachant describe this
analytic asymmetry: “While it is the patient’s process, it is the analyst’s situation. In the organization of the
analytic situation, it is always the analyst’s obligation to safeguard the analytic dyad from potentially
disruptive intrusions, whether they arise from mounting pressures within the analytic situation or from the
needs of an outside party” (1996, p. 1041).
98
As Parsons argues, “what allows experience to be processed is the separation between the representation
in psychic reality and the thing itself in literal reality” (2000, pp. 174-175).
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along with the shrinking to life-size, in Harry Stack Sullivan's phrase, so joyfully
experienced upon being survived. This is the task of establishing real and helpful
boundaries – boundaries that are not barriers but that establish “edges” for both
interchange and contact. (1995, p. 242)
The “shrinking to life-size” describes, in Lacan’s paradigm, the symbolic’s intersection
and interruption of the limitless imaginary. In Kleinian terms, the bad objects are no
longer monstrous and the good objects no longer saintly, but all objects – including the
ego as one of the subject’s internal objects – are experienced as something more akin to
‘human, all too human.’ As Fromm indicates, contact between objects becomes possible
without the risk of annihilation. There are vulnerabilities, of course, but they come to be
anticipated as ‘worth the risk,’ as they say, rather than so anxiously avoided, as the
housebound agoraphobic has needed to do.
Milner provides a clinical example of the destruction and survival of the object,
and the way in which the patient is able to make use of it: “The repeated discovery that I
went on being friendly and unhurt by him, in spite of the continual attacks on me,
certainly played a very important part [in the mutative effects of the analysis]” (1952, p.
193). She links this effect directly to her patient’s developing creativity, in Winnicott’s
sense:
[W]hen I began to see and to interpret, as far as I could, that this use of me might
be not only a defensive regression, but an essential recurrent phase in the
development of a creative relation to the world, then the whole character of the
analysis changed; the boy then gradually became able to allow the external object,
represented by me, to exist in its own right. (1952, p. 194)
As I note above, Winnicott distinguishes between object-relating and object-use in these
terms of internal and external realities. Object-relating, as Winnicott understands it, “is an
experience of the subject that can be described in terms of the subject as an isolate”
(1969, p. 712). Object-use, on the other hand, requires that the object “be real in the sense
of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections” (p. 712). In this way, through
the analysand’s destruction of the frame and the frame’s survival (including the analyst’s
ability to survive: as analyst, as maintaining an analytic stance), the frame can become
something like a transitional object for the analysand. Further, as Rappaport suggests, the
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analysand’s capacity for object-use will extend beyond the specific object that has
‘survived’ – in this case, the analytic frame – and will ideally include the analysand’s
own mind (1998, p. 378).99
Winnicott describes the fate of the child’s transitional object and elaborates the
meaning of the third area of experience. The first two areas of experience are psychic
reality, to which internal objects belong, and external or objective reality. The third area
of experience, which Winnicott associates with cultural life, “corresponds to the infant’s
transitional phenomena and […] actually derives from them” (1959, p. 57). The
successful use of the transitional object is required for the third area of reality to be
accessible to the mature individual. The transitional object is
gradually allowed to be decathected, so that in the course of years it becomes not
so much forgotten as relegated to limbo. […] In health the transitional object does
not “go inside” nor does the feeling about it necessarily undergo repression. It is
not forgotten and it is not mourned. It loses meaning and this is because the
transitional phenomena have become diffused, have become spread out over the
whole intermediate territory between “inner psychic reality” and “the external
world as perceived by two persons in common”, that is to say, over the whole
cultural field. (1951, p. 5)
This third reality is defined by the same paradox characteristic of the infant’s relation to
the transitional object: “the transitional object is symbolical of the internal object which is
kept alive by the alive mother’s presence” (Winnicott 1951, p. 58). Paradoxically, an
experience is both created by the individual and would have existed even if the individual
did not. As opposed to internal objects, which do not require any sort of maintenance
from external reality, transitional objects – the use of which becomes the capacity to
enjoy cultural experiences – depend upon some play between inner and outer reality. This
third area of experience, characterized in part by a shared illusion and also by the
exchange of internal and external phenomena, supports the difficult task of keeping the
99

Before this development, pseudo-debility, pseudo-stupidity, and/or pseudo-imbecility may be evident.
Cohn describes pseudo-stupidity as an “inhibition, characterized by a generally (not focally) diminished
curiosity, intellectual interest, and astuteness relative to one’s potential” (1989, p. 132). Mahler suggests
that pseudo-imbecility is a particularly effective way of “restoring or maintaining a secret libidinal rapport
within the family” (1942, p. 149). It is often accompanied by a similar inhibition of affect. This
phenomenon is connected to the capacity for mentalization, which I discuss in Chapter Three.
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ego and its objects separate and connected; that is, keeping the ego alive within and
against the world. The nebulous boundaries between the agoraphobic’s inner and outer
realities lead to her inability to inhabit Winnicott’s third area of experience, and the
inability to continually navigate the paradox of individuation and object relations. Lacan
characterizes the symbolic dimension in the same way as Winnicott’s shared reality and
emphasizes this aspect of language: we are born into a discourse that we must learn to
make our own, even as it shapes us beginning before we are born.100 Again, as Green
writes, “[l]anguage [...] is the heir to the first transitional objects” (1975, p. 11). The
agoraphobic, unable to inhabit this space of creativity, is unable to engage with a process
of symbolization – to bear the frustration of the absence of the thing in order to name it –
leading to melancholia and the persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) identifies in her
agoraphobia patients.101
Winnicott’s conception of creativity is unique and is essential to his sense of
“potential space.” Creativity is possible only when the fear of annihilation is not too
great; creativity is possible only when one’s continuity of existence can be taken for
granted. Creative living is the doing that comes out of being. It is distinguished from
artistic creativity by the fact that “what we create is already there”; the creative aspect
involves “the way we get at perception through conception and apperception” (Winnicott
1965, p. 52).102 Kumin connects creativity in Winnicott’s sense with the experience of
emptiness, the transitional object, and the process of separation-individuation:
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Rey also indicates language’s “personal” and “universal” meanings. See Rey 1994, p. 185.
Steiner conceptualizes a pathological kind of transitional space – a psychic retreat – out of which a
patient must emerge for any progress to occur (1993, p. 41). Specifically, Steiner suggests that melancholia
can be thought of as a psychic retreat away from the depressive position – that is, mourning: “If the patient
can shift from melancholic denial towards facing reality, then it is mourning that he has to confront and
work through” (2011, p. 15). Milrod’s (2007) patients seem to have replaced their ‘safe’ physical space of
the home, from which they feared to emerge, with the psychical space of emptiness that has, indeed,
removed them from an area of experiencing, thus indicating, as I argue in Chapter Three, the need for
mourning in order to emerge into the painful world of vulnerability, loss, and, of critical importance,
potentiality.
102
Winnicott perhaps overstates this distinction, as Milner’s productive thoughts on the analytic frame,
symbol formation, and the boundary between inner and outer realities are inspired by her artistic creativity,
and the inhibition of her artistic expression. Her sense of the nature of intermediary spaces is inspired by
her experiences as psychoanalyst and as artist. She writes, for example: “To be able to break down the
barrier of space between self and other, yet at the same time to be able to maintain it, this seems to be the
101
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The transitional object, and its use at bedtime to help deal with the separation
represented by sleep, may therefore be viewed as the first primordial work of art:
created by the infant in ‘external reality’; symbolizing the mother, her holding and
her breast; regressive, but in the service of the ego; ultimately an expression of the
self and utilized in its own differentiation. The transitional object is the first
artistic creation and it grows out of emptiness. (1978, p. 214)
The paradox of creativity, if we are sane, is that “we only create what we find”
(Winnicott 1965, p. 53).
The analytic frame can become a transitional object for the analysand if it is able
to, as I describe above, survive the analysand’s destruction of it. Busch, however,
emphasizes the particularly analytic function of the frame, suggesting that the analytic
frame is characterized “by the principle that the analysand’s free associations are the
primary data upon which the two participants base their understanding” (1995, p. 453;
original emphasis). Further, he argues, “the frame I believe it is necessary to establish is
that it is the patient’s free associations that we will be analyzing, for the purpose of
increasing freedom of thought and the capacity to see these thoughts as psychologically
meaningful” (pp. 453-454). Opdal concurs with Busch’s view, arguing that the
analyst's main task is not to understand everything, but to sustain the analytic
setting. The analyst will support the continuous flow of associations in both the
analysand's and the analyst's minds as well as the evolving experience of objects
and others that may be staged in the analytic setting. (2012, p. 7)
The establishment of a firm analytic frame marks a different space from all that is
uncontained by the frame. Paradoxically, this containment provides a safe space in which
the analysand is given a greater degree of freedom, freedom with which to experiment
and be creative, to play with the psychic material that has previously been only
oppressive. The analytic frame, which marks the analytic space as that in which free
association is the ‘rule’ that the analysand must follow, can survive if the analyst supports
the analysand’s developments of free and freer associations.103 The analyst must be aware

paradox of creativity” (1950, p. 144). Artistic creativity and creative living might therefore both depend on
the same psychological processes of finding and creating reality.
103
R. Lowenstein argues that the analytic setting is part of the fundamental rule and helps to facilitate free
association (1963, pp. 458-459). I investigate these elements of the analytic process – the fundamental rule
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of, and beware of, her own resistance to the psychoanalytic process, be cognizant of the
things she does not want to hear the analysand say. The analyst must maintain her own
boundaries between internal and external in the onslaught of the analysand’s –
particularly the agoraphobic’s – unconscious destruction of them.
In Chapter Four, I argue that it is necessary to follow the method of free
association particular to psychoanalysis in order to effectively address the agoraphobic’s
persistent emptiness. Part of the efficacy of free association is, as Bollas articulates, its
nature as “creative destruction” (1995, p. 53). Using the destructive drive in the service of
creation parallels the creative differentiation at work in the construction of the ego’s
boundaries. Thus, establishing and maintaining the analytic frame in the sense that Busch
describes – that is, as demarcating the analytic space as particular insofar as the
analysand’s free associations are the primary data of analysis – is particularly useful in
countering the therapeutic emphasis on interpreting the transference, which, following
Bollas (2013), can lead to the inhibition of the development of free association.

2.4. Conclusion
Agoraphobia is a problem of boundaries; it is the psychic defence against the insufficient
capacity to experience the world with others without being consumed by them or
destroying them, to share external reality while maintaining ego integrity. Rather than
risk the loss of reality from the threat of a world that is too big, that threatens to
overwhelm and engulf, the agoraphobic closes herself off from experiencing the world at
all and in so doing loses herself regardless. Neither the world nor the self is wholly
satisfying to the individual; one must learn to navigate the in-between and risk the
disintegration of boundaries in order to establish them. The agoraphobic’s threshold
anxiety indicates a lack of clarity as to what is internal and what is external, which leads,
paradoxically, to the absence of “the illusion of a shared world” (Hämäläinen 2009, p.

and the method of free association – in detail in Chapter Four, as well as the relationship between the free
associative process and the development of the transference.
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1286). Instead of illusion, the agoraphobic experiences the shared world as terrifyingly
real.
The agoraphobic patient is overwhelmed by her anxieties, but the correspondence
between the psychical processes of the agoraphobic patient and the normally developing
infant indicates that a developmental tool – namely, the transitional object – may be of
use in the relief of the agoraphobic symptoms of anxiety and avoidance, and also in the
development of a capacity for object-use, which would, I suggest, relieve the persistent
emptiness Milrod (2007) identifies. Clinically, the analytic frame has the potential to
become a transitional object for the analysand. Language (as both perception and
representation), and the particularly psychoanalytic method of free association, is the
means by which this potentiality can be realized. The possibility of new experiences with
a transitional object – if it can survive the analysand’s destruction of it – allows the frame
to be used in the creation of the ego’s boundaries. The non-correspondence between the
unconscious destruction of the internal object and the survival of the external object
creates and clarifies the individual’s sense of internal versus external, which the
agoraphobic has thus far been unable to take for granted. Once ego boundaries are
established, the potential spaces between self and other, and between the ego and its
objects, can thereby be creatively inhabited, with all of the risks and rewards of human
vulnerability.
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Chapter Three: Agoraphobia and Emptiness
In Chapter One, I argued that agoraphobia involves a profound anxiety about the
boundaries between spaces, both physical and psychical. This anxiety is fuelled – if not
caused – by the inability to symbolize (or, more specifically, to engage in the creative
process of symbolization). In Chapter Two, I expanded on the nature of this anxiety and
argued that the agoraphobic is not able to take for granted the distinction between internal
and external, and therefore cannot experience shared reality as illusion. This illusion of
shared reality is necessary for the creative uses of language. The arguments of both
chapters are informed by Milrod’s (2007) finding of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia
patients whose symptoms of anxiety and avoidance have remitted. In this chapter, I
consider Milrod’s article in detail and provide an analysis of the meanings of emptiness
in the psychoanalytic setting.
Standard psychiatric treatment of agoraphobia includes cognitive behavioural
therapy (CBT) combined with pharmacotherapy. This treatment is often effective in the
remission of overt agoraphobic symptoms.104 However, the incidence of relapse is
striking, with rates between 83% and 91% when medication is discontinued without
prolonged maintenance treatment (Wiborg & Dahl, 1996). Milrod, one of the foremost
contemporary theorists of agoraphobia, addresses this problem from a psychoanalytic
perspective, presenting case material of agoraphobia patients who are technically in
remission but experience a persistent psychic emptiness, which, she suggests, may
contribute to agoraphobia’s chronicity (Milrod 2007). Given the important implications
of her finding of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients for the successful treatment
of the disorder long-term, that is, the need to address this persistent emptiness in
agoraphobia patients for whom panic symptoms have remitted, I critique Milrod’s
analysis of the persistent emptiness and propose an alternative explanation with clinical
implications.105
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I discuss the characteristic symptoms and various definitions of agoraphobia in Chapter One. Here, I am
referring specifically to the DSM definition and the particular symptoms of high levels of anxiety and
avoidance of the world outside a self-defined safe space.
105
These findings have not otherwise been addressed in the literature. Strubbe and Vanheule (2014)
provide a technical counterpoint to Milrod and colleagues Panic-Focused Psychodynamic Psychotherapy
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In the first section, I consider the plurality of possible meanings of emptiness in
the psychoanalytic clinic. This first section is composed of three subsections: in the first,
I consider Milrod’s suggestion that persistent emptiness may be indicative of a
development deficit in the form of a weak reflective function. In the second subsection, I
argue that assertions of emptiness in the analytic situation precisely indicate the
unconscious presence of strongly warded-off emotional or cognitive experiences. The
nature of these experiences must be explored with each patient, as they will naturally vary
among individuals. The majority of the psychoanalytic literature on emptiness accords
with Milrod’s interpretation of unconscious rage. However, in the third subsection, I
argue that the clinical material Milrod provides supports an alternative interpretation,
namely, that the subjective experience of emptiness in agoraphobia patients commonly
indicates the presence of significant losses that have yet to be mourned. In the second
section, I provide an analysis of agoraphobic anxieties in the normal process of mourning.
As part of this analysis, I propose several explanations as to why agoraphobia patients, in
particular, defend against mourning. In the third section, I argue that a structural
emptiness exists in all individuals along with the pathological emptiness evident in
certain patients. Pathological emptiness, I argue, is a complex defense organization that
masks overwhelming unconscious material; for the agoraphobia patient, pathological
emptiness is a defense against one’s own aggressivity and the painful experience of
overwhelming loss. Structural emptiness, on the other hand, and as Winnicott argues,106
is the basis for all learning; it is an aspect of the psychical apparatus that allows for the
possibility of new thoughts, feelings, and experiences. An understanding of structural
emptiness does not elucidate the particular meaning of pathological emptiness, but it does
provide a technical counterpoint to the therapeutic emphasis on the transferential
relationship. As I argued in Chapter Two, and below, structural emptiness is a

(PFPP), offering an account of a Lacanian psychoanalysis of a panic patient, but they do not address the
persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) identifies in agoraphobia patients. Reed (2009) refers to Milrod (2007)
only obliquely in an article on Green’s concept of the void; she does not consider agoraphobia, nor does she
directly address the emptiness Milrod identifies.
106
See Chapter Two for my analysis of Winnicott’s arguments. Briefly, emptiness is a psychical response
to hunger; hunger stimulates aggression, which is necessary for healthy ego development insofar as the self
must reject all that does not belong to the self in order to establish the boundaries between self and other.
Further, the experience of emptiness is the basis of all learning and of all new experiences.
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consequence of entering into a language system; by following the psychoanalytic method
of free association and abiding by the fundamental psychoanalytic rule – the pact between
the analysand and the analyst of complete candor and complete discretion respectively –
the analytic couple can make use of this structural emptiness in order to elucidate the
individual meaning(s) of pathological emptiness.

3.1. Meanings of Emptiness
We are all familiar with the feeling of being “full of emptiness.” Emptiness is positive, in
sensation, just as darkness is felt as an actual thing, not the mere absence of light,
whatever we may know. Darkness falls, like a curtain or a blanket. When the light comes,
it drives away the darkness; and so on.
(Isaacs 1948, p. 88)
Milrod (2007) presents the case studies of two agoraphobia patients, Deborah and Rita.
Deborah began treatment of twice-weekly psychodynamic psychotherapy at the age of
twenty-one for panic disorder with severe agoraphobia. Although enrolled as a college
student, she was unable to attend her classes due to the increasing severity of her
symptoms. Anxiety began affecting her school attendance in junior high, though her main
complaints were nausea and dizziness. Milrod’s report indicates that Deborah’s mother
experienced severe separation anxiety when apart from her daughter and limited
Deborah’s social involvement in outings that would result in their separation. Deborah
was an only child with “a childlike manner” and she “ascribed magical, omnipotent
powers to her parents at times of heightened anxiety” (Milrod 2007, p. 1012). She
“wound up repeatedly disappointed and furious if they too ran into difficulties managing
practical problems” (p. 1012). Her agoraphobia remitted after eight months of treatment,
after which emerged the quality of “emptiness.” Rita began four-times-weekly
psychoanalysis at the age of twenty-nine for worsening panic disorder and severe
agoraphobia, despite increasingly aggressive pharmacotherapy and several attempts at
CBT. Her anxiety and agoraphobia symptoms began at the age of eighteen. Following her
first panic attack and a six-week period of being housebound, she was able to return to
school with the aid of pharmaceutical intervention. She worked with her father and lived
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with her husband in her parents’ home. Rita was terrified of being alone and arranged her
time accordingly; any moment she was alone, even at work, she watched television to
“help take her ‘mind off stuff’” (p. 1016). She also exhibited claustrophobic anxieties,
walking up and down twenty-two flights of stairs every day at work rather than taking the
elevator. Rita was an only child, and her parents were “nearly absent” (p. 1016) during
her childhood. Rita’s mother had a phobia of being touched and Rita couldn’t recall ever
being embraced. Rita’s history is quite different from Deborah’s, though their
experiences of emptiness are similar.
Milrod’s description of emptiness includes both an emotional and an intellectual
aspect. She defines the clinical phenomenon that she observes in her agoraphobia patients
as an “inner constriction” that “affects [their] ability to think independently and to lead
emotionally full and intellectually broad and stimulating internal lives” (2007, pp. 10081009). Milrod refers to the phenomenon variously within her article as “emptiness” (p.
1007), “inner constriction” (p. 1008), “internal vacancy” (p. 1009), and “subjective sense
of incompleteness” (p. 1010) without remarking on the very different meanings of each
of these terms. The complexities of the subjective phenomenological experiences of this
emptiness are evident from the connotations of these various terms: emptiness implies a
nothingness and a complete absence; constriction implies an intense anxiety; and,
incompleteness implies a something missing along with the presence of something else.
All of these meanings accord with Milrod’s descriptions of her patients’ experiences at
certain moments; however, Milrod’s use of these various terms without clarification
obscures her intended meaning, which remains unclear throughout the article; or, rather,
the complexity of the phenomenon she encounters in her patients remains to be
explicated.
Milrod argues that it is necessary to determine clinically (and individually)
whether the manifestation of emptiness in analysis is strictly defensive (evident in the
transference) or whether the patient does not have the capacity for thinking about her own
feelings.107 Milrod points to Levy’s (1984) excellent article on emptiness as a reminder to
107

Bion makes a similar distinction regarding types of pathology, summarized by Ferro: “As we know,
Bion distinguishes two types of pathology. The first and more serious concerns a deficiency of the α
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distinguish between these two interpretations of emptiness; however, her emphasis on
maintaining this distinction overshadows the multiplicity of meanings a single patient’s
experience of emptiness may encompass. I return to Levy’s article in order to emphasize
a different point, namely, that emptiness is neither straightforward nor simple. That is,
emptiness in the analytic situation “differs from patient to patient both in how it feels and
in its particular dynamic meaning” (Levy 1984, p. 388; my emphasis). Singer makes a
similar point: the state of emptiness “reflects a spectrum of meanings at one and the same
time” (1977a, p. 460). As with most expressions encountered in the course of an analysis,
the specific meaning or meanings of emptiness must be explored with each patient and
within the context of the analytic situation and the particular analytic moment. Emptiness
includes the patient’s statements of feeling empty and the subjective experience of that
feeling (for the patient and for the analyst, who may approach some experience of the
patient’s emptiness in various ways, including, for example, through the
countertransference). It bears repeating that the meanings of emptiness cannot be
assumed to be fixed.108

function, in which the inability to transform β into α elements is lacking, so that the former are evacuated,
giving rise to hallucinatory and psychosomatic disorders, characteropathies, etc.; while the second, in
which the α function is unimpaired, is observed when the apparatus for thinking thoughts is incapable of
‘handling’ or using these thoughts” (2002, p. 67). See Wilde (2003) for her important analysis of the
relationship between agoraphobia, and the α [alpha] function.
108
The common fantasy that meaning is stable and shared often results in striking miscommunications, a
particularly dangerous interference in the analytic process. This fantasy exists in Lacan’s imaginary
dimension, or register. Fink describes the nature of this potential interference: “In the imaginary register, I
am focused on what I believe the other person is saying and trying to say as opposed to what the other is
actually saying. Insofar as I operate in the imaginary register, I cannot hear a slip of the tongue, because I
immediately correct it in my mind with what I believe the other meant to say. I do not really need to hear
the other speak, because I think I already know what he is going to say, believing that I comprehend his
point of view even before I hear it” (2010, p. 266). Or, in Lacan’s words: “the unconscious shuts down
insofar as the analyst no longer ‘supports speech [porte la parole],’ because he already knows or thinks he
knows what speech has to say” (1955/2006j, p. 297). Bion makes this same point, arguing that the analyst
must suspend his memory, desire, and understanding in order for analytic work to be possible (1984, pp.
143-145, 151). The capacity to tolerate the presence of emptiness is directly related to the capacity to
tolerate the movement between coherence and incoherence; I expand on this point in Chapter Four. For
now, let me emphasize the complexity of emptiness’s meanings, which is also evident in Levy’s
enumeration of emptiness’s multifacedness: “[e]mptiness may appear as a complaint of feeling empty, as a
fear of being empty, or as a belief that someone else is empty. Emptiness may appear along with feelings of
depression, boredom, rage, restlessness, unreality, or may be felt as the entirety of experience, precluding
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Milrod’s priority and, in my view, the success of her article, is the identification
of this emptiness in agoraphobia patients. Secondarily, she offers a number of potential
suggestions to explain this phenomenon. At times, it is difficult to distinguish between
Milrod’s descriptions of the phenomenon and her explanations for it. The first
explanation I discern is the possibility of a developmental deficit in the form of a weak
reflective function (RF).109 Milrod and I agree that RF, as I detail below, refers to the
ability to conceive of mental states in one’s own and in others’ minds, as well as to
conceive of the otherness of others’ mental states. However, there is the possibility of
inferring from the phrase “developmental deficit” the sense that these patients’
experiences and assertions of emptiness indicate an actual emptiness. For example,
Milrod writes: “These patients cannot go out by themselves. The question is, can they
think for themselves either, and if not, why not?” (2007, p. 1011). I caution against this
interpretation of pathological emptiness as it risks, as I argue below, perpetuating the
deeper elements of agoraphobia. Glucksman (2000), for example, makes the distinction
between defense and deficit in patients with affect dysregulation. His clinical report,
however, is of a single patient exhibiting both types of affect dysregulation, indicating the
defensive aspect of any kind of “deficit.” While the term “developmental disturbance” is
surely apt, and we can speak of “deficits of self-representation,” it is, I suggest, both
imprecise and misleading to speak of a developmental deficit. I argue, contrary to Milrod,
that the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness neither indicates an actual emptiness nor can
it be explained by a “developmental deficit” in the form of a weak RF. Further, I contend
that Milrod seems to conflate RF with conscious introspection. I am not suggesting that
these patients do not have a weak RF. I am suggesting, rather, that these patients’

any other feeling” (1984, p. 388). Even if the experience of emptiness “preclud[es] any other feeling,” there
are always feelings about the emptiness, including, for example, frustration, fear, and/or pride.
109
In Rudden et al. (2003), which Milrod co-authored, the authors imply that they agree with Kessler, who
argues against “reductionistic ‘deficit theories’ for panic disorder” (1996, p. 1001). It appears, then, that
Milrod favors a ‘deficit theory’ for the emptiness she finds in agoraphobia patients but not as a theory of
panic disorder itself. Rudden et al. (2003) is not cited in Milrod (2007), and clarification of this apparent
complication is not provided. Further, Milrod argues that panic-focused psychodynamic psychotherapy
(PFPP) with a focus on strengthening RF is an effective treatment for panic disorder; thus, according to her
view, an increase in RF is associated with a decrease in panic symptoms. However, it is not clear how, in
her view, a weak RF explains the persistent emptiness apparent beyond the agoraphobic symptoms of
anxiety and avoidance, which have presumably been alleviated by an increase in RF.
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assertions of emptiness in the analytic session cannot be explained by appeal to the RF in
either Milrod’s use of the term or in the sense Fonagy (1991) originally uses it (which I
explicate below). The second explanation Milrod presents for her patients’ persistent
emptiness is the repression of overwhelming affects, specifically rage.110 Milrod’s
identification of repressed rage hiding behind emptiness accords with much of the
literature and I do not disagree with her interpretations of repressed rage. However, I
offer an alternative analysis of patients’ experiences and assertions of emptiness based on
the clinical material Milrod provides: I argue that the phenomenon of emptiness Milrod
identifies can be better explained by the presence of traumatic and unmourned losses.
Green’s theories of the negative are useful and, as of yet, underemployed in
understanding the clinical phenomenon of emptiness, which – diversely conceived – is a
well-noted phenomenon. The negative, as Kernberg writes in his introduction to Green’s
work, “exceeds by far the death drive, but also includes the expression of the death drive
as an ever present, intrinsic and unavoidable aspect of all object relations” (1999, p. xiv).
Importantly, Green identifies the work of the negative not only in what he calls the
aggressive expressions of the death drive (expressed directly as attacks on self or other)
but also in what he calls the destructive aspect of it. This “disobjectalising” function of
the death drive is characterized by a withdrawal of investment: “Destruction without
aggression can be expressed in a radical withdrawal from objects, or in a tendency to
eliminate the very self as an agency searching for satisfaction” (Kernberg 1999, p. xv).
However, as I discuss in more detail below, the negative, according to Green’s
theorizations, is not fundamentally pathological; rather, the pathological expression of the
negative is only a “‘negativisitic’ vicissitude of a potentially creative negative which
suffering, rage and impotence have distorted and transformed into psychical paralysis”
(Green 1999, p. 5). This description allows us to connect Green’s concept of the negative
with Winnicott’s sense of emptiness as the basis of all learning and all new experiences.

110

Milrod also asks: “From a more behavioral perspective, is it simply that it is only people with no interest
in self-reflection, no curiosity about themselves or the rest of life, who can tolerate the restrictions
engendered by agoraphobia?” (2007, p. 1009). However, she does not appear to consider this as a viable
suggestion and does not provide any further reflection on the possibility.
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Green’s theorizations are relevant here for two reasons: firstly, he draws attention
to the structural aspects of the negative and, thus, emptiness. That is, the negative is an
integral aspect of the ego, not ever only a deficit or a defense. I discuss this element in
detail below, in Section 3.3. Secondly, Green articulates the connection between the
negative and melancholia, and identifies melancholia as a particular instance in which
emptiness – or, the negative – becomes something else, or rather, takes on a different,
more pervasive character. I discuss this element in Section 3.1.iii. Briefly, in melancholia,
the negative acquires a greater complexity, to wit:
We are in an all-too-present world of suffering resulting from loss, but the one
who is suffering cannot know either what he is suffering from or what has caused
his suffering. The more the suffering presents itself as an excess of internal
presence caused by the absence of the lost object, manifesting itself by a psychic
pain, the less the ego knows the nature of this suffering (the hate which is
underlying it) and that of the object which causes it. (Green 1999, pp. 53-54)
The absence of a lost object, then, can become more present than any original presence.
This excessive presence of an absence characterizes melancholia and also, I suggest, the
persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) describes in her agoraphobia patients.

3.1.i. Emptiness as Deficit
As I indicate above, Milrod suggests that agoraphobics’ restricted exploration of the
external world is paralleled by an equally challenged exploration of the inner world, of
“reflecting on their lives or feelings, or permitting themselves to experience their feelings
at all” (2007, p. 1009).111 Milrod utilizes the concept of mentalization, which Fonagy
introduces and defines as “the capacity to conceive of conscious and unconscious mental
111

Bodin (1996) anticipates much of Milrod’s argument and provides a clinical example of a patient
suffering from “claustra agoraphobia” who used practical or physical activities, and an inhibition of her
mentalizing capacities, as a psychic retreat from overwhelming emotional situations. Although Bodin
suggests that Miss P’s increasing ability to mentalize effectuated her decrease in panic symptoms, he also
describes her painful realization that her father had sexually abused her. Although Bodin does not offer
details of this aspect of the analysis, some mourning is implied, as the realization “made her see herself as
an orphan” (p. 187). Bodin also notes the patient’s movement from the paranoid-schizoid position to the
depressive position, again implying the work of mourning in the progress of the analysis and the alleviation
of the patient’s panic symptoms.
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states in oneself and others” (Fonagy 1991, p. 641), as one way of thinking about her
patients’ inner constriction. Milrod argues that the emptiness she observes in her
agoraphobia patients might indicate an inhibition of the operationalized form of
mentalization, that is, a weak RF (pp. 1009, 1011). She suggests that this persistent
emptiness, like an inhibition of the RF, is indicative of a profound inability to relate to
others. Her argument that her agoraphobia patients’ persistent emptiness is connected to a
deficient RF is consistent with her findings (with colleagues) in a pilot study, “Reflective
Functioning in Panic Disorder Patients” (Rudden et al. 2006), which supported the
following hypothesis (based on clinical observations): “panic disorder patients use
defenses involving ‘not knowing’ to defend themselves against the highly charged and
conflicted affective states connected with their symptoms” (p. 1342). Significantly,
despite the inferences Milrod draws, this study did not show that a higher RF was
associated with any significant change in panic symptoms (Rudden et al. 2006, p. 1342),
which suggests that what is “not known” is something other than unconscious
emotional/impulse conflicts. That is, despite Milrod’s (2007) suggestion that her patients
experience emptiness as a symptom of a deficient or inhibited RF – in other words, an
inability to mentalize – the significance of real events that may have contributed to a
limited RF (and thus led to her patients’ experiences of emptiness) is not explored. This
possibility is also not suggested by Rudden et al. (2006). I argue that the analysand’s
assertions of emptiness in the psychoanalytic setting are always, at least in part,
defensive. The experience of emptiness is, in fact, a developmental achievement, and
may be used either defensively or productively, as I argue in more detail below.
I return to Fonagy’s initial conceptualization of mentalization in order to clarify
what the term is meant to refer to, and to indicate its limited applicability in Milrod’s
(2007) patients. I argue that appealing to the concept of mentalization, or the capacity for
RF, as an explanation for assertions of emptiness assumes a causal relationship between
the two where only a correspondence can be shown; that is, do these patients experience,
or assert, feelings of emptiness because they have a deficient RF or does the concept of
RF merely describe, and not explain, the pathological experience of emptiness? Fonagy
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(1991) links the “capacity to mentalize”112 with the capacity for symbolization, although
he prefers the specificity of the concept of mentalization given the wide array of
meanings related to symbolization in the psychoanalytic literature.113 However, despite
this terminological manoeuvre, mentalization and symbolization are conceptually linked;
that is, mentalization is a process of representation, with significant consequences for the
individual’s experiences of self and other. Without this capacity, the separation of self
and other (or self and object) is constantly threatened (Fonagy 1991, p. 642). The
tenuousness of this separation, or boundary (as I argued in Chapter One), is a
fundamental aspect in agoraphobia. Furthermore, the representation of affect, as idea, “is
crucial in the achievement of control of overwhelming affect” (Fonagy 1991, p. 642). The
inability to idealize, or represent affects mentally, of both self and other, consequently
means that “affect in others can be appreciated only through direct experiencing via
emotional resonance” (p. 642). That is, for those with an inability, or limited ability, to
mentalize, affective experiences of others are knowable only through an elision of the
divide between self and other. This affective experience is easily overwhelming. The
subjective experience of emptiness can be used as a defence against the overwhelming
experience of an other’s affective life because the boundary between self and other is
only, if at all, nebulously conceived. The agoraphobic asserts her own emptiness in order
to avoid being overwhelmed by her own emotional reality (specifically, her unconscious
rage and/or unresolved loss) and, because of her inability to distinguish between her own
emotional reality and that of her objects, to defend against being overwhelmed by others’
emotional states. I am not, then, suggesting that Milrod’s (2007) patients do not exhibit a
weak or inhibited RF; I am suggesting, on the one hand, that assertions of emptiness
cannot be explained by an inhibition of the RF and, on the other hand, that assertions of
112

The concept of mentalizing, though introduced and elaborated by Fonagy, is evident in the early work of
Ferenczi (1926). Ferenczi introduces the term psychophobia to describe the inhibition of what Fonagy will
later call mentalization. Psychophobia is a regression to a “purely materialistic phase, characterized by
excessive (perhaps even entire) projection (Ferenczi 1926, p. 318). For Ferenczi, negation, as a capacity for
differentiation, is connected with autonomy. The ability to conceive of mental states in others’ minds, as
well as the otherness of others’ mental states, is a critical component of the mentalizing faculty. Negation
and the capacity to tolerate one’s own aggressivity are thus intimately linked with the reflective function.
113
I discussed symbolization in the psychoanalytic literature briefly in Chapter Two. In this thesis, my use
of the term symbolization refers to the use of language as a system of symbols. Engaging in a process of
symbolization, then, simply means putting one’s thoughts and feelings into words. See also infra note 6.
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emptiness do not indicate a developmental deficit. As I indicate above, it is, in my view,
more accurate and productive to describe this psychical phenomenon as a “developmental
disturbance” in the form of a “deficit of self-representation.”
Fonagy and Target suggest that the psychological impetus for the development of
RF is as follows: “By attributing mental states to others, children make people’s
behaviour meaningful and predictable” (1997, pp. 679-680; original emphasis). The
capacity does not depend on a particularly high level of intellectual activity; rather, the
emphasis is on behaviour rather than cognition. Fonagy and Target emphasize that the
point “is not that the individual should be able to articulate this [knowledge]
theoretically” (1997, p. 680; original emphasis). Further, they distinguish RF from the
conscious act of introspection: “Introspection or self-reflection is quite different from
reflective function as the latter is an automatic procedure, unconsciously invoked in
interpreting human action” (p. 681). The intellectual gains Milrod identifies in her
patient, Rita, as indicative of an improved RF, then, are not consistent with Fonagy and
Target’s development of the concept. Milrod indicates that Rita “was able to see that
Laura [her daughter] was in part expressing despair about the emotional and physical
distance her mother seemed to require from her, and she also recognized that she herself
must have been in a similar emotional situation with her own mother”; Milrod suggests
that this recognition “demonstrates considerable improvement in reflective capacity”
(2007, p. 1020). However, Milrod appears to be conflating reflective capacity with
conscious introspection, and mistakenly characterizing the cognitive and intellectual
gains Rita has made as unconscious emotional knowledge. Milrod indicates the limits of
Rita’s gain as a conscious development insofar as “this understanding did not alter Rita’s
need to distance herself from Laura and her emotional demands, nor did it make her more
empathic with her daughter’s distress” (2007, p. 1020). Again, despite Milrod’s
characterization of this intellectual understanding as a gain in reflective capacity, it lacks
the unconscious dimension by which that capacity is defined. The limited development of
RF is likely connected, in my opinion, to the relationship of Rita and Deborah to their
phobic companions (often mothers), whose behaviour was “routinely self-absorbed or
thoughtless and controlling toward them” (p. 1021). Although Milrod indicates, and I
agree, that this “parental input” cannot be considered the sole etiological factor in the
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development of agoraphobia, this thoughtless behaviour could be (and ought to be)
considered a key element in the patients’ inhibition of their RF. The relevance of parental
treatment of these patients as objects rather than as thinking and feeling individuals
clearly affects the patients’ own sense of themselves as thinking and feeling individuals. I
suggest, then, that the development of agoraphobia and the development, or inhibition, of
RF follow two independent courses. This suggestion is supported by much of the research
on RF in individuals with, for example, borderline personality disorder (see, for example,
Levy et al. 2006). It is also supported by Graf (2009), the results of which determined that
the capacity for reflective functioning is not related to the severity of an individual’s
agoraphobia.
Fonagy (1991) indicates that the inhibition of the RF (mentalization) is in itself a
defensive function, even as it prohibits the development of more mature defensive
functions such as repression. This point is sometimes lost in subsequent discussions of
mentalization (which is now a popular concept in contemporary circles). To emphasize,
then: mentalization is a capacity that depends on particular environmental factors in order
to develop interrelationally; and, the inhibition of mentalization is also a relatively
primitive defense brought about by psychic trauma. These two factors are undoubtedly
related insofar as the psychic trauma that the inhibition of mentalization responds to is
most likely not uncommonly the failure in some way of the facilitating environment to
provide the necessary factors for the safe development of the mentalizing capacity: to
practice mentalizing. This connection is suggested by Fonagy’s presentation of some
case material of a borderline patient, Mr. S,114 marked by an inhibition of his mentalizing
capacity and also by severe abuse suffered at the hands of his father and a severely
depressive and intermittently suicidal mother.115
114

Mr. S’s referring psychotherapist characterized him as narcissistic, schizoid, and prone to
intellectualizing affective life. Fonagy notes his “transient psychotic-like episodes” (1991, p. 642). Again, I
emphasize the complexities of psychic life and the co-existence of schizoid, psychotic, neurotic, and
normal elements. While Fonagy develops the concept of mentalization through his work with borderline
patients, he clarifies his own use of the term “borderline” as more descriptive, in distinction to the
psychiatric diagnosis.
115
As becomes increasingly clear to Fonagy through the course of the analysis, this patient’s “experience of
his mental self as empty, his experience of me [Fonagy] as non-human and his apparent inability to
conceive of my [Fonagy’s] mental state to a degree that might permit communication could be understood
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Fonagy details the defensive aspect of the inhibition of the mentalizing capacity,
arguing that, at least in the case of borderline functioning, 116 the inhibition of
mentalization is “self-imposed and partial” (1991, p. 651). Even in the context of RF,
then, the assertion of a psychic emptiness ought never to be taken as a purely descriptive
manoeuvre; the subjective experience of emptiness does not indicate an absolute
emptiness, but rather an inhibition of the awareness of aliveness due in part to an
incomplete (or malformed; perverted) sense of the other in the self and the self in the
other. Singer offers some clinical vignettes of borderline patients which support this
argument and from which he similarly concludes: “behind the defensive scotoma or
erasure, was the unacceptable and painful sensations rather than a structural defect”
(1977a , p. 465).117 The significance of emptiness thus exceeds reflective functioning’s
definitional reach. While a limited capacity to reflect on one’s own mental state, and on
thinking and feeling more generally, likely results in an experience of emptiness, the
agoraphobic’s experience of persistent emptiness is not sufficiently explained by a

as an inhibition of and defence against conceiving of his own or his objects’ mental functioning” (1991, p.
647; emphasis added). Again, a limited reflective function is already indicative of a defensive inhibition,
even as it also indicates some inability to mentalize.
116
Connections between Fonagy’s description of his borderline patient and the persistent emptiness Milrod
describes in her agoraphobia patients are evident. Fonagy writes of his experiences with his Mr. S: “It was
not just his expressionless voice and matter-of-fact, harsh way of speaking but also the content of his
utterances that left me with a sense of emptiness which I gradually realized was an echo of something that
Mr. S experienced” (1991, p. 644; my emphasis). Following a “bad” dream of “a bureau with many
drawers” which “should be full, yet […] were empty,” Fonagy interprets Mr. S’s “fear of finding only
emptiness in himself and me [Fonagy]” and his fear that his relationship with Fonagy, experienced as an
intimacy, “might replace his [the patient’s] emptiness in a way that threatened to make him feel entrapped
and suffocated” (p. 644; original emphasis). Fonagy describes this movement between the fear of a vast,
isolating emptiness and the fear of a suffocating intimacy as “claustra-agoraphobic shuttling” (p. 644, n. 1),
again underscoring the connections between the type of borderline patient/behaviour Fonagy uses to
exemplify the concept of mentalization and the anxieties of the agoraphobia patients discussed here.
Fonagy suggests that, given the patient’s inability to mentalize, “analytic self-reflection could only yield to
him a nameless dread of mental emptiness” (p. 644; my italics). Milrod also notes her patients’ dread of
their own emptiness, further suggesting that this emptiness is not a pure emptiness, but is rather an
emptiness replete with affective meaning. Significantly, and perhaps a notable distinction between the
experiences of borderline and agoraphobic patients, Fonagy’s patient seemed to experience his emptiness as
“a background against which the rest of the analysis took place” rather than as “a peremptory response to
anxiety” (p. 644).
117
See Kohut (1971) for an example of an argument for the deficiency state of emptiness. Similar to
Milrod, he argues that an empty state occurs due to the failure to internalize the idealized object at a
particular stage of development due to experiences of disappointments, frustrations, and absences.
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deficiency in reflective functioning. Further, while agoraphobia patients exhibit an
inhibited RF, it is not their assertions of emptiness that tell us so.
Here, Green’s (1999) concept of negative hallucination118 may be instructive.
Referring specifically to work with borderline patients,119 Green draws our attention to
particular moments when the analysand fails to understand the analyst’s words, or fails to
recognize her own words when the analyst’s reminds her of them: he identifies such
moments as involving a “psychical agnosia”120 (1999, p. 175), a term that, in my view,
encompasses the existence of psychical material and the analysand’s inability to access it.
While this inability may correspond to a weak or underdeveloped RF, there is no
confusion about an analysand’s assertions of emptiness being taken as fact.
Milrod suggests a possible meaning of emptiness in the clinical situation that is
particular to the agoraphobic: “fears of the unsafe external world reflect and mirror an
inner fear of the internal world, or of thinking and intense emotions” (2007, p. 1010). The
implication of Milrod’s argument is that the overt symptoms by which agoraphobia is
defined conceal the covert aspect of this pathology; external space is anxiously avoided
as a projection of anxieties about internal (that is, psychical) space, including one’s
impulses and object relations. The implication of this suggestion supports my argument

118

Green distinguishes between repression – “employed against the internal processes of drives, affects,
and representations” – and negative hallucination, effectuated against either internal or external
perceptions, and cautions against confusing perceptions and representations (1999, p. 194). As I indicated
in Chapter Two, language is both a representation and a perception (we find it and we create it): “it
represents the relation between things and the relations of thought relations making it possible for the latter
to be perceived” (Green 1999, p. 197). Language’s doubled nature as both perception and representation
leads Green to distinguish “the silence of an absence of speech” and the silence “of the formation of words
as tools for thinking” (p. 197). This latter silence characterizes negative hallucination and may be linked to
Bion’s concept of the alpha function, or the absence of the capacity to think thoughts and to make
experiences (beta elements) meaningful. See also infra note 107.
119
Green links negative hallucination to alexithymia and psychosomatosis without much elaboration (1999,
p. 174); the kernel that connects them is the inability to symbolize, or nominate, unconscious affects and
thus to have them.
120
Freud (1891) introduced the term “agnosia” to describe a neurological disturbance in the recognition of
objects. Contemporary neuropsychology distinguishes many types of agnosia, which can affect visual,
tactile, or auditory objects. Despite its symptoms, agnosia is not a disorder of the senses. Rather, for those
with agnosia, a normal part of their life “has somehow been stripped of its meaning” (Teuber 1968, p. 293).
See also Heilman and Valenstein (2011). Green’s suggestion of “psychical agnosia” precisely implies the
individual’s inability to recognize or process words of psychical and emotional significance.
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that the concept of RF cannot be utilized to explain the agoraphobic’s persistent
emptiness and, more specifically, that the inhibition of RF is always to some degree
defensive. That is, emptiness does not only involve the incapacity for self-reflection, but
indicates a defense against what reflection reveals. The outside world still exists, even if
the agoraphobic never ventures beyond the threshold of her self-defined safe space;
likewise, the inner world is never “empty,” though it may remain unexplored.

3.1.ii. Emptiness as Defense
The patient’s declaration of emptiness in analysis indicates a paradox: while it serves a
defensive function, it also draws attention to the repression of unbearable or forbidden
thoughts and feelings. Klein argues that “certain manifestations of very acute anxiety and
the specific defence mechanisms against this anxiety (particularly an increase in denial
of psychic reality) indicate that an internal situation predominates at the time” (1940, p.
365, n. 1; my emphasis). Although Klein is not referring to agoraphobia or emptiness in
particular, the relevance is clear: emptiness can be seen as a defence mechanism against
very acute anxiety insofar as it involves “an increase in denial of psychic reality.” The
very declaration of this emptiness points to the fact of an overwhelming internal situation.
The expression of emptiness “becomes in this sense the conscious experience of the
absence of warded-off wishes along with their associated fantasies” (Levy 1984, p. 389;
my emphasis). Emptiness is related to negation121 insofar as “a positive assertion that
something is not there is required to maintain repression” (Levy 1984, p. 389). Negation
is “already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is
repressed” (Freud 1925b, p. 236). The same psychical movement is apparent in
complaints of emptiness: there is something identified as emptiness, though the affective
content (or the historical reality) of that something, of the emptiness, remains repressed.
121

See Chapter Two for my discussion of the intellectual function of negation and its role in the
development of a sense of self distinct from the world. Insofar as the individual uses negation as a mediator
between external reality and psychical reality, it relates analogously to assertions of emptiness: that which
is denied must first be unconsciously understood to exist. This denial must be treated appropriately, as a
marker of a significant unconscious presence. Negation is a specific, and relatively sophisticated, psychical
process that may be considered a manifestation of Green’s concept of the negative.
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As Freud observed, “we never discover a ‘no’ in the unconscious and […] recognition of
the unconscious on the part of the ego is expressed in a negative formula” (1925b, p.
239). Therefore, the assertion “I am empty” already indicates the presence of something
unconscious. Levy emphasizes this critical point regarding experiences of emptiness:
assertions of emptiness may not always be predominantly defensive, but they are never
only descriptive; that is, the analysand’s assertions of emptiness cannot be taken as
accurately and comprehensively describing her inner world, however “empty” she may
feel. A patient can express the subjective feeling of emptiness, but, as indicated above,
the subjective feeling of emptiness is the conscious experience of unconscious material:
the manifestation of latent meaning: “emptiness, despite its conscious assertion of the
absence of something, portrayed in spacial and bodily terms, always consists of more or
less specific latent mental content which, when brought to light, helps delineate and
clarify the mental activity [...] represented by emptiness” (Levy 1984, p. 396; internal
reference omitted).122
Emptiness is also related to negation insofar as meaning is established by
discrimination or exclusion, a necessarily aggressive repudiation. The patient might
experience an emptiness that indicates an inability to exclude, to aggressively repel
otherness; emptiness, then, may also be a ‘too much,’ which one can think of as an
emptiness of ‘self-ness.’ Ellonen-Jéquier (2009) aptly explores the potential fullness of
asserted emptiness in a psychotic patient. Specifically, the analysis progressed
significantly when Ellonen-Jéquier interpreted to her patient how much work went into
her (the patient’s) creation of nothingness or emptiness. Prior to this interpretation, the
patient had thought she was, in actuality, “deficient in certain [intellectual] areas” (p.
849). Echoing Levy’s statement of caution, Ellonen-Jéquier emphasizes that the ego is
doing a significant amount of work in the creation of emptiness. She writes:
I was able not to fall into the trap of believing that there was a real emptiness or
that some aspects were actually missing; the danger would have been to think, for
122

I do not disagree with Levy’s point that assertions of emptiness always refer to unconscious psychical
content; however, I add that the experience of emptiness is also constitutive of psychical life. Emptiness is
structurally related to incoherence, which is one aspect of unconscious activity. I explore this connection
between emptiness, incoherence, and psychical life below and further in Chapter Four.
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example, that her ego had to be strengthened123 – whereas, in fact, her ego was
already powerful and highly active, although in a particular manner. Believing
that something was actually deficient would have entailed going along with the
patient’s defence mechanisms. (p. 864; original emphasis)
Even if a patient’s subjective experience indicates, for example, a low capacity for
reflection, it would be a mistake to believe that the patient’s assertion of emptiness is
indicative of an actual, unconscious absence. Furthermore, as Levy also indicates, the
temptation and the mistake would be “to view emptiness as the state of things for a
person, as patients often aggressively insist upon,” which would “deprive the patient of
the opportunity to ‘fill in’ his awareness of his always active inner life” (1984, p. 396;
original emphasis). Ellonen-Jéquier also “emphasized her [the patient’s] destructiveness”
(2009, p. 847), engaging with the patient’s aggressive wishes and phantasies in relation to
emptiness. The patient’s destructiveness was evident in the manner in which she
“suppress[ed] all space between meanings” (p. 862) and “was gradually making me [the
analyst] into almost nothing – I felt paralysed, I had no ideas, no feelings when I was with
her” (p. 847). Transformation only became possible through the analyst’s interpretation
of the work that the patient put into the creation of emptiness, or nothingness, in herself
and in the analytic relationship. The patient was eventually able to express the effect of
these interpretations: because the analyst “hadn’t tried to fill up any gaps,” the patient
was able to see “that her feeling of emptiness was the outcome of the work she was doing
inside herself” (p. 849).
Milrod indicates the defensive aspects of her patients’ persistent emptiness, noting
that Deborah’s “emptiness had a partially defensive quality” (2007, p. 1015) and that
Rita’s “inability to think” was an “enormous resistance” to their analytic work (p. 1020).
Despite Milrod’s emphasis on the need to differentiate between emptiness as a defense
and emptiness as a deficit, it is evident that these two meanings might occur at different
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Although Freud refers to strengthening a weakened ego (1940, pp. 180-181), it is clear that the term
“strength” must refer to the ego’s original function, “to meet the demands raised by its three dependent
relations – to reality, to the id and to the super-ego – and nevertheless at the same time to preserve its own
organization and maintain its own autonomy” (1940, p. 172). A “weakened” ego, then, is not the same as a
deficient ego. The work of analysis, if it can be said to strengthen the ego, must refer to re-organizing the
ego’s efforts, which are overworked by the demands of the neurosis.
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times, or simultaneously, in the same patient.124 Indeed, Eigen argues that these two
elements are “profoundly linked” (1993, p. 216).125 The defensive activity of declarations
of emptiness emerges out of a “destructive hate,” which we can also characterize as rage,
anger, or the work of the death drive. I draw attention to Eigen in order to again
emphasize the insufficiency of the ‘deficit theory’ of emptiness and in order to highlight
the importance of unconscious affects in the clinical assertion of emptiness, specifically
rage. Milrod highlights her patients’ unconscious rage, noting Deborah’s “rage at her
mother’s controlling anxiety and chronic depression” and her “unconscious death wishes
toward her mother” (2007, p. 1012); Milrod suggests that Deborah’s anxiety is in fact
“fuelled by her rage at her mother” (p. 1013). Rita’s analysis focused at times on “her
overwhelming rage at her parents” (p. 1018) and, “after years,” Rita “had a growing
understanding that her excessive anxiety about being apart from her parents was
connected to her long-standing unconscious murderous rage at them” (p. 1019).
Similarly, Singer indicates that the conscious experience of emptiness may occur “over
fear of one’s murderous, rageful impulses […], so that rather than feel full of evil and
power, one feels weak, useless and empty” (1977a, p. 463). Ironically, fear of one’s own
hostility leads to the destruction, via defense, of one’s powerful (and useful)
aggressiveness. As a corollary, the pleasure, or gratification, patients’ exhibit in their own
emptiness, particularly within the analytic context where emptiness becomes resistance to
the analytic work, further indicates the work of the death drive. LaFarge (1989),126 Levy
(1984),127 and Ellonen-Jéquier (2009)128 highlight the gratifying aspect of emptiness,
further supporting my argument that assertions of emptiness can neither be taken at face
124

See, for example, Glucksman (2000).
Eigen (1993) provides a brief discussion of a vignette Bion offers of a psychotic patient. He comments
on the impossibility of knowing whether the patient’s “lack of discipline, his inability or refusal to conform
to the rules of discourse” stems from “destructive hate” or a “deficiency.” This impossibility, he argues,
“suggests how profoundly linked these two elements are” (p. 216).
126
LaFarge suggests that the defensive function of emptiness is, in particular, a defense against “aggressive
object relations,” noting the “interplay of such empty states with aggressive fantasies” (1989, p. 986). She
emphasizes “the highly deviant aspects of these states” (p. 994).
127
Levy cautions analysts against the temptation of “joining the empty patient” in the maintenance of
“ultimately pathological gratifications” (1984, p. 403; my emphasis).
128
“In the analysis of psychotic patients, I have always noted the hidden pleasure they take in the emptiness
that they create – forcing the other person to go looking for them – a pleasure that is mixed with feelings of
revenge and persecution” (Ellonen-Jéquier 2009, p. 859).
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value, that is, as indicating an actual emptiness, nor explained as a “developmental
deficit.”
LaFarge (1989) argues that the experience of emptiness is, in fact, a
developmental achievement. Following Isaacs, to whom I allude in the epigraph at the
beginning of this chapter, LaFarge writes: “empty states are not a normal experience of
early childhood. The young child does not see absence or darkness as empty, but fills the
empty space with negative feelings and fears” (1989, p. 992). In Isaacs’s words, “the
absence of satisfaction is felt as a positive evil. Loss, dissatisfaction or deprivation are
felt in sensation to be positive, painful experiences” (1948, p. 88). LaFarge also
highlights Winnicott’s (1974) idea of the fear of breakdown129 and emphasizes that “the
child’s ability to maintain the idea of an absence, without filling the empty space, [is] a
developmental accomplishment” (1989, p. 992). That is to say, the developmental deficit
would be an inability to experience emptiness. These are two different but related points:
the subjective experience of emptiness is not a naturally occurring state, but must be
learned. Emptiness may be used as a defence or it may be experienced as a potentiality to
new experiences; in either case, it is a complex state, indicating a relatively high degree
of psychical development. Assertions of emptiness in the analytic space are thus
distinguished from the experience of emptiness.
We might better understand the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness if we think not
of her emptiness as being revealed, but of the affective content of her psychic reality
being emptied. She ‘empties’ herself of anxiety, but is then unable to experience much
feeling at all. LaFarge describes this phenomenon of emptying in severely ill borderline
patients and notes that her patient’s “emergence from her ‘empty’ state was accompanied
by anxiety” (1989, p. 983). The exchange, so to speak, between emptiness and anxiety is
also evident in Ellonen-Jéquier’s patient, for whom the discovery of “all kinds of aspects
of life” were met with “tremendous happiness, of course, but also a great deal of anxiety”
(2009, p. 851). While this patient seems to have been able to fill her emptiness with more
feelings and the capacity to bear more of the happiness and sadness that life brings,
129

I explore Winnicott’s idea of the fear of breakdown and primitive anxieties in Chapter Two on the
development of the ego. I connect this idea to the concept of Nachträglichkeit and the use of language in
the psychoanalytic situation in Chapter Four.
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Milrod’s (2007) patients seem to have exchanged their intense anxiety for a life emptied
of emotional experiences.130 At the same time, there are many hints in Milrod’s
descriptions of both Deborah and Rita that suggest an on-going intense anxiety. Deborah,
Milrod reports, “became anxious about the expectation of thinking and talking about her
thoughts and feelings in therapy” (2007, p. 1014). While Milrod suggests that Deborah’s
emotional life was now “free of anxiety” (p. 1015), she goes on to describe Deborah’s
“underlying terror of depression and her deep terror of being unable to be different, or to
be separate from her mother” (p. 1016). After years of psychoanalysis, Rita was able to
move out of her parents’ house with her husband and have a child with him; however,
despite saying that she “loved her daughter,” Rita “found it difficult to spend much time
with her” and found her daughter’s expressions of emotional needs “’somewhat
sickening’” (p. 1020). Rita continued to experience a “terror of asserting herself at all” (p.
1018). Both Rita and Deborah “remained unable to tolerate intimacy, intense emotions, or
very much thinking” (p. 1021). Despite the remission of their agoraphobic anxiety, it is
evident that both Rita’s and Deborah’s emotional lives are greatly coloured by a profound
anxiety concerning the limits of their selves, the limits of their emotional effects, and the
limits of their rage.
The subjective experience of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients beyond
the remittance of their overt symptoms shares some qualities of the experience of
emptiness in psychotic, narcissistic, schizoid, and borderline patients discussed by other
analysts’ case reports. This subjective experience of emptiness is primarily defensive, and
arguments that it indicates a developmental deficit are unconvincing; rather, assertions of
conscious emptiness are a form of negation that specifically indicate the intensity of an
unconscious emotional experience. Although for some patients the feeling of emptiness
itself causes a profound anxiety, for others the emergence from an empty state increases
the level of anxiety. Analyses of the subjective experience of emptiness in patients
130

Singer suggests, however, that in borderline patients, an increased sense of emptiness is associated with
increased anxiety, connected to the quality of their emptiness that includes the dissolution of the self. The
affective experiences associated with persecutory internal objects is preferable to their absence, which is
experienced as a loss of the self (not a part of the self that can be mourned, but a loss of the self’s essence,
so to speak) (1977b, p. 476). The loss of self is accompanied by an increase in anxiety, hence the great
potential for suicide that Singer identifies.
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suffering from a range of disorders include an emphasis on the patients’ unconscious rage
and aggressivity, particularly towards (ambivalently) loved objects. Although one of the
primary affects emptiness defends against is murderous rage, or any aggressive impulse,
grief is another affect that requires particular attention but is infrequently recognized in
the literature. As I discuss below, the relationship between emptiness and melancholia
suggests that, for Milrod’s patients at least,131 the loss of agoraphobic anxieties results in
feelings of emptiness when traumatic losses are not mourned. One of these losses
particular to agoraphobia patients is the unconscious tie to the phobic companion. In the
next section, I explore the relationship between loss and anxiety, and experiences of
emptiness in agoraphobia patients for whom significant losses have not yet been
mourned.

3.1.iii. Melancholia: Emptiness and Anxiety
The connection between experiences of emptiness and melancholia is especially relevant
in agoraphobia patients. A contemporary respondent to Westphal’s early article on
agoraphobia draws this connection: “the case seems essentially a form of mental
depression in certain faculties […] closely allied to what is called simple melancholia”
(White 1884, p. 1141).132 In a letter to Fleiss, Freud mentions briefly: “Melancholia
appears in typical combination with severe anxiety” (1985/1895, p. 98). Freud also adds a
short addendum to Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) in an attempt to ask some
of the very difficult questions surrounding psychological responses to loss. Namely, he
asks: “when does separation from an object produce anxiety, when does it produce
mourning and when does it produce, it may be, only pain?” (p. 169). Although Freud
suggests that the answers to this question continue to elude him, he offers one point that
may be of help to us here: “When there is physical pain, a high degree of what may be
termed narcissistic cathexis of the painful place occurs. This cathexis continues to
131

Milrod indicates that the case studies she provides are more typical than exceptional in her many years
of experience (2007, p. 1022). Bodin (1996) provides another discussion of a patient with “claustra
agoraphobia” who uses coherence and “the silencing method” (1996, p. 181) as defenses against
overwhelming affect (connected to discordant ideas). See infra note 111.
132
I discussed the history of the concept of agoraphobia in detail in Chapter One.
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increase and tends, as it were, to empty the ego” (p. 171; my emphasis). An unbearable
level of pain – whether physical or psychical, I contend – is accompanied by a kind of
emptiness, a protective emptying of the ego, though what exactly the meaning of that
emptiness is Freud never says.133 In her influential article on agoraphobia, Deutsch also
indicates some relationship between the two pathological states: “The process [of
phobias] reminds us of melancholia. There the object is introjected and its fate – the
threat of death and the reaction of anxiety in the imperilled ego – is through the
destructive instinct inflicted on the subject’s own ego” (1929, p. 68).134
Despite these early, though brief, acknowledgements of the relevance of
melancholia in understanding agoraphobia (and necessarily vice versa), the relationship
between agoraphobia and melancholia has not, as of yet, been developed in the
psychoanalytic literature.135 As Rudden et al. (2003) indicate, major depression is often
comorbid with panic disorder. This comorbidity assumes, or follows from, a psychiatric
diagnostic mode. The literature on both depression and panic disorder focuses on
unconscious conflicts, particularly on guilt over aggression (which, in depression, is
turned against the self). The need for mourning traumatic losses in patients with
depression is not commonly discussed. Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) draws attention to the
connections between attachment and separation, anxiety, and loss. The second volume in
Bowlby’s trilogy focuses on anxiety and the third on depression, indicating – as Bowlby
133

We also note that grief is a complicated process: more than the sadness resulting from a loss, grief
includes suffering the loss and, as Klein (1940) writes, doing the painful work of rebuilding the internal
world bereft of the lost object. Klein, in fact, offers this solution to Freud’s question as to why mourning is
so painful: “[t]he pain experienced in the slow process of testing reality in the work of mourning thus seems
to be partly due to the necessity, not only to renew the links to the external world and thus continuously to
re-experience the loss, but at the same time and by means of this to rebuild with anguish the inner world,
which is felt to be in danger of deteriorating and collapsing” (1940, p. 354). Although Freud seemed not to
understand why mourning is so painful, the fact that it is indeed very painful work cannot be overstated. In
melancholia, the bereft individual attempts to avoid suffering the loss which she has endured. Of course, in
order to avoid suffering a loss, we must never have had it (the lost object) in the first place: an ultimately
untenable paradox that the melancholic attempts to inhabit.
134
I will not go into detail here about the process Deutsch describes, as I have done so in Chapter One. My
point here is to emphasize the connection between the development of phobias (including agoraphobia,
which is the main subject of Deutsch’s article) and melancholia.
135
One exception to this absence in the literature is Bion, who describes the impairment of mourning and,
consequently, symbolization, in claustrophobia (and agoraphobia), which he considers to be a result of an
intolerance of frustration (1962a, 1965). See Willoughby (2001) for a Bionian analysis of claustrophobia.
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and others theorize elsewhere – the assumed progression of separation: from protest, to
yearning and searching (anxiety), and, finally, to detachment (melancholia). The more
complex relationship between anxiety and mourning (beyond melancholia or depression)
is not developed,136 although Rey briefly notes of schizoid patients exhibiting claustroagoraphobia: “What was extremely useful to the patients was [...] a developing capacity
to think and experience mourning and reparation” (1994, p. 85). In the psychiatric
literature, the connection between anxiety and depression is more elaborated, insofar as
low dosages of some antidepressants offer relief to many patients who suffer from panic
attacks.137 However, the question of why anxiety may be relieved for some individuals
with antidepressants is not addressed.138
In this subsection, I consider the connections between the agoraphobic’s persistent
emptiness and melancholia. I argue that the agoraphobic, having finally escaped, so to
speak, the maddening cycle of anxiety and avoidance, situates herself in a new cycle of
avoiding grief and mourning (and the specific anxiety that mourning includes) by
immersing herself in emptiness, or, in other words, by emptying herself of as much
emotional content as possible. Above, I argued that assertions of emptiness in the analytic
situation are not to be taken literally; that is, that the subjective feeling of emptiness is the
conscious experience of an unconscious something. The nature of that something
necessarily varies from patient to patient, and from moment to moment. I also argued, in
agreement with Milrod, that one of the affects likely to be repressed and hidden behind an
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There are two articles in the psychoanalytic literature on the relationship between claustrophobia and
depression. Gehl notes: “In frequent, rather dramatic episodes in treatment, interpretations have succeeded
in greatly lessening the phobic anxiety only to find a melancholic state replacing it. At other times a state of
depression has been relieved, only to find a claustrophobia making its appearance” (1964, p. 312). Asch
argues that both claustrophobia and depression are specific reactions to the threatened loss of an object; he
suggests that “the clinical picture of claustrophobia appears in place of depression when there is threatened
object loss in an ego that has developed a propensity for displacement and avoidance” (1966, p. 728). I
argue that melancholia (that is, depression, or defences against mourning) is particularly strong in the
agoraphobic patient precisely because of this “propensity for […] avoidance.”
137
See, for example, Mitte (2005).
138
For examples within the psychiatric literature on the co-morbidity of panic disorder and depression, or
agoraphobia and depression, see Breier et al. (1984), Kessler et al. (1998), Marchand et al. (1994),
Starcevic et al. (1992), and Westenberg (1998). Rudden et al. (1996) provide an overview of this literature,
concluding similarly that the psychological meanings of this comorbidity are largely unexplored in the
psychiatric literature.
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emptiness is the patient’s aggressivity and murderous rage. Here, I argue that another
affect likely to be replaced by an emptiness particularly relevant to agoraphobia patients
is loss, either the real loss of a loved object or the loss of the fantasies upon which the
agoraphobic anxieties were maintained; perhaps, of course, both of these kinds of losses
are present in any particular patient.
Before moving on to an examination of melancholia in agoraphobia patients, I
bring our attention to some more terminological complications. Steiner offers an
important note about the psychological terminology for the various processes involved in
mourning:
It is confusing that the word depression has been applied both to the state that
accompanies mourning and to that which results from the defences mounted
against mourning. The path that leads towards facing the loss, and mourning it, is
associated with painful depressive feelings, involving guilt, regret, remorse, and a
wish to make reparation. These feelings were thought by Klein [1952] to represent
the depressive position and are very different from those observed in depressive
illness. Although mixed states are common, severe depressive illness or
melancholia results from defences against loss and hence against all those feelings
associated with the depressive position. The clinically depressed patient is likely
to suffer anxiety and persecution, to harbour grievance, and to deploy manic and
obsessional defences that aid in denying the reality of the loss. (2011, p. 151)
Clinical depression is caused, not by loss itself, but by the avoidance of grief in the face
of loss. As Steiner notes, “mixed states are common”; indeed, during a state of acute
mourning there will almost necessarily be moments of pathological depression
(melancholia). In the psychiatric mode, these moments are not diagnosed as depression
because the duration of the state is an integral aspect of the definition. However, we
expect that those individuals doing the work of mourning will occasionally vacillate
between mourning and melancholia, that is, between mourning and defending against
mourning.
Freud offers the following symptomatological description of melancholia: it
includes “a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of
the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding
feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and
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culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment” (1917, p. 244; my emphasis). We
quickly note the similar experiences of emptiness in agoraphobia patients whose overt
symptoms have remitted. To reiterate what I have described above in more detail,
Milrod’s (2007) patients demonstrate an inability to tolerate intimacy and seem to reject
their own loving aspects.139
In more detail, we recall those differences Freud notes between the normal
process of mourning and its pathological counterpart, melancholia:
Where the exciting causes are different one can recognize that there is a loss of a
more ideal kind. The object has not perhaps actually died, but has been lost as an
object of love […] [M]elancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is
withdrawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, in which there is
nothing about the loss that is unconscious.140 (1917, p. 245)
The unconscious aspect of the loss is particularly relevant in agoraphobia, where it
frequently appears that the object lost, or one of the lost objects, is the tie between the
patient and the phobic companion. Frances and Dunn describe the nature of this tie in
detail, indicating three distinct levels: “the psychotic symbiotic, the narcissistic, and the
differentiated dependent” (1975, p. 438). The first level, the psychotic symbiotic, implies
a complete lack of self-object differentiation. The second type exists on a higher level of
differentiation and includes an “intense narcissistic investment in the other” (p. 438)
resulting in a degree of impaired self-object differentiation and self-object constancy. As
long as the object (i.e., the phobic companion141) is present, a stable self constancy is
139

Green writes on the negative in the case of melancholia: “it seems to know nothing about the way it has
negativised itself in order to replace the lost object, losing its capacity for recognition and awareness,
sacrificing the love it has for itself and the pleasure which it can draw from its own image” (1999, p. 54).
140
I disagree on a small point with Freud’s description of mourning: I suggest that even if the actual loss is
consciously recognized, there will always be aspects of that loss that are unconscious. I do not know that
we can ever be fully conscious of the losses we have suffered. As Klein writes, the “poignancy of the actual
loss of a loved person is, in my view, greatly increased by the mourner’s unconscious phantasies of having
lost his internal ‘good’ objects as well” (1940, p. 353). That is, the unconscious phantasies (“phantasies”
instead of fantasies already implies their unconscious nature) concern the loved, internalized object even if
the reality of the loss of the loved person is entirely conscious.
141
It is important to note that, when the phobic companion is another person (as opposed to a phobic object
like those described in the Introduction: a cane, a pet, a house, etc.), the tie implies a mutual dependency,
though the dependency may be more unconscious in the partner not exhibiting traditional agoraphobic
symptoms.
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possible. The third type predominates when there is a high level of dependency, but clear
self-object separateness is maintained. Agoraphobia can be present on any of these three
levels of differentiation, but for those patients with either the psychotic symbiotic or
narcissistic tie to the phobic companion, “the real or symbolic loss of the phobic partner
is experienced as a loss of part of the self – a threat to self constancy” (p. 438). This
“threat to self constancy” is described clearly in the accounts of borderline and psychotic
patients exhibiting agora-claustrophobic anxieties indicated above, but is also hinted at in
Milrod’s patients (2007, pp. 1014, 1019).
The agoraphobia patient’s fantasies surrounding the phobic companion – for
example, his or her ability to keep the patient safe – must be confronted with the reality
of the phobic companion’s helplessness, as well as the patient’s own helplessness, in
order for the symptoms of anxiety and avoidance to be addressed. The loss of this
fantasy, a fantasy which was experienced as part of the self, leads to a melancholic
feeling of emptiness. Levy makes a similar point: “confusion secondary to difficulties in
the separation-individuation process may contribute to the experience of the self as
empty” (1984, p. 392). It seems likely that the agoraphobic’s difficulties in the process of
individuation lead to a particular experience of melancholia subsequent to the loss of the
psychic connection to the phobic companion following remission of overt symptoms
which served to maintain the fantasy of symbiosis. Milrod indicates this ongoing
difficulty with her patient, Rita: “Likely her desperate need to define herself in keeping
with and as being linked to one of her parents had been substituted in part by her
relationship with me” (2007, p. 1020). Despite the remission of Rita’s overt agoraphobic
symptoms, she has not been able to relieve herself of the need for a symbiotic tie with
another. A similar development occurred between Milrod and her patient, Deborah, who
“began to feel as though she and I [Milrod] were fused” (p. 1014). Again, this
development became more salient in the analysis after the remission of Deborah’s overt
agoraphobia symptoms.
Returning to Freud, we find a further distinction between mourning and
melancholia: the melancholic suffers “an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard”
(1917, p. 246). Freud’s astute explanation involves the ambivalence towards a love
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object, an ambivalence with which we are now familiar: “the self-reproaches are
reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient’s
own ego” (p. 248). In melancholia, “countless separate struggles are carried on over the
object, in which hate and love contend with each other; the one seeks to detach the libido
from the object, the other to maintain this position of the libido against assault” (p. 256).
The agoraphobic is unable to feel anything but emptiness because of the refusal to mourn
the reality of her losses, a process which includes learning to tolerate her ambivalent
feelings toward her phobic companion. Because the agoraphobic is unable to fully and
functionally differentiate between self and other, the loss of the other cannot be mourned;
thus, the ego remains bereft.
Milrod hints at the relevance of loss and mourning. For instance, she writes: “The
loss of a phobic companion is experienced as the catastrophic loss of a part of the
object/self symbiotic union” (2007, p. 1011). However, Milrod does not suggest a
connection between the inner constriction her patients experience and the need to mourn
this “catastrophic loss.” The complexities of mourning are overlooked, evident in the
very brief mention of “a later focus” in the analysis with Milrod’s patient, Deborah,
which “involved her deeply and secretly mourning the sudden death of a cherished older
cousin, Marcy, who was killed in a car crash two months before the onset of Deborah’s
somatic symptoms and agoraphobia at the age of thirteen” (p. 1012). I question the nature
of Deborah’s “mourning” insofar as it seems more likely that this loss, rendered secret,
was never truly mourned at all, rather than “deeply” mourned, as Milrod suggests. Instead
of exploring this sudden death as another, earlier “catastrophic loss,” Milrod connects the
death of this cousin to Deborah’s “unconscious death wishes toward her mother” (p.
1012). I am not suggesting that Milrod is mistaken in this interpretation; rather, I am
suggesting that there is potentially also an issue of unresolved mourning – that is,
melancholia – in Deborah’s ongoing and persistent feelings of emptiness and that
Deborah’s “unconscious death wishes” contribute to this unresolved mourning.142
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Dunn, in his commentary on Milrod (2007), offers a pertinent description of a sequence from one of his
own patients, Charlotte, a nineteen-year-old woman who suffered from agoraphobia and, in particular, a
travel phobia: when she was seven, Charlotte’s “best friend Annie was run over by a truck,” an “incident”
which Charlotte “quickly forgot” (2007, p. 1030). Dunn’s description of the sessions focusing on this loss,
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Gassner (2004) suggests that the role of conflict over impulse expression and
unconscious fantasy is over-emphasized in clinical reports of patients with panic disorder
and/or agoraphobia, insofar as this emphasis has led to the neglect of the impact of
development trauma. Gassner indicates examples of parental illness or death, parental
substance abuse, and physical, sexual, or emotional child abuse (pp. 223-224). I add to
these examples, as evidenced in Milrod’s and Dunn’s case reports, the early traumatic
loss of a childhood friend.143 As Gassner indicates, the trauma of loss is compounded
when a parental figure is unavailable to help the patient grieve or, further, prevents
mourning by denying the severity of the loss:
A significant aspect of the childhood trauma is that the parent(s) are unavailable
to offer their child sustained, emotionally attuned, and reality-oriented help, the
kind of responsiveness that would facilitate their child’s capacity to process and
master the intense emotions and associated disturbing convictions that these reallife ordeals inevitably generate. (p. 223)
The combination, then, of developmental trauma and the absence of a supportive parental
figure for the mourning process contribute to the traumatic effects of a childhood event.
Both of these elements are evident in Milrod’s and Dunn’s patients.
Milrod describes other melancholic features of her patients’ emotional lives.
These features evidently contribute to Deborah’s ongoing emptiness in particular. Milrod
quotes Deborah: “My whole life has been about these symptoms that are just…gone.
There’s nothing there, and it makes me upset. It’s not worse than the panic, but it’s a
and the accompanying injunction from Charlotte’s mother against mourning, draws out the relevance of
melancholic factors in agoraphobia. Dunn interprets that “Charlotte must have sensed that her mother
wanted Charlotte not to think about the accident or to have any feelings about it,” an impossible wish given
that Charlotte, who in fact witnessed the accident, “must have been filled with frightful images” (p. 1030).
Dunn provides this segment to support his (and Milrod’s) hypothesis that “certain patterns of pathological
parenting play a role in the genesis of agoraphobia” (p. 1032). Again, I do not disagree with his assessment.
However, he fails to emphasize the relation between melancholia (the refusal to mourn – based partly,
perhaps, on an injunction against mourning) and his patient’s feeling “bored and empty” (p. 1030).
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See also Bonomi (2003), Boulanger (2005), Brown (2005), Tarantelli (2003), and Torsti (2000), all of
whom “emphasize that traumatized patients have generally impaired symbolizing capacities or that they
defensively avoid symbolization [...]. That is, not only do they have trouble remembering their trauma,
experiencing it, and integrating its meaning in their lives, but their very capacity to remember, to
experience, and to integrate is impaired or its use defensively avoided” (Rosegrant 2010, p. 503).
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weird feeling” (2007, p. 1014). Milrod interprets that “giving up her [Deborah’s] anxiety
symptoms seemed to represent a loss to her, and also a sad separation from her mother”
(p. 1014), but there is no indication that this loss has been worked through. Indeed,
Milrod’s choice of words, that the absence of Deborah’s anxiety symptoms “seemed to
represent a loss,” implicitly denies or devalues the reality of this loss. Instead, the loss of
her mother-fusion was substituted with an analyst-fusion (p. 1014). There is a tension
between Deborah’s experience of “nothing there” and the feelings that accompany that
“nothing.” That is, there cannot be an absolute nothingness if there is also a “weird
feeling.” There is an absence, surely, a something missing that had always been there
previously, but there is not literally “nothing.” As indicated above, the expression of a
nothingness is the conscious manifestation of an unconscious something, even if it is not
apparent what that unconscious something signifies.
Problematically, Milrod suggests that, with her agoraphobic symptoms in
remission, Deborah’s emotional life was “now free of anxiety” (2007, p. 1015). However,
Milrod then writes that “psychotherapeutic focus on her boredom144 and superficiality
consistently invoked both her underlying terror of depression and her deep terror of
being unable to be different, or to be separate from her mother” (p. 1016; my emphases).
I do not know if Milrod is implicitly suggesting a distinction between anxiety and terror,
but it seems as though Deborah has repressed her anxiety in order to function and that she
has not sufficiently worked through the repressed material at the root of her anxiety. Her
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Phillips considers the experience of boredom and emptiness in childhood development: “In the muffled,
sometimes irritable confusion of boredom the child is reaching to a recurrent sense of emptiness out of
which his real desire can crystallize. But to begin with, of course, the child needs the adult to hold, and to
hold to, the experience – that is, to recognize it as such, rather than to sabotage it by distraction” (1993, p.
69). According to the clinical reports of Fenichel (1934/1953) and Greenson (1953), emptiness and
boredom are often encountered together. Milrod also indicates the co-occurrence of emptiness and boredom
in her two clinical case studies (2007, pp. 1014, 1016, 1017, 1020). Writing on boredom, Fenichel and
Greenson both emphasize its defensive function, particularly the defense against unacceptable instinctual
wishes. Boredom may be a “screen for rage” (Phillips 1993, p. 76), as Milrod implies is the case in her
patients, and also may indicate the repression of traumatic events. Greenson indicates of his patient: “It
quickly became clear that in the bored state the affects connected to the traumatic events were repressed”
(1953, p. 10). Weiss notes: “A sense of boredom and impatience often precedes a patient’s first anxietyattack” (1935, p. 69).
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“terror of depression” is particularly striking, given that the description of her ongoing
emptiness depicts a melancholic state. The recognition that mourning is called for would
perhaps relieve some of her terror of depression as well as some of her depressive
symptoms.

3.2. Emptiness and Agoraphobic Anxieties in Mourning
No one ever told me that grief felt so like fear. I am not afraid but the sensation is like
being afraid. The same fluttering in the stomach, the same restlessness, the yawning. I
keep on swallowing.
(Lewis 1961, p. 1)
Emptiness in patients for whom overt symptoms of agoraphobia have remitted may
potentially indicate the presence of losses which have not yet been sufficiently mourned.
At the same time, agoraphobic anxieties may also appear during the process of so-called
normal mourning. Klein identifies this phenomenon quite clearly, stating that “[i]n
normal mourning early psychotic anxieties are reactivated” (1940, p. 354). However,
there are very few examples in the psychoanalytic literature of agoraphobic anxieties
during the process of mourning. Klein provides one of the very few descriptions of this
process, clearly articulating the emergence of agoraphobic anxieties (although she does
not identify them specifically as such). “Mrs A” is mourning the sudden death of her
young son:
After a few weeks of mourning, for instance, Mrs A went for a walk with a friend
through the familiar streets, in an attempt to re-establish old bonds. She suddenly
realized that the number of people in the street seemed overwhelming, the houses
strange and the sunshine artificial and unreal. She had to retreat to a quiet
restaurant. But there she felt as if the ceiling were coming down, and the people in
the place became vague and blurred. Her own house suddenly seemed the only
secure place in the world. (p. 361; my emphasis)
Klein provides one explanation for the sudden onset of agoraphobic anxieties during a
period of mourning, suggesting that the “frightening indifference of these people was
reflected from her internal objects, who in her mind had turned into a multitude of ‘bad’
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persecuting objects” (p. 361). That is, because the ‘good’ internal objects had not yet
been firmly re-established, persecutory anxiety predominated. As we know, the absence
of love is felt as hate; the indifference of the crowds, ignorant of her loss and her
vulnerable state, were experienced as hateful and destructive. Klein continues: “The
external world was felt to be artificial and unreal, because real trust in inner goodness had
temporarily gone” (p. 361). The relationship between internal reality and external reality
is the key consideration in the evaluation of these anxieties: the “chaos” of the internal
world results in a hostile and frightening external world. In my words, following the
arguments of the previous chapters, the limits of the self and of the other have suddenly
become unstable.145 Whether the threat comes from inside oneself or from the
surrounding people is unclear to the mourner; it is, rather, the collision of the two that is
so frightening. Hence, the solitary safety of one’s own home is sought.
Mrs A provides a counter-example of mourning to the melancholic responses of
Milrod’s and Dunn’s patients. Klein describes the complicated and painful mourning
process Mrs A both endures and must actively participate in, as the loss of the loved
person is accompanied by the loss of the protective function of the ‘good’ internal
objects; ‘bad’ (persecutory, punishing, annihilating) objects predominate for a time. As
the reality of the loss becomes internalized, ‘good’ objects can be re-established and
‘bad’ objects become less powerful. In Klein’s words:
Mrs A, who at an earlier stage of her mourning had to some extent felt that her
loss was inflicted on her by revengeful parents, could now in phantasy experience
the sympathy of these parents (dead long since), their desire to support and to help
her. She felt that they also suffered a severe loss and shared her grief, as they
would have done had they lived. In her internal world harshness and suspicion had
diminished, and sorrow had increased. (1940, p. 359)
Milrod’s and Dunn’s agoraphobia patients do not have the internal good parents with
whom to share their grief. Even if it is true in reality that the parents suffered a great loss,
they were not able to share their grief and therefore share their sympathy. These historical
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See also Davidson (2001, p. 294): “In the face of bereavement, for example, one feels utterly impotent.
The profound experience of loss can seem to alter the shape of one’s family relations and life-world,
forcing the subject to negotiate new spaces, or gaps in their lives where, previously, there were none.”
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facts impede the patients’ own mourning processes, leading to severe melancholia and
feelings of emptiness. The emptiness refers not only to the lost loved persons, but also to
the absence of the good internal objects with whom they could share their sorrow and by
whom they could be comforted. Reiterating Fonagy’s arguments about the development
of the mentalizing capacity, we see that “disavowal should not be confused with absence,
it is tantamount to an inhibition, which is permitted by the incomplete development of the
capacity in the first place” (1991, p. 651). I emphasize this important point: the
incomplete internalization of ‘good’ objects leads to the inhibition of mourning insofar as
mourning the loss of the loved person would also necessitate mourning the absence of the
‘good,’ sympathetic objects with whom one could share his or her grief. In the examples
of Milrod’s and Dunn’s patients, mourning would require recognizing both the severity
and painful nature of the traumatic childhood losses, and also mourning the painful
absence of parents with whom the burden of those losses could be shared.146 I emphasize
that this ‘painful absence’ is a presence; that is, it is the presence of a painful absence.
Assertions of emptiness signify the very presence of this painful absence.
The transference relationship between Milrod and her patients helps to alleviate
some overt agoraphobic symptoms, but also perpetuates the deeper elements of the
disorder by acting as a substitute for the parental relationship.147 Milrod theorizes that
146

I detail the theoretical relevance of loss and mourning in the process of ego development in Chapter
Two, especially pp. 43-44.
147
The dependence on the analyst is another consonant element between Fonagy’s description of borderline
functioning and Milrod’s description of her agoraphobic patients. As Fonagy writes, “the desperate
dependence borderline patients manifest in the transference [...] may well concern their difficulty in
maintaining analytic understanding as a functioning mental entity” (1991, p. 651; internal reference
omitted). Milrod’s patients are unable to keep her alive in their minds outside of the analytic sessions; or
rather, the analytic process is only alive in the moment and disappears from mental reach as soon as it is
over (2007, p. 1019). This dependence, Fonagy argues, relates to the analysand’s use of the analyst’s
mentalizing capacity, the relinquishing of which “inevitably bring[s] with it a fear of disintegration” insofar
as the analysand is unable to maintain a representation of his or her own “coherent and mature identity”
(1991, p. 652). Fonagy reports that Mr. S’s “sense of emptiness” referred to his inability to “conceive of
himself as a person with various feelings and thoughts in the past and present” (p. 645). His various rages at
Fonagy expressed an inability to tolerate the experience of his analyst thinking about him, since he was
unable to think about himself and therefore to conceive of himself as a person about whom one could think;
rather, he had to “conceive of his life as something which cannot be thought or felt about” (p. 645). Fonagy
connects this emptiness to Mr. S’s early traumas, which “must have included a profound identification with
the thoughtless state of the original abusers [his father and mother]” (p. 645). As a protective function, the
inhibition of his mentalizing capacity was threatened by the developing analytic relationship, which incited
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agoraphobia patients are unable “to function psychically for themselves without an
external ego to guide them” (2007, p. 1023), and appears to put herself, as analyst, in the
position of the guiding external ego. Although she argues that it is the patients who
“unconsciously turn their psychoanalyst into the object they require in order to feel secure
and complete” (p. 1023), she offers no indication that the analyst might be
problematically complicit in becoming their patients’ required object. The problem, as
Lacan articulates it, is clear: “If the intersubjective relationship in analysis is, indeed,
conceptualized as that of a dyad of individuals, it can only be based on the unity of a
perpetuated vital dependency” (1955/2006j, p. 288). That is, interpretations emphasizing
the transference relationship, especially when formulated with the basic assumption that
the analyst must be the agoraphobic’s guiding external ego (as Milrod implies), indicate
and perpetuate the analyst’s dependency on the analysand as much as vice versa. Both
Fonagy (1991) and Steiner (1993) note their patients’ painful experience of an increasing
awareness of the analyst’s independence. This experience is one which Deborah and Rita
have refused, leading to the denial of their own independence as well, further restricting
the process of separation-individuation.
Klein provides a vital distinction between kinds of dependence that clarifies the
unconscious significance of the agoraphobic’s dependence on her analyst, and its relation
to mourning:
The pining for the lost loved object also implies dependence on it, but dependence
of a kind which becomes an incentive to reparation and preservation of the object.
It is creative because it is dominated by love, while the dependence based on
persecution and hatred is sterile and destructive. (1940, p. 360)
The agoraphobia patient, particularly one no longer suffering from the overt symptoms of
anxiety and avoidance, has learned that she is pathologically dependent on her phobic
companion and that, to be ‘well,’ she must learn to be more independent, to not rely on
others for her sense of self. She has learned these things, and they are true, but she must

the incredible terror of an increased capacity to mentalize: “I said that he was just as frightened of mental
aliveness in himself as in me; that the sadness inside him when he missed me was sometimes so unpleasant
that it was easier to kill the thinking part of both of us than face the pain of experiencing the end of the
session that he valued” (p. 647).
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also learn more dependence, a good kind of dependence that allows her to mourn her
losses and to internalize ‘good’ objects: a kind of dependence that is “dominated by love”
rather than persecution and hatred.148
There are many and complex reasons, then, for why the work of mourning might
be especially difficult for patients suffering from agoraphobia. As Lewis (1961)
describes, grief feels startlingly like fear. For agoraphobia patients whose overt symptoms
have remitted, the fear of their return (relapse is notably common in agoraphobia cases)
might readily scare off, so to speak, the patient from suffering her losses, a process which
would require the fear-like experience of grief. Not only does grief feel like fear, even
normal mourning can stimulate the emergence of agoraphobic anxieties in particular.
This emergence is due to the primitive nature of agoraphobic anxieties and also due to the
nature of loss, which, in its essence, threatens to tear us apart.149 Secondly, the losses of
the phobic companion, in fantasy, and of the agoraphobic anxiety itself, are difficult to
recognize as losses that need to be mourned. Interpretations that aim at the analysand’s
unconscious conflicts without acknowledging the depth and reality of these losses delay
their necessary mourning. Thirdly, for the agoraphobic, mourning traumatic losses from
childhood would require acknowledging how painful those losses are and how
overwhelmingly alone she has been with her pain. Not only must the losses to death be
mourned, but the absence of ‘good’ internal objects to whom one can turn to in grief must
also be mourned. Finally, the agoraphobic has never known the kind of dependence
“dominated by love” (Klein 1940, p. 360). Instead, she has been both pathologically
dependent and devastatingly alone. Like the feelings of fear that come with grief, the
feelings of dependence also present particular challenges to the agoraphobic patient.
It is clear that agoraphobia is not reducible to a single cause, or to any one of the
single paradigms of theoretical understanding currently available. Gassner articulates this
point, which has serious implications for theoretical and clinical work with agoraphobia:
“Panic attacks and agoraphobic symptoms are clearly a multidetermined psychological
disorder, and like other symptoms, there are undoubtedly many pathways to these
148

Fairbairn (1944, 1963) refers to the “anti-libidinous ego,” which attaches to the rejecting object and
which itself rejects and hates all dependence.
149
Taylor and Rachman (1991) argue that sadness, like fear, is itself an aversive state.
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manifestations of psychopathology” (2004, p. 224). Treatment plans that emphasize the
diagnostic criteria for agoraphobia and, as it were, treat the symptoms of the disorder
(such as CBT combined with pharmacotherapy), tend to result in some short-term
positive effects but long-term ineffectiveness. Psychoanalytic psychotherapy that focuses
on the transference seems to provide some long-term effectiveness against the recurrence
of anxiety and avoidance, but also appears to reach an impasse if the transference
relationship continues to be emphasized (as seen in Milrod 2007). At this point, we may
inquire if perhaps the transference has become, as Freud originally thought it was, an
obstacle to the progress of the analysis. What is beyond the ego of the analysand? How
can we get beyond the transference, an egoic phenomenon, in order to relieve a persistent
“inner constriction”? We must return to the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis and the
pursuit, however impossible, of putting all of one’s thoughts and feelings into words. I
address these questions, along with the unconscious function of incoherence, in Chapter
Four. For now, I remain with the meanings of emptiness. In the next section, I argue that
the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness is a pathological manifestation of a structural
emptiness that is central to psychic life. Out of this structural emptiness, all new things
emerge.

3.3. Structural Emptiness
Is there not a danger of overfilling the psychic space, when one should be helping to form
the positive cathexis of the empty space?
(Green 1975, p. 17)
Green distinguishes what he calls “the no of the ego, the no of the super-ego and the no of
the id” (1999, p. 269). He argues that the drives are expressions of the “no of the id,” an
argument that is particularly relevant in the establishment of the boundaries and limits of
the self. He writes:
Expelling what is bad allows for the creation of an internal space in which the ego
as an organisation can come into being, setting up an order founded on the
formation of links related to experiences of satisfaction. This organisation
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facilitates recognition of the object as separate in the space of the not-ego as well
as the reunion with it. (p. 272)
The work of the negative is apparent prior to the differentiation of the ego from the id in
the process of expulsion by which the ego is organized.150 This process indicates the “no
of the id.” This process also indicates that the vulnerable moment exists at the frontiers of
the self; and, in the process of establishing what belongs to the ego and what the ego will
exclude from itself, there must be room for emptiness.151 I follow Green’s argument that
the work of the negative “extends to the agencies of the psychical apparatus as a whole”
(1999, p. 269). That is, the negative is a structural aspect of psychical life. I argue that
the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness is a manifestation of Green’s pathological
negative; however, the point of the structural emptiness is a technical one – how do we
make use of structural emptiness in the treatment of persistent, pathological emptiness? I
argue that structural emptiness reveals itself in the gaps created by language; following
the psychoanalytic rule, ‘try to say everything,’ encourages the foray into more of these
gaps so that the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness may be overcome, replaced with all
kinds of feelings as well as an enjoyment of her structural emptiness out of which all new
things emerge.
As I described in Chapter Two, the experience of emptiness is necessary for
healthy ego development. Emptiness is the psychical representation of physical hunger,
both of which stimulate aggression. The ego must use this aggression to repudiate the
other and the external world in order to establish itself differentiated from the world.
Without the experience of emptiness (hunger) and the resulting aggressivity, the
individual is able to experience neither satisfaction nor love, but only frustration and a
limited kind of gratification. Winnicott identifies emptiness as a constitutive experience,
150

I described the details of this process and the relevance of agora-claustrophobic anxieties in ego
development in Chapter Two.
151
On the potentiality and vulnerability at the boundaries of the self, see also Milner: “...the basic
identifications which make it possible to find new objects, to find the familiar in the unfamiliar, require an
ability to tolerate a temporary loss of sense of self, a temporary giving up of the discriminating ego which
stands apart and tries to see things objectively and rationally and without emotional coloring” (1952, p.
189); and, Kumin, on schizoid emptiness: “Emptiness has become a fact of ego structure and the ego
feeling will reside chiefly at the external ego boundaries, separated by a libidinal gulf from the developing
self representations” (1978, p. 212).
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arguing that the “basis of all learning (as well as of eating) is emptiness. But if emptiness
was not experienced as such at the beginning, then it turns up as a state that is feared, yet
compulsively sought after” (1974, p. 107). Similarly, and as I quoted above in Chapter
Two, Kumin writes:
It is thus that experiences of emptiness, for the schizoid patient as well as for the
infant, are essential stages in the ultimate constitution of self in the world. The
loss of the mother by the infant through repetitive experiences of cold, hunger,
frustration and separation, which must be experienced by the infant as
excruciating emptiness and annihilation, is a necessary precursor of introjections
of the maternal imago and the development of internalized object relations, which
strengthen the process of separation-individuation and the formation of the self.
(1978, p. 214)
Grotstein, writing on the vicissitudes of nothingness, also indicates the structural
manifestations of emptiness: “Nothingness, similarly, may be primary or secondary. In its
primary sense it is the matrix or ‘ether’ of primary meaningless and is the emptiness
which must be experienced in order for meaningful experience to be realized” (1990, p.
268). In Green’s words: “The dimension of absence, essential to psychic development,
finds its place in the potential space between the self and the object” (1975, p. 18).
LaFarge (1989), in her arguments against the deficit theory of empty states, refers to
these descriptions of structural emptiness: the experience of emptiness is required for
healthy ego development and is also a developmental achievement. To understand
emptiness as a development achievement, we might also think of a different but similar
example: the developmental achievement of the capacity for anticipation. If the
individual has developed the capacity for anticipation, some painful experiences can be
endured in order to achieve a greater satisfaction. If there is no capacity for anticipation,
and therefore no tolerance for painful or frustrating experiences, there can be only a very
limited, immediate kind of gratification. If there is no capacity to tolerate or enjoy
emptiness, then there can be no room for creativity, no possibility for the emergence of
new thoughts or feelings. As Winnicott argues, “only out of non-existence can existence
start” (1974, p. 107; emphasis in original). This opening to new experience is the
“positive element” of emptiness that is neither deficit nor defence. Emptiness, then, is not
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simply a deficiency, nor is it only related to the ego and its mechanisms of defence, but is
a structural aspect of the psychical apparatus.
Strongly related to ignorance, or not-knowing, the capacity to tolerate emptiness,
like the capacity to tolerate one’s ignorance, is a necessary step towards the enjoyment of
a full life. If these states of emptiness, ignorance,152 and silence153 are defended against,
nothing new can emerge. Scott writes of “wooing” the unknown, “since from it all new
good, as well as, bad and sad states, will come” (1981, p. 577). The ability to “woo the
unknown” and love our ignorance depends on our faith in our capacity to mourn our
losses: “With mourning, the realization emerges that a new beginning becomes possible”
(p. 574).154 As I argue above, the agoraphobic’s pathological emptiness indicates the
presence of losses not yet mourned. The agoraphobic defends against painful mourning
and, in doing so, closes herself off to new experiences. Without faith in her capacity to
mourn, the risk of more loss is too great. As Scott argues, “[w]e must accept the risks of
new development leading to new opportunities and new zest, knowing that the more we
risk the more we may lose” (pp. 574-575). The agoraphobic, with so many losses not yet
mourned, is not able to take these risks.
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See, for example, Lacan: “Indeed, the analyst cannot follow this path unless he recognizes in his own
knowledge the symptom of his own ignorance, in the properly analytic sense that the symptom is the return
of the repressed in a compromise [formation] and that repression, here as elsewhere, constitutes the
censorship of truth. Ignorance must not, in fact, be understood here as an absence of knowledge but, just as
much as love and hate, as a passion for being – for it can, like them, be a path by which being forms. […]
The positive fruit of the revelation of ignorance is nonknowledge, which is not a negation of knowledge but
rather its most elaborate form” (1955/2006j, p. 297). Bion makes the distinction between K (knowledge)
and –K (minus knowledge): –K is neither ignorance nor nonknowledge; indeed, K “covers everything the
individual knows and does not know” (1992, p. 182). –K is associated with “nameless terror” and involves
envy’s destructiveness; rather than indicating nonknowledge, –K involves an attack on knowledge. I
expand on the relevance of ignorance in Chapter Four; for now, I indicate its importance and its relation to
structural emptiness.
153
I explore the relation between speech and silence, and the importance for both in the analytic situation,
below and also in Chapter Four. Free association is, I argue, the vehicle in analysis by which the meanings
of both speech and silence can be apprehended.
154
See also, Scott: “Our knowledge is finite, but our ignorance is infinite. Consequently, we can be
frustrated by our ignorance or we can progress to being disappointed by our ignorance and also to learning
to mourn the loss of our omnipotent beliefs. Possibly, eventually, we can learn to love and woo our
ignorance, from which all new things will come” (1988, p. 88). See also infra note 55.
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The “unconscious fear of not knowing” (Ogden 1989, p. 195) is an important
psychological construct in the analyses of patients who have tremendous difficulties
creating and occupying their own potential space (which, as I argued in Chapter Two, the
agoraphobic does). This unconscious fear develops from an inability to know what one
feels and, therefore, “who, if anyone, [one] is” (Ogden 1989, p. 195). In response to the
fear of not knowing, the individual creates the illusion “that he is able to generate
thoughts and feelings, wishes and fears that feel like his own”; as illusion, this defense
“further alienates the individual from himself” (Ogden 1989, p. 195). Ogden refers to
these illusions as “misrecognitions,” and distinguishes this defense from the more
extreme cases of alienation encountered in alexithymia, states of non-experience, and
disaffected states; rather, Ogden describes patients “who are able to experience the
beginnings of feelings of confusion, emptiness, despair, and panic, as well as being able
to mobilize defenses against these incipient feelings” (p. 196). The agoraphobia patients
discussed above fit Ogden’s description, alternately using panic and emptiness to defend
against the fear of not knowing, which is ultimately a fear of the unknown and of what
might emerge out of the spaces between knowing. In Milrod’s words, there is a “core lack
of structure in the self-representation” (2007, p. 1023) of these patients.
Ogden highlights Lacan’s emphasis on the méconnaissance of the ego, and the
problematic (though inescapable) introduction of the symbolic (namely, language) into
our self-knowledge.155 Alienation is not just an effect of symbolization as such, but also
depends on the nature of the symbol as something that predates the individual: “we do not
create the symbols we use; we inherit them” (Ogden 1989, p. 197). Thus, we engage in
the (necessary) illusion of self-expression; it is only possible to misname our experiences.
At the same time, as Winnicott (and others, including Lacan) argues, we make the
symbols we have inherited our own. Like the transitional object, which had to have
existed before we can make use of it, and which we are able to make use of only as we
create it anew, we are born into a language system: it exists long before we begin to
155

See also Reeder on Lacan’s “symbolic castration”: “the acquisition of language establishes a splitting
and division within the subject. But, what has been lost in symbolic castration is not so much the breast or
even this or that person -- what is at stake is a severance from the immediate reality of experience in a
process that reaches its height when the subject has become well-anchored in the realm of language to
represent its world” (2012, pp. 38-39).
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speak (to use it) and before we are even born. And yet, even as we can only misname our
experiences, our use of language makes it something that it never was before, something
new and uniquely our own. This paradoxical relation to the self is determined by the
nature of language; it institutes a structural emptiness within every individual’s psychical
apparatus. This structural emptiness has the quality of chinks in a suit of armour: as
breaks or gaps in the integrity of the armour, chinks are both areas of vulnerability and
necessary spaces that allow for movement. The armour can be inhabited by a body that
requires movement only insofar as its chinks provide openings and spaces between the
various pieces of the suit. If language is the suit of armour, gaps in the integrity – that is
to say, wholeness or absolute coherence – of language allow it to be inhabited by an
individual; the individual can use language only insofar as s/he can take advantage of the
chinks, the structural emptiness, that is, the spaces where coherency falters.
Wilson, via the analyses of several obsessional narcissistic patients, investigates
the doubled meaning of “the nothing that is a source of fear and the nothing that is a
source of help” (2006a, p. 398). The former, “the nothing that is a source of fear,” is
described above in the sections on pathological emptiness, and grief and agoraphobia; the
latter, “the nothing that is a source of help,” refers to what I am calling structural
emptiness. Like Wilson, I refer to Lacan because his notion of lack occupies a central
position in his theories of subjectivity and psychical life. In Chapter Two, I discussed the
centrality of lack in the constitution of the subject. Here, I am concerned with the
manifestation of lack in the analytic situation and its connection to the agoraphobic’s
persistent emptiness. In particular, I emphasize lack’s function within language in order
to identify the transformative limitations of interpreting the transference particularly for
agoraphobia patients who appear to be stuck within their subjective experiences of
emptiness. Wilson takes up the question, empirically derived, of why the analyst’s
mistakes are often transformative. Following Lacan, Wilson argues that the “analyst’s
missing the patient, on a fundamental level, is an evocation of nothing or lack” (2006a, p.
401; original emphasis). That is, when the analyst misses the patient, or the analyst’s
interpretation misses the mark, there is a space opened between them out of which the
patient can find something new about his or her own self. Wilson clearly articulates that
both the analyst and the analysand must learn to tolerate lack in order for the analytic
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process to unfold. Lack is essential to analysis and is essential to the very “nature of
meaning” (p. 402). Although the analyst’s mistakes are particularly obvious ‘evocations’
of lack, “[t]here is always a limit or a lacking in any statement, even if the statement
suggests an excess of meanings” (p. 402). Thus, the analyst’s mistakes are not the only
instances of lack irrupting in the analysis. It, lack, is always there in the inevitably
incomplete encounters between people. Wilson argues that a capacity to “explore this
inevitable missing” in both the analyst and the analysand contributes to the analytic work,
insofar as this “missing” creates an “interpretive space” (p. 402).156 Curiosity about this
space provides opportunities for new thoughts and feelings. The problem arises when the
meanings of this space are foreclosed, whether by the analyst’s embarrassment about
making a mistake, the analyst’s narcissistic desire to make a clever interpretation, or the
analysand’s anxiety about what the analyst does not know. Wilson summarizes: “The
structure of the subject and the structure of things meaningful both rest on a space created
by lacking” (p. 406).
In the cases of the agoraphobia patients discussed above we can say that the
anxiety and avoidance – as well as all of the fantasies that go along with one’s identity as
an individual with agoraphobia – concealed any meaningful encounter with lack, and
therefore any encounter with the creation of meaning. Once overt agoraphobic symptoms
have remitted, the emptiness out of which everything new appears is terrifyingly
revealed:
When the components of the fantasy appear, the lack that supports and is hidden
by the fantasy can be ‘seen,’ or experienced. This experience is the experience of
nothing, and more precisely that nothing which supports what one thinks, where
one is, what one feels. It is an experience of confusion, of utter not knowing. One
can see then what one has used, psychically, to prop oneself up, so to speak.
(Wilson 2006a, p. 417).
The agoraphobic’s loss of her anxiety and other phobic symptoms entails a significant
encounter with the “utter not knowing” of who she is. Her experience of emptiness, then,
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See also Faimberg (1996, 1997) on “listening to listening.” I discuss this clinical technique further in
Chapter Four.
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is not at all surprising. However, insofar as her emptiness gets in the way of her lack, so
to speak, it remains a pathological phenomenon.
Goldberg, in his commentary on Wilson (2006a), suggests (as critique) that “when
a patient reaches a point of missing or of misunderstanding, it is not an invitation to settle
for some sort of compromise; instead it is an opening to the pursuit of a more positive
accomplishment” (2006, p. 432). Yes; the “opening” is exactly the point. I cannot speak
for Wilson but, in my reading of his article, this opening is also part of his point.
Although I am not as optimistic, perhaps, as Goldberg appears to be in the analyst’s (or
the analysand’s) capacity to arrive at what might be called “a more positive
accomplishment,” the “opening” and the “pursuit” is the goal of analysis. Lack, or
emptiness, when it can be tolerated, provides this necessary opening towards something
“more” – if it is to be more “positive,” well, that will always remain to be seen. In his
“Response to Commentaries,” Wilson emphasizes this essential point: “an assumption of
lack and the capacity to act follow one from the other” (2006b, p. 459). The meaning of
this statement is perhaps clarified if re-formulated in its negative version: the denial of
lack and the incapacity to act follow one from the other. That is, if lack, or structural
emptiness, is defended against, there is no opening for new experiences, and no freedom
to explore one’s internal and external worlds.
Reed’s commentary on Wilson (2006a) provides an important hesitation: “in
Wilson’s paper there is an underlying rhetorical legerdemain that equates lack with
missing the patient and missing the patient with good analytic practice. It is this current in
Wilson’s paper that makes me uneasy” (2006, p. 451). Further, she writes:
Techniques appropriate for the normal negative, for patients who can express
affect and ideation together in the chain of signifiers characteristic of neurosis, are
not necessarily helpful for Green’s pathologically negative patients. It is a
question of letting space between analyst and patient evolve, but of allowing just
enough so that the patient’s frustration does not take on the flavor of the original
trauma. (p. 454)
Wilson’s important work on the clinical use of lack (or what I have called structural
emptiness, and Green has called the normal negative) as the structuring element in the
constitution of the subject and of meaningfulness is hampered by his clinical example,
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which provides evidence, rather, of pathological emptiness. Wilson indicates that Evan157
endured severe maternal deprivation very early in his infancy; it is possible that Evan’s
losses must be recognized, analytically, and worked through before it is possible for him
to approach the profundity of his subjective lack.
In Chapter Two, I gestured towards the importance of all of emptiness’s meanings
via Luepnitz, who indicates the most significant difference between Winnicott and Lacan:
“For Winnicott, the central drama will turn around the infant’s loss or feared loss of
maternal connection. For Lacan, while loss is obviously important, something even more
profound is at stake – the lack built into subjectivity by the mere existence of the
unconscious” (2009, p. 964). Analyses of loss and mourning encounter a limit, a barrier
to a deeper experience, if the centrality of lack is never articulated; at the same time, we
cannot approach the profundity of subjective lack if there is a loss, real or phantasied, in
the way. As Green provocatively writes in his work on negative hallucination, “[p]leasure
arises from its roots in need. Desire is a pivotal concept for one cannot overlook the fact
that it is the satisfaction of need which sets it in motion” (1999, p. 183). That is, without
the satisfaction of need, desire (and thus lack) is unmotivated, so to speak. The analyst,
however, can make use of lack insofar as it is part of language and insofar as language is
the analytic medium. Lack irrupts in the analysand’s speech in many and various forms,
including slips of the tongue, silences, and bodily gestures158; by drawing attention to
these moments of potential meaning-making, the analyst utilizes the structural nature of
lack without overwhelming the analysand with its profundity. These little incoherencies
are also manifestations of lack, or emptiness, and the capacity to explore these gaps in
coherence encourages the analysand to greater explorations of his subjective experiences.
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In order to protect his patients’ anonymity, Wilson constructs a patient composite, which he nominates
Evan, comprised of details drawn from several patients.
158
See also Lacan 1998, p. 234: “Desire always becomes manifest at the joint of speech, where it makes its
appearance, its sudden emergence, its surge forwards. Desire emerges just as it becomes embodied in
speech, it emerges with symbolism.”
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3.4. Conclusion
In Chapter One, I discussed the distinctions between agoraphobia and “true,” or discrete,
phobias. One of the main distinctions involves the nature of the phobic object: in discrete
phobias, the phobic object is specifically identified and the phobia can be said to be a
displacement of an unconscious fear onto the phobic object. In the case of Little Hans,
which I offered as an early example, Hans’s unconscious fear of his father was displaced
onto the horse and became the conscious fear that the horse would bite him. The phobic
object, then, becomes a symbol of the unconscious fear. In agoraphobia, the precise
nature of the phobic object is contentious. Agoraphobia, I argued, is not only the anxiety
about space but, more specifically, the boundaries between spaces, including the spaces
between the self and the world and the ego and its objects. As I argued in Chapter Two,
agoraphobia signals an individual’s inability to create secure boundaries between the self
and others, and also to creatively inhabit the spaces between the self and others (and the
self and its objects). It develops out of an inability to delimit affects via symbolization,
leading to, in Deutsch’s words, “a genuine dread of death” (1929, p. 51) or in Bion’s
phrase, “a nameless dread” (1962a, p. 309). For patients with agoraphobia, particularly
evident in those patients whose overt symptoms have remitted, the gaps inherent in
language and in the meaning-making process of putting it all into words are defensively
avoided. This avoidance mimics the agoraphobic’s avoidance of the external world,
which, as I argue, is fundamentally an avoidance of intermediary spaces. These spaces,
like the gaps in language, are avoided because the agoraphobic does not know what will
emerge out of them.
Language inevitably fails to be wholly satisfying insofar as representation
definitively encounters the gap between the sign and that which the sign attempts to
signify; therefore, language, I argue, structures an emptiness that is central to psychic
reality: the gap that always remains between what is said and what is. There is always
something left behind, something that falls out during our attempts to express meaning. It
leaves a gap, an emptiness, a silence, an ignorance. While in health, this emptiness is
effectively a potentiality, an opening to (unconscious) experience, for the agoraphobic
this emptiness is a barricade to experience. That is, rather than experiencing the
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emptiness as a potential space wherein something productive might happen, the
‘something’ that ‘might happen’ – which, for the agoraphobic, is either an overwhelming
‘already-happened’ or a ‘nothing happening’ where something might have productively
happened – is defended against by filling the emptiness with a blankness, like putting
psychic locks on emotional doors and then experiencing them as impenetrable walls.
Therefore, the freedom to be incoherent affords the agoraphobic the opportunity to
experience her intrinsic emptiness as a potential space wherein something productive
might happen rather than as a barricade to experience or as an emptiness that needs to be
filled. In the next chapter, I argue that a therapeutic emphasis on narrative coherence
displaces the focus from unconscious truth to a good story. The tasks of trying to be
coherent and trying to say everything involve different processes and therefore have
different results; likewise, the task of listening differs between trying to make sense of
what is being said and waiting to see what sense emerges. It is not that incoherence in
itself is preferable to coherence, but that when coherence is demanded, fewer feelings and
thoughts are possible; when incoherence is tolerated, new and unanticipated feelings and
thoughts can develop. Coherence, then, cannot be taken to dictate the process of
psychoanalysis, or as its ultimate aim. I develop these arguments in the next chapter on
the use and function of language in the psychoanalytic situation.
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Chapter Four: In/Coherence
In Chapter Three, I discussed the phenomenon of emptiness Milrod (2007) identifies in
patients whose agoraphobic symptoms of anxiety and avoidance have remitted. Milrod’s
discussion of the clinical case studies she presents emphasizes the transference
relationship and implies (as she argues elsewhere: see Milrod et al. 2000, 2001, 2007)
that it is this particular element of psychoanalysis that distinguishes it from the temporary
effects of the psychiatric treatment of agoraphobia. However, the limitations of this
emphasis are evident in Milrod’s assessment of one of her patients’ progress: “Likely her
desperate need to define herself in keeping with and as being linked to one of her parents
had been substituted in part by her relationship with me” (2007, p. 1020). The
substitutive relationship with the analyst allows for higher everyday ‘functioning,’159 but
it fails to relieve the patient’s psychic emptiness. In light of the failure of interpreting the
transference to effect change in patients’ experiences of pathological emptiness, I argue
that the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis – what Bollas (2013) calls the Freudian Pair:
the freely associating analysand and the evenly suspended analyst – is the most important
element in psychoanalysis generally, and in the psychoanalysis of patients with
agoraphobia specifically.
As I argued in Chapter One, agoraphobia indicates a failure to symbolize – and,
thus, to limit – the anxiety that results from the repression of libidinal and aggressive
drives. Rather than the symbolic fear of a specific phobia, agoraphobia indicates the fear
of symbolization itself.160 The persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) describes, along with
the agoraphobic’s inability to limit her anxiety by locating a specific phobic object, is
indicative of this inhibition of symbolization. As I argued in Chapter Two, the
agoraphobic “object” of anxiety is intermediary spaces, which can be understood to
include all of what Winnicott calls the third area of experience. As I developed in Chapter
Two, this third area of (shared) experience develops from the diffusion of the transitional
159

For example, this patient’s psychiatrically delineated agoraphobic symptoms of anxiety and avoidance
remitted. She was able to move out of her parents’ house and into her own apartment with her husband
(Milrod 2007, p. 1020).
160
As I described in Chapter One, agoraphobia is “more gradually developed, more generalized, less
demonstrably related to conditioning, more resistant to treatment and more likely to involve extensive
character pathology [than specific phobias]” (Frances & Dunn 1975, p. 435).
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object and, following Green (1975), includes the use of language. In order to alleviate the
agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness, the agoraphobic needs to be able to learn to use
language creatively. The creative use of language is only possible when the
agoraphobic’s fear of destruction (of the object) or fear of annihilation (of the ego) is not
too great. There are two problematic uses the agoraphobic makes of language: the first is
indicated above and is symptomatic of her inability to symbolize, namely, to limit
feelings by putting them into words. This problem may only become evident once, as
Milrod (2007) shows, anxiety and avoidance recede to reveal the agoraphobic’s persistent
emptiness. The second problem involves a particular reliance on specific narratives to
defend against the gaps in language which, as I described in Chapter Three, emerge out of
the subject’s structural emptiness. I argue that the agoraphobic’s use of language in this
latter way is characteristic of a repetition compulsion, distinct from the more familiar
behavioural repetition compulsion in which individuals re-enact troubling relationships
and traumatic events.161 This second problem may be more apparent in frankly
agoraphobic patients – that is, individuals currently beset by the anxiety and avoidance by
which the disorder is psychiatrically defined – than in patients for whom these symptoms
have remitted. Free association addresses both of these problems, providing the
agoraphobic with the opportunity to experience her structural emptiness as a potential
space wherein something productive might happen instead of as a barricade to experience
or as an emptiness that needs to be filled.
I argue that the tasks of trying to be coherent and trying to say everything involve
different processes and therefore have different results; likewise, the task of listening
differs between trying to make sense of what is being said and waiting to see what sense
emerges. It is not that incoherence in itself is preferable to coherence, but that when
161

For some early conceptualizations of the repetition compulsion, see Freud (1914b, 1920) and Kubie
(1939). Loewald makes a distinction between active and passive repetition, and suggests that the
“compulsion to repeat unconscious conflicts, wishes, experiences, passively is due primarily to their having
remained under repression, that is not exposed to the influence of the organizing activity of the ego” (1971,
p. 61). The agoraphobic’s conscious repetition of her narratives belies the simplicity of this distinction, but
also suggests the possibility that something in the agoraphobic’s unconscious remains repressed,
unacknowledged, or unsaid. For a recent addition to the literature, see Künstlicher (2010), in which the
connection between the repetition compulsion and the phenomenon of Nachträglichkeit is demonstrated,
though not made explicit. I discuss this connection further in section 4.4.
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coherence is demanded, fewer feelings and thoughts are possible; when incoherence is
tolerated, new and unanticipated feelings and thoughts can develop. The agoraphobic is
unable to tolerate incoherence: she either produces narratives that are too coherent or she
produces empty narratives. The agoraphobic suffers from a restricted unconscious
freedom in addition to the restrictions she places on her freedom of mobility. Following
Bollas, I argue that there are two aspects of mental health: the ability to construct
coherent narratives and the freedom to explore the feelings that precede coherence.162 The
agoraphobic, I suggest, uses narrative to stave off the overwhelming emotions that
accompany incoherence. An analytic emphasis on interpreting the transference colludes
with the agoraphobic’s ego in the resistance of incoherence, inhibiting the development
of free association. Focusing on narrative coherence forecloses the emergence of the
unconscious in the gaps revealed by language, gaps which must emerge in order for new
thoughts and feelings to be possible. The invitation ‘try to say everything’163 provides the
space for these gaps to emerge and the opportunity to explore them.
In this chapter, I explore agoraphobia and the uses of language in the
psychoanalytic setting through three main themes: coherence as resistance; the analyst’s
over-reliance on interpreting the transference as an impediment to the development of
free and freer associations; and, the concept of Nachträglichkeit and the logic of the
unconscious.164 These themes are all connected to the concepts of psychoanalytic truth
162

Some patients exhibit a problematic lack of coherence. The inability to cohere can be related to a
plethora of possible traumas and presents a different kind of psychic dilemma that is beyond the scope of
this thesis. As Loewenstein indicates, and as I argued in Chapter Two, the “illusion of unity and identity
[…] is an absolute necessity for being in this world that is less than harmonious (1994, p. 730). I do not
think any of the theorists I consider here disagree that narrative is an important aspect of psychical life. The
disagreement revolves around how one uses narrative analytically and where a patient’s narrative comes
from. Here, I focus on the agoraphobic’s inability to explore the gaps in conscious experience, which is to
say, the inability to use the experience of incoherence (and emptiness) creatively.
163
As I explore below, the articulation of the fundamental rule takes many forms. I note here the historical
shift from Freud’s authoritarian insistence on free association to contemporary analysts’ “gentle
exhortation” (Lichtenberg & Galler 1987, p. 63), evident in such phraseology as “try to say everything.”
See also Busch 1994, pp. 364-365: “Lichtenberg and Galler’s characterization of the tone of the guidelines
given to patients as ‘gentle exhortation’ (p. 63) captures a current dilemma for many analysts. The strident
nature of Freud’s view of the method of free association seems alien, thus the ‘gentle’ component. Yet we
still believe it necessary to ‘exhort’ our patients to hold back as little as possible.”
164
I refer to unconscious “logic” in the Freudian tradition. See, for example, Bollas (2013), Bradby (1920),
Freud (1900, 1915), Green (1986), and Melnick (2000). See especially Matte Blanco (1959, 1973/2005,
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and psychical reality, which provide the frame within which I develop my arguments.
There is little consensus on what constitutes psychoanalytic truth. As I am here concerned
with psychical coherence – and, relatedly, psychical reality – I follow Faimberg’s concept
of psychic truths, which “are the consequence of the psychic work resulting from the
demands of reality that are fashioned by the unconscious wish and the unconscious
fantasy” (1997, p. 449). This definition is consistent with my arguments in Chapter Two,
namely, that psychical reality is created through the ego’s mediation of external reality;
both the facts of external reality and the ego’s mediation – or, better, modification – of
those facts is clinically pertinent. Indeed, it is precisely the ego’s modification of external
reality that is the concern of psychoanalytic work and is the realm of that work’s
influence.

4.1. Psychoanalytic Truth and Psychical Reality
“Go ahead and lie.”
(Stern 1966, p. 144)
The question of psychical coherence is intimately connected to the question of psychical
reality. In Chapter Two, I addressed the question of ‘realities’ along one line of thought,
arguing that the agoraphobic is not able to take for granted the distinction between
internal reality and external reality, and therefore cannot experience shared reality as
illusion. Psychical reality refers to internal reality, which is formed in a process of
creative differentiation; the process involves both identification of what is internal and
what is external, and the creation of a uniquely individual internal reality at the same
time. I developed these ideas in detail in Chapter Two. However, there is much more that

1975, 1988) for an elaboration of the “symmetrical” or “anaclitic” logic of the unconscious, which is
contrasted with – in fact, defined against – the asymmetrical logic of conscious thought. Matte Blanco’s
term “bi-logic” (1975) refers to the admixture of these two logics which forms most thought. The qualities
of unconscious logic include: displacement; condensation; timelessness; the confusion of (inner) fantasy
with (outward) reality; the absence of negation; and, the principle of non-contradiction (Freud 1915; Matte
Blanco 1975, 1988). In this chapter, I am primarily concerned with the quality of timelessness – as
displayed in the phenomenon of Nachträglichkeit – and its implication for the psychoanalytic treatment of
agoraphobia.
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has been said and much that remains to be said on the question of reality in
psychoanalysis. At the same time, this question of psychical reality cannot be entirely
extricated from psychoanalytic considerations of truth. As recent publications indicate,
the natures of truth (Mills 2014) and of psychical reality (Rosegrant 2010) are entirely
unresolved in the psychoanalytic literature, both clinically and theoretically. Some
distinguish between “historical truth” and “material truth” (e.g., Avenburg & Guiter
1957; Freud 1937); “narrative truth” and “historical truth” (e.g., Spence 1982a and
Shengold 1985); “psychical reality” and “historical truth” (e.g., Schimek 1975);
“narrative truth” and “theoretical truth” (e.g., Spence 1982b); “poetical truth” and
“scientific truth” (e.g., Toynbee 1949). Truth is also variously distinguished from
illusion, fantasy, lies, and error. Rather than belabour these various distinctions, I draw
attention to a few critical points. The first point is quite simply that the questions of truth
and of reality remain open. Mills, referring specifically to truth, summarizes this state:
Psychoanalysis has no formal theory of truth. When analysts speak of truth, they
are often referring to empirical matters, such as patients’ statements or disclosures
that correspond to events in the real world, historical facts, recollection from
memory versus construction via fantasy, sincere first-person narratives, and how
truth is revealed or concealed in the analytic encounter. A close inspection of the
psychoanalytic contributions on the question and meaning of truth is almost
exclusively centered on clinical phenomena, while a genuinely unique
philosophical theory peculiar to psychoanalysis remains unrealized. (2014, p. 268)
Although the question of truth is unresolved, this is not to say that there are no arguments
about the nature of truth in psychoanalysis; that is to say, while the question of truth may
be unresolved – like many, if not most, psychoanalytic concepts – as a psychoanalytic
principle, there are a finite number of specific arguments concerning the nature of truth in
psychoanalysis. Most of these arguments concern the competing clinical relevance of
narrative truth (that is, a “good story”) and historical truth (that is, “what really
happened”). As I will argue below, following Faimberg (1997), neither of these exclusive
options is clinically satisfying as each ignores the complexity of psychical reality.
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Hanly (1990, 2009) explicates the three philosophical theories of truth:
correspondence, coherence, and the pragmatic.165 Although these theories have
traditionally been opposed one to the others, Hanly importantly argues that they can
function together psychoanalytically, that is to say, clinically.166 To this end, he implicitly
moves from considering each one as a philosophical theory of truth to considering each
one as a criterion for truth clinically. Briefly, the coherence theory of truth “requires
logical consistency (non-contradiction) and explanatory completeness” (Hanly 2009, p.
364). Ultimately, Hanly argues that clinical “[a]rguments based only on a criterion of
coherence over-value logical consistency which while necessary is not sufficient as a
criterion [for truth]” (2009, p. 365). While Hanly emphasizes an over-valuation of logical
consistency, I point to the overvaluation of narrative consistency, which is more relevant
clinically in the work of narrative-oriented psychoanalysts. Generally speaking, the
narrativists privilege the coherence theory of truth over the correspondence theory, which
requires that a proposition find its match in external reality. They argue that, working
psychoanalytically, the material reality of the patient’s clinical discourse cannot be
verified by any external source. Partly, the private nature of psychoanalytic work is
responsible for this impossibility.167 The narrativists also express concern over the
analyst’s supposedly authoritarian access to truth – as if there could be one absolute Truth
– for those analysts subscribing to the correspondence theory. However, as Hanly argues,
in the context of clinical psychoanalysis (as in the empirical sciences), “[c]orrespondence
165

Cf. Muniz de Rezende (Lewkowicz & Flechner 2005), who distinguishes types of truth according to
discipline: in formal sciences, truth requires coherence; in empirical sciences, it needs correspondence; in
human sciences, it calls for symbolic consensus. Symbolic consensus is based on Blumer’s (1962/1969)
symbolic interactionism in the discipline of sociology and is similar to critical pragmatism in its clinical
significance. See also infra note 166.
166
In the history of psychoanalysis, the debate between correspondence and coherence is reflected in the
longstanding debate on psychoanalysis as science or art; popular perspective has shifted from defending
psychoanalysis as a science to holding that psychoanalysis is both art and science. See, for example,
Bowlby (1979), Dugan (2010), French (1958), and Slochower (1964). Despite the consensus of popular
opinion, the debate continues, and continues to develop greater complexity as findings from other fields
(especially developmental psychology and neuroscience) are taken into account.
167
One can also argue that the past no longer exists in material reality and cannot therefore be confirmed or
refuted. See, for example, Russell (1921). In the past century, arguments in this vein have gained
complexity. Faimberg (1997), for example, distinguishes material reality from historical truths.
Correspondence, for Faimberg, refers not to the relationship between psychical reality and material reality
(by which she refers to an apprehendable, objective, and external world), but to psychical reality and
historical truth (by which she refers to past events).
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can be evaluated without omniscience, without absolute knowledge and without
certainty” (2009, pp. 366-367). Furthermore, correspondence “is not a question of
absolute, automatic, intuitive certainty. It is a matter of accumulated evidence” (Hanly
2009, p. 367). Both the coherence and correspondence theories of truth lack the third
element that Hanly identifies as essential to the clinical enterprise: critical pragmatism:
An idea or theory is true, if, by means of a technology specified by it and coherent
with it, the theory can be used to change the course of nature. It is this concept of
pragmatism that we find at work in Freud’s development of psychoanalytic theory
and technique. In psychoanalysis the change in the course of nature we look for is
the amelioration of neurotic disorders. The technique is the interpretation of free
association and transferences in the analytic setup. The theories are about the
causes of neuroses. (Hanly 2009, p. 368)
Hanly overstates the psychoanalytic consensus on all of these issues.168 Nonetheless, his
point regarding the clinical need for critical pragmatism as a criterion for truth is welltaken. As Jacobs (2002) also demonstrates, without the critical pragmatic element of
truth, correspondence and coherence is clinically insufficient.169
Hanly vacillates between arguing about the truth value of a theory, suggesting that
a theory is true if it fulfills these three criteria, and the truth of statements made clinically.
Although one might think that, on questions of truth, there could be no distinguishing
between theoretical and clinical truths, we must nevertheless do so. This distinction is
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See Levy for a brief discussion, from the perspective of the editor of a leading psychoanalytic journal
(JAPA), of “changing perspectives on the clinical role of interpretation” (2011, p. 1120) and other critical
issues of dissension or contention among contemporary analysts. Kiersky and Fosshage also provide an
editorial response to a case study with commentaries, noting “that something is missing in [this group of
analysts], and that is the rigid, authoritarian analyst of the past who always knew more about the patient
than she knew about herself” (2009, p. 355). Their response draws out the plurality of theoretical
perspectives, which, of course, impacts each analyst’s clinical work. See also Goldberg (2012), who
addresses the plurality of clinical aims through an examination of clinical failures.
169
See also Eigen (1983). Through the analysis of a dream from each of three patients, Eigen aptly
demonstrates the limitations of coherence and correspondence. Referring to her dream, one patient
succinctly describes her fear of the potential for “more” (more life, more experiences, more feelings): “‘But
what if I cross the ladder and the boat is empty?’ [Eigen comments:] She apparently felt better off
immersed in a fruitless or vicious circle with plenty of activity, if no real movement” (p. 215). Eigen’s
patient echoes one of Milrod’s agoraphobic patients, who states: “‘I’d prefer to live without any of this
emotional intensity. […] What I like is to do things’” (Milrod 2007, p. 1021). Only with the addition of the
criterion of pragmatism is, in Eigen’s words, “genuine movement beyond the status quo” (p. 216) possible.
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necessary precisely because of the nature of psychical reality. Here, I am not concerned
with theoretical coherence, which, as Hanly points out, is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for theoretical truth. I am concerned with truth in its relationship to psychical
reality and psychical in/coherence.
Holmes, a leading figure in British psychodynamic psychiatry,170 draws a
conclusion on the significance of narrative coherence in attachment research, the
psychoanalytic situation, and psychical reality: “It [attachment research] points to
powerful links between the ‘narrative truth’ of the clinical situation and the ‘historical
truth’ of the patient’s actual biography” (1999, p. 56).171 This conclusion is simply
incorrect. As the Adult Attachment Interview manual clearly states, no assumption is
made between reported and actual experiences (Main et al. 2002, p. 8). Furthermore, as I
emphasized in Chapter Two, what is at stake in psychoanalysis is psychical reality. While
the relationship between narrative truth and historical (or material) truth is certainly of
170

Holmes has written extensively on attachment theory, narrative therapy, and psychoanalysis. See, for
example, Holmes (1994, 1997, 1999, 2014) and Holmes and Slade (2013).
171
The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) is a semi-structured interview used as a psychological research
measure of “adult state of mind with regards to attachment.” In other words, the AAI attempts to reveal the
nature of an individual’s object relations using language as the medium between internal representations
and behaviour. The AAI produces a transcript which is analyzed for the individual's discourse coherency
about attachment experiences. The hallmark of a secure-autonomous speaker is precisely narrative
coherence; in parallel, the various insecure states of mind with regard to attachment are characterized by
different styles of incoherency. Coherence is defined according to the dyad; that is, coherence depends on
the speaker and the listener, the text and the reader. Clinically, as Vaslamatzis (2007) demonstrates, the
patient’s degree of coherence is determined according to the analyst’s understanding, or lack thereof, of the
patient’s speech. In adult attachment research, coherence is defined according to Grice’s (1975) maxims of
collaborative conversation: be truthful and have evidence for what you say; be succinct, yet complete; be
perspicacious; and, be clear and orderly. The relevance of the AAI is due not only to its systematization of
discourse analysis in terms of attachment status, but more importantly because of the link it demonstrates
between language and behaviour. Specifically, a parent’s state of mind as determined via discourse is
strongly predictive of his or her child’s attachment status, which is measured behaviourally through the
Strange Situation Procedure (SSP). That is, a parent’s state of mind with regards to attachment, measured
via discourse analysis, is strongly correlated with his or her child’s attachment style, measured
behaviourally. The way a parent talks about his or her own attachment experiences corresponds,
statistically, to the child’s attachment behaviours towards that parent (see, for example, Main et al. 1985).
Research with the AAI demonstrates that the ability to be coherent regarding attachment experiences is
correlated with positive outcomes (see, for example, Karen 1998; Berlin, Cassidy & Appleyard 2008).
Correlatively, incoherence, evidenced via the violation of these maxims, is associated with adverse
outcomes both individually and intergenerationally (see, for example, van Ijzendoorn & BakermansKranenburg 1997). For an example of the clinical application of the AAI in a psychotherapy patient, see
Muscetta et al. (1999). See also Steele & Steele (2008).
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interest, Holmes’s suggestion that there might be a correspondence between them based
on coherence conflates the philosophical distinction between the coherence theory of
truth and the correspondence theory of truth and ignores the gamut of clinical literature
arguing against this very claim (including Spence [1982a, 1982b], whom I discuss
below). Furthermore, such a position displaces the focus of the clinic from unconscious
(psychical) truth to a good story, which, as I describe below, is also the pitfall of the
narrativists.
The chasm between narrative truth and historical truth is well articulated by
Spence, a psychoanalyst who follows a narrativist approach:172 “Narrative truth is
confused with historical truth, and the very coherence of an account may lead us to
[mistakenly] believe that we are making contact with an actual happening” (1982a, p.
27). And further:
[T]he particular satisfaction that comes from good narrative fit should not be
confused with the excitement of making a historical discovery; constructions
should not be shaded into reconstructions, and the difference between the two
kinds of truth statements should always be kept in mind. (1982a, p. 185)173

172

This “narrative approach” to psychoanalysis characterizes the work of, for example, Geha (e.g., 1993,
1996), Riceour (e.g., 1970/1977), and Schafer (e.g., 1987, 1996). Geha describes the extreme version of
this narrative approach, fictionalism: “Fictionalism maintains that all aspects of human experience are
creations of imagination, that mind-made realities constitute for human beings their sole realm of existence,
and that it is only about these realms that anything at all can be known. No other knowable realities exist”
(1993, p. 209). Further, Geha argues that “psychoanalysis is basically a fictional enterprise” (p. 210). To be
clear, he does not intend this argument as a criticism of the psychoanalytic project; rather, he uses this
argument to frame his criticisms of psychoanalytic “realism.” Less extreme, Spence quotes Schafer on the
analyst’s role: to “help [analysands] transform these narrations into others that are more complete, coherent,
convincing, and adaptively useful than those they have been accustomed to constructing” (Schafer 1980, p.
63; qtd. in Spence 1983, p. 460). Loewenstein (1991) provides a comparison of the narrative approach and
the positivist scientific approach of the ego psychologists (e.g., Kohut 2011/1990; Hartmann 1939/1964a,
1964b) and criticizes the narrativists and the ego psychologists alike for constructing coherence as one of
the pillars of psychoanalytic truth.
173
Cf. Schimek: “What Freud (1899) said about conscious childhood memories – namely, that they are
only memories ‘relating to our childhood,’ which do not simply re-emerge in the present, but are ‘formed at
that time’ – should apply as well to the reconstruction of the past through the psychoanalytic process”
(1975, p. 862); and Eickhoff, in his work on Nachträglichkeit, who also quotes Freud: “‘Our childhood
memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the
memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as people are
accustomed to say, emerge; they were formed at that time. And a number of motives, with no concern for
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Succinctly, Spence emphasizes: “Narrative fit speaks to narrative truth; it says relatively
little about historical truth” (1982a, p. 187). Even as Spence distinguishes between
narrative truth and historical truth, he privileges narrative truth for the transformative
effects it may have in the analytic setting: “narrative truth has a special significance in its
own right and [...] making contact with the actual past may be of far less significance
than creating a coherent and consistent account of a particular set of events” (1982a, p.
28; my emphasis). While the correspondence between narrative truth and historical truth
may not be as close as Holmes suggests, the asymmetry between them may not be as
radical as Spence argues.174
Avenburg and Guiter, following Freud’s use of “historical reality” to refer to the
subjective experience and “material reality” to refer to that which may be confirmed by
external sources,175 suggest that
the concept of truth includes different realities and, in analysis, is capable of
resolving the opposition between internal and external by pointing precisely to
those moments upon which such distinction between psychical reality and
external reality was founded, the moment when both realities were one and the
same, i.e. only one truth, a material truth which was then preserved as historical
historical accuracy, had a part in forming them, as well as in the selection of the memories themselves’”
(Freud 1899, p. 322; original italics; qtd. in Eickhoff 2006, p. 1457).
174
Fitzpatrick Hanly provides an assessment of the current status of narrative in clinical psychoanalysis,
suggesting that the “idea of a ‘narrative approach’ has come to mean that the history of the psyche of a
patient is inaccessible and that what the analyst should aim to achieve in the process of the analysis is the
co-construction of a ‘story’ agreed to by both analyst and patient. The psychoanalytic process constructs a
fiction that is somehow helpful” (1996, p. 445). Referring to the clinical process (as opposed to theory),
Fitzpatrick Hanly importantly argues that psychoanalytic discourse cannot be reduced to a narrative process
without doing injustice to its integral aspects: “Disorganized, disconnected and fragmentary, with gaps
whose content lie in the unconscious, and lacking any clear beginning-middle-end sequence,
psychoanalytic ‘discourse’ has a unique status. To use the word ‘narrative’ (with its connotations of clear
‘beginning, middle, end sequence’ and ‘coherence’) for this special discourse can blur many distinct
features of free association and can ignore the deeper structures of the psyche that are glimpsed through
disjunctions in the associative process” (p. 451).
175
It is interesting to note that the shift from contrasting historical reality with material reality to contrasting
narrative truth with historical truth implicitly conceals the fictional aspects of any “history,” which is
always already a subjective narrative construction of past events. Schimek traces this shift in Freud’s work,
noting that “Freud started with the assumption that the analyst was unearthing unconscious memories of
actual events, then only fantasies, then a psychical reality inherited from prehistoric events, and, finally,
back to individual experiences that ‘did really happen’” (1975, p. 858). See Schimek (1987) for the further
development of these arguments.

126
truth in our subjectivity, separated from that other reality which is present,
immediate and conventional. (1976, p. 17)
“Truth,” then, brings us back to Chapter Two, the question of what is internal and what is
external, and the process of reality-testing. As I suggest above, the question of truth is
here of interest in its relation to coherence and the process of free association. As with the
question of internal versus external, the question of truth is deceptively – impossibly –
simple. The traditional philosophical notions of truth, established according to either
correspondence or coherence, counters the work of free association in the psychoanalytic
setting. As Stern suggests to one of his patients, “‘Go ahead and lie’” (1966, p. 144).
With this permission to deviate from the “truth,” Stern encouraged the patient to “[make]
up stories, creating material out of the spontaneous imaginative elements of his mind on
the spur of the moment” (1966, p. 144).
I do not endeavour to construct a philosophical or metapsychological theory of
truth. I wish only to indicate the impossibility of arriving at Truth, which is my second
point here. Drawing attention to the truth of speech, Lacan states: “I always speak the
truth. Not the whole truth, because there's no way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally
impossible: words fail. Yet it's through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto
the real” (1990, p. 3). This statement brings us back again to my arguments in Chapter
Two. The real is that which resists. Narrative coherence indicates that the real remains
outside of the story. As I argued in Chapter Three, the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness
is better explained by the presence of traumatic and unmourned losses than by a deficient
reflective function (as Milrod [2007] suggests). The historical reality of these losses must
be given their due weight. Miller argues that, clinically, “what is said is not to be
measured against what is” (1990, p. xxii). Further, the truth “is related to the real […] by
the impossible-to-say” (Miller 1990, p. xxiii). A narrative’s coherence, then, more likely
indicates an altogether different relation to “historical reality” than the one Holmes
suggests above. This impossibility (“saying it all”), like the “impossibility” of following
the fundamental rule and the “impossibility” of analytic neutrality, does not entail that
there is no use in the attempt. That is, the real resists symbolization, but one works at it
and one gets better at saying more. There is always, as Faimberg notes (and I return to
below), “an insistent residue” (1997, p. 449), but the more that can be said, the closer one
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is able to approximate truth: to approach psychical truth and account for the unconscious
compromises between material reality and the mediating ego. As Bollas argues (and I
developed in Chapter Two):
The analyst must return to the patient’s presentation of his or her facts of life not
because they bear some meta-truth in themselves that will displace the patient’s
projective constructions of an internal world, but because the patient is entering
the intrinsically traumatic in the process of analysis, unconsciously asking that
the trauma of things done be addressed. (1995, p. 113; original emphasis)
The truth of the psychoanalytic process is this: that the patient is “unconsciously asking
that the trauma” be recognized by someone other than herself. As I argued in Chapter
Two, it is only once the loss is acknowledged in external reality that the patient – and
especially, I argue, the agoraphobic – can begin to take for granted the distinction
between internal and external.

4.2. Free Association, Coherence, and Resistance
Free association that reveals a coherent theme is already affected by anxiety, and the
cohesion of ideas is a defence organization.
(Winnicott 1971, p. 55)
As I suggest above, the agoraphobic individual displays a kind of repetition compulsion
of narratives. Frances and Dunn note that some “[agoraphobic] patients report repetitive
ruminations or fantasies which they ‘use’ to protect them from frightening situations”
(1975, p. 438).176 Capps and Ochs (1995), Davidson (2000, 2001), and Hollway and
Jefferson (2001) provide some data on the specific “repetitive ruminations” that
agoraphobics use. Although Frances and Dunn suggest that the “repetitive ruminations or
fantasies” protect agoraphobic individuals from frightening situations, Capps and Ochs
importantly add that “agoraphobia is in part kept alive through [...] repeated
psychological reconstructions of panic” (1995, p. 21; my emphasis). Capps and Ochs
176

See also Parsons 2000, p. 41: “He spoke without emotion and his narrative technique obviously served
to keep him affectively out of touch with what he was describing. Near the end of one session I commented
on his organised way of presenting himself: perhaps it might be to try and ward of inner feelings of chaos.”
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perform a three-year case study on agoraphobia and discourse; Meg is the subject of this
study. Through an analysis of Meg’s discourse, Capps and Ochs demonstrate that
agoraphobia is not only “kept alive” but continuously revivified and reinforced.177
Davidson works with groups of agoraphobic women and suggests that “[e]ach individual
has a different story to tell, and many continue to speculate and rework their narratives to
the present day” (2001, p. 293). Unlike other psychological disorders, these individual
stories about the disorder seem to be an integral aspect of the agoraphobic experience.
Hollway and Jefferson consider the question of why these repetitive ruminations, which
the agoraphobic often uses – consciously – in the aim of understanding her agoraphobic
anxieties, are unsuccessful in relieving those anxieties. Hollway and Jefferson draw
attention to the unconscious uses of narrative to, as Frances and Dunn indicate, “protect
them from frightening situations,” or, I add, to protect themselves from frightening
feelings of, specifically, rage and grief.
Fink (2010) has argued that it is not necessary for a patient to understand the
aetiology of her traumatic neuroses in order for the alleviation of her symptoms. On the
contrary, understanding can be used, intellectually, to defend against overwhelming
affects.178 As I argued in Chapter Three, Milrod’s patients exhibit an increased
177

I return to Capps and Ochs, and their case study of Meg, in Section 4.4.
See also Grotstein: “Understanding is a myth, a falsehood – on its way to becoming a lie – and subverts
transcending experience” (1981, p. 29). For a clinical example, see Jacobs 2012, p. 65. Although Jacobs’s
point is not that understanding is not necessary, or can even impede, analytic progress, he provides a clear
clinical vignette of the limits of understanding. Indeed, like the agoraphobic patients I describe here,
Jacobs’s patient uses narrative – in this case, phrases previous of his analysts had used – to defend himself
against overwhelming affect and true engagement with his unconscious, leading to little psychical
transformation or growth: “He carried the analyst’s words—he memorized phrases—with him like a magic
talisman that he pulled out for use when needed. His defenses against true reliving and re-experiencing,
both within and outside of the transference, remained unchanged” (2012, p. 65). See also p. 66: “Perhaps
his intellectual grasp of the conflicts that lay behind his symptoms and many aspects of his character had
increased, but this knowledge had not seemed to touch him.” Although some (see, for example, Goldberg
2012, p. 162) have misread Fink (2010) as arguing against the analyst’s understanding, it is clear Fink
refers specifically to the analysand’s understanding. At the same time, a therapeutic emphasis on
understanding certainly distracts the analyst from his primary task of listening. Fink is not against
understanding as such but, more specifically, he is cautioning against using understanding as a primary aim
of psychoanalysis insofar as it interferes with psychical change: “Understanding what happened, why it
happened, and how it changed is all well and good, as long as it does not get in the way of the change
itself” (2010, p. 261). As Phillips phrases it, the “question is what we use understanding to do”
(Holdengräber 2014; original emphasis).
178

129
intellectual understanding of their emotional lives; and yet, to reiterate, “this
understanding did not alter Rita’s need to distance herself from [her daughter] Laura and
her emotional demands, nor did it make her more empathic with her daughter’s distress”
(Milrod 2007, p. 1020).
As I developed in Chapter Two, the ego is “a coherent organization of mental
processes” (Freud 1923, p. 17). Resistance is a defence that arises in the clinical setting
and is the work of the ego struggling to maintain its coherent and familiar self, to not
admit conflicts into its being. Many theorists have written on the (false) lure of
coherence. Stern connects truth and coherence, and importantly argues that a patient’s
strict adherence to “the truth” may interfere with his ability to free associate:
[F]or some people, free-association is immoral, in accordance with their strict
background of speaking only the truth and only what they are sure is the truth.
[...For some, this means] that one has a responsibility to be sure that what is
spoken corresponds to a rational, conscious estimate of truth. [...I]n order to speak
along those lines, one must be coherent and accurate so that there is no question
but that what is spoken is the truth. (1966, p. 143)
Meerloo similarly notes that “[w]hen patients talk continuously and coherently in the
therapeutic session, they rarely associate freely” (1959, p. 76). Fink writes: “It is the
analysand’s ego that seeks to force his thoughts and speech to be coherent, whereas it is
his ‘free associations’ (as unfree as they ultimately are, in a deeper sense) that allows us a
glimpse of the repressed” (2007, p. 45). And, further:
We do not assume that the analysand is of one mind – indeed, we assume that the
analysand is inhabited by contradictory thoughts and desires, some conscious,
some preconscious, and some unconscious – and we certainly do not want to be
complicit with the analysand’s ego when it attempts to impose coherence and
consistency on what comes out of the analysand’s mouth. (Fink 2007, p. 46; my
emphasis)
To clarify: we do not assume that the analysand is “inhabited by contradictory thoughts
and desires” because she is ill but because that is the very nature of subjectivity. As
Loewenstein argues, by
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focusing on coherence […] the narrativists compromise Freud’s insight that the
subject is divided; that in the subject who says ‘I’ there is an ‘otherness,’ one that
is erratic, everchanging, ambiguous, contradictory and, as Freud taught us in so
many ways, defies coherence, certainty, and consistency. (1991, p. 11)
The coherence of statements regarding an individual’s drives, thoughts, reflections, and
desires must be distinguished from the coherence of statements regarding “facts,”
behaviours, or actions. I reiterate Fink’s statement, bearing in mind this important
distinction: “we assume that the analysand is inhabited by contradictory thoughts and
desires” (2007, p. 46; emphasis added).
Winnicott develops a similar idea of coherence as defence: “free association that
reveals a coherent theme is already affected by anxiety, and the cohesion of ideas is a
defence organization” (1971, p. 55). The analyst’s role is to support the emergence of
incoherence or, perhaps, to bear the communication of nonsense. Winnicott warns against
the dangers of being “a clever analyst” and of trying “to see order in chaos,” which would
force “the patient [to] leave the nonsense area because of hopelessness about
communicating nonsense” (1971, p. 56). As I argued in Chapter Two, via Milner, the
illusion of shared experience is only possible if there is a time when “it will not be
necessary for self-preservation’s sake to distinguish clearly between inner and outer, self
and not-self” (1952, p. 192). If the analysand has to abandon her attempt to communicate
nonsense, she also has to forsake this opportunity of relief from the conscious distinction
between the internal and external worlds. As Winnicott writes, an “opportunity for rest
has been missed because of the therapist’s need to find sense where nonsense is” (1971,
p. 56). As I also argued in Chapter Two, if the analyst can make room for the analysand’s
experience of this “opportunity for rest,” the agoraphobic develops a greater sense of
what is internal and what is external. When this distinction can be taken for granted, the
third area of experience (shared reality) can be inhabited and language can be used
creatively rather than only defensively.
Singer notes, “[m]any patients […] fear unlimited and unbounded free
association, for that opens them up to infinity and psychological annihilation, since they
cannot grasp or get hold of any continuity and coherence of their thought, and thus of
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themselves” (1977b, p. 475).179 Although Singer is referring to borderline patients and
their characteristic lack of a stable and coherent sense of self, his remark is equally
applicable to agoraphobia patients. It is precisely a secure sense of the self separate from
the other that the agoraphobic lacks and it is only through an exploration of the limits of
the self via free association that the agoraphobic is able to establish the boundaries
between self and other that will allow her to explore freely both her external and her
internal worlds.
Green develops the connection between free association and the negative, which,
as I argued in Chapter Three, manifests pathologically in agoraphobia patients as
‘persistent emptiness’: “Free association [...] is still the most prototypical expression of
the negative. What does free association mean if not loosening the noose of the positive
which constrains consciousness?” (1999, p. 37). I draw attention to Green’s metaphor of
the noose: even in the thought of a noose, one feels one’s breath quickening and
becoming shallow; the noose impinges the breath as the tyranny of the positive tightens
around the agoraphobic, constricting her worlds, both internal and external. If the
negative cannot be tolerated, the noose tightens. Approaching emptiness, or the open
door, cannot be without its anxiety. If the analyst can encourage this exploration of space
and freedom via free association, the analysand can contemplate and risk more feelings
and more experiences (that is, more experiences in the internal and the external worlds).
As I described in Chapter Two, the ego is an essentially coherent organization of
psychical reality. An adherence to coherence, which is the cause of the agoraphobic’s
suffering, interferes with destabilizing the ego’s organization. In health, the ego need not
adhere to its organization so rigidly, as evidenced in Green’s additional description of the
ego’s functions: “The ego must chiefly be able to establish flexible connections, which
alternately are going to be done, forming temporary hypotheses and conclusions, and be
undone, in order to leave room for others who give a better representation of the
situation” (1986, p. 20; my emphasis). In Bollas’s terms, coherence is precisely not
179

Lacan writes: “with the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, the analyst is far from directing the subject
toward full speech, or toward a coherent discourse – rather, the analyst leaves the subject free to have a go
at it”; further, “this freedom is what the subject tolerates least easily” (1958/2006b, p. 535). See also Adler
and Bachant: “Expressive freedom, like any freedom, is both a burden and an opportunity” (1996, p. 1024).
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psychoanalysis’s therapeutic goal; rather, the goal is to increase the analysand’s freedom
to free associate, to “crack up” the coherent narratives that the conscious mind is
constantly writing. This dialectic movement between uniting disparate ideas and breaking
up those unities is evidence of “unconscious freedom” (Bollas 1995, p. 3).180 The
agoraphobic, I suggest, uses narrative to stave off the overwhelming emotions that
accompany incoherence. She uses narrative to resist the disorganization, the undoing, of
the ego’s connections.181 The agoraphobic protects her neuroses to prevent a descent into
psychosis.182 As Green writes, “[r]esistance opposes the danger of disorganisation
through a loss of control of speech and through speech which gives rise to a fear of
madness” (1999, p. 270).
Bollas argues that the psychical processes involved in dream work also occur
during waking life183: the movement between condensation and dissemination184 is the
180

Rey – whose work I discussed in Chapter Two – also indicates that one aim of psychoanalytic treatment
is “to increase freedom of choice” (1994, p. 32). Similarly, Meerloo states: “when a neurotic patient is
really able to associate freely (in the psychoanalytic sense) he is, in effect, cured” (1959, p. 76). Milner
makes a similar point: “as all analytic experience shows, it is when the patient becomes able to talk about
all that he is aware of, when he can follow the analytic rule, then in fact he becomes able to relate himself
more adequately to the world outside. As he becomes able to tolerate more fully the symbolic reality of the
analytic relationship and the literal reality of libidinal satisfaction outside the frame of the session, then he
becomes better (1952, p. 194).
181
See also Wilson, who argues that the patient often consciously experiences her own moments of
transformative insight as “the emergence of something alien within the self, usually of a drive-related,
affective, and at times uncanny nature” (1998, p. 54). Wilson argues that the theoretical emphasis on the
ego’s integrative and narrativizing functions may impede our clinical understanding of these moments of
insight.
182
As I suggested, tentatively, in Chapter Two, it is possible that agoraphobia is a defense against a further
breakdown towards schizophrenia. It is this breakdown that the agoraphobic fears and protects against. It is
the analyst’s responsibility to maintain the boundaries of the analysis to protect against an unlimited
breakdown. See also, Adler and Bachant 1996, p. 1021: “Honoring the boundaries of this structure [the
analytic situation] serves to guarantee the safety of both participants by channeling and absorbing the
powerful psychological forces released by the psychoanalytic process. […F]ree association and analytic
neutrality are the fundamental structural pillars of the psychoanalytic situation, providing stability in the
wake of the regressive and progressive currents of the psychoanalytic process” (my emphases). I discuss
Adler and Bachant’s work further below.
183
See also A. Freud (1937/1966/1993): “The dreamer’s psychic state differs little from that of the patient
during the analytic hour” (p. 15). The phenomenon of secondary revision refers to the “phenomenon of
ordering, connecting and making [dreams] intelligible” (Breznitz 1971, p. 407). This phenomenon
explicitly connects the psychical processes at work in dream and waking states. As Breznitz and Stein both
argue, “[s]econdary revision […] is not confined to the sleeping state, but merges into waking and is the
major contribution of waking thought to the final version of the dream” (Stein 1989, p. 70; see also
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dialectic of the unconscious. The process “starts with a sequence of psychically intense
experiences during the day, continues with the dream ‘event,’ followed by cracking up
the dream contents through free association” (Bollas 1995, p. 3). Unconscious freedom is
“found in the necessary opposition” between these two movements, each of which offers
its own truths (p. 3). The aggressivity inherent in this process is clear: “Free association is
creative destruction. […] It is essential to one’s personal freedom to break up lucid
unities of thought, lest consciousness become a form of ideational incarceration” (Bollas
1995, p. 53). As I argued in Chapter Two, via Winnicott, aggressivity “creates the quality
of externality” (Winnicott 1951, p. 93). It is precisely a sense of externality – or rather, a
confident sense of what is internal versus what is external; and, hence, a sense of what
belongs to the self, as well as the self’s limits – that the agoraphobic lacks. The
agoraphobic, I suggest, is unable to mobilize her aggressivity in the service of this
creative destruction.
As opposed to Bollas, who follows Freud (1900) in arguing that these two
processes of uniting and “cracking up” are conversely related,185 Spence (1982a) argues
that there is too much conscious control over free association for that to be the case.186
Specifically, Spence writes that the “partitioning” required for the dream’s articulation
“introduces an element of conscious control into what is assumed to be a largely
unconscious and automatic process”; furthermore, “the very fact of fragmentation does
damage to the integrity of the dream” (Spence 1982a, p. 67). This last point takes us back

Breznitz 1971, p. 407). Fitzpatrick Hanly notes that “[s]econdary revision brings it about that the more
coherent is the telling of a dream the more distorted it may be and the more defended the patient against the
latent content in which its meaning lies” (1996, p. 451). See also Bion’s (1962b) waking dream state,
which, as Ferro (2005) discusses, broadens the dream work to include both sleeping dreams and waking
dreams.
184
“Dissemination” is Bollas’s term for the ‘cracking up’ process of free association. It helps move the
dream work, traditionally associated with condensation and displacement, into waking life. I return to the
logic of the unconscious below, which includes, for example, these processes of condensation and
displacement, timelessness, and the absence of negation. See also infra note 164.
185
When there is a moderate level of resistance, Freud writes, “the dreamer’s associations begin by
diverging widely from the manifest elements, so that a great number of subjects and ranges of ideas are
touched on, after which, a second series of associations quickly converge from these on to the dreamthoughts that are being looked for” (1923, p. 110).
186
Many have noted that free association is not actually ‘free.’ See, for example: Busch (1995); Fink
(2007); Freud (1925a); and, Scarfone (qtd. in McDermott 2003). See also infra note 202.
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to Bollas’s term “cracking up,” which implies more than denies the aggressive nature of
free association and the “damage” to the dream’s integrity (whatever it is that “integrity”
might mean in terms of a dream187) that Spence warns against. Consciousness can never
be entirely absent from the work of analysis; to argue that free association is too
conscious of a process implies, as a corollary, that consciousness is contrary to the work
of analysis, or interferes with the work of analysis. Spence’s argument is that how we
choose to put our dreams into words affects our memory of them; on this point, we agree.
Spence suggests, as a consequence of that argument, that there is something inherently
limited about language and that attempting to put pictures into words is, inevitably, an
impossible task. Again, I concur. However, I additionally argue, the words we choose to
describe a dream image is as significant as the dream image itself. That process of
selection is part of the analytic work: choosing to say some words and choosing not to
say others even as we try to say it all. The dream work – not the dream – is most
significant to the process of analysis,188 which, as Aron indicates, is precisely Freud’s
argument:
Freud believed that the narrative coherence of dreams argued against their being
considered the product of random neurological processes. In clinical work with
dreams, however, Freud argued that analysts “should disregard the apparent
coherence between the dream’s constituents as an unessential illusion” (1900, p.
449). [...D]reaming is both meaningful and motivated, but the meaning and
motivation are to be found not in the manifest content, but in the dreamer’s
associations. (1989, p. 110)
Again, the dream’s “apparent coherence” is a red herring and leads the analytic work
away from the unconscious (Aron 1989, p. 114). Aron indicates that an analytic focus on
the manifest content of dreams (namely, the narrative or the story rather than the details
and their associations) is accompanied by either a movement away from, or a complete
rejection of, the method of free association; furthermore, the abandonment of the free
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As Stein indicates, “[m]ost of the dreams told to us are ‘dreamlike,’ full of contradictions and
inconsistencies, mixed up in time and space, making little sense at first” (1989, p. 67)
188
See also Faimberg 1997, p. 440: “In the session, for example, we interpret not a dream, which is an
absent object, but the account of a dream, which forms part of the context of the history of the
transference” (original emphasis). See also Lacan 2006i, pp. 393-394: “‘Only the dream’s elaboration
interests us,’ Freud says.” See also Green (1975).
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association method is often accompanied by a de-emphasis of the role of psychic conflict.
Focusing on narrative coherence forecloses the emergence of the unconscious in the gaps
revealed by language, gaps which must emerge in order for new thoughts and feelings to
be possible.
To this end, Lacan argues that narrative coherence is antithetical to the work of
analysis, which requires precisely, as I indicate above, a dismantling of coherence:
Certainly, there is no question of restoring the chain of those reactions through the
narrative, but the very moment in which the account is given can constitute a
significant fragment of the chain, on condition that we demand that the patient
provide the entire text and that we free him from the chains of the narrative.
(2006a, p. 65; my emphasis)
Narrative coherence, rather than indicating an individual’s state of psychological wellbeing or providing a therapeutic end-goal, can become a prison not unlike the
agoraphobic’s so-called safe space. What was once a retreat from the terrifying outside,
the terrifying world of possibilities, becomes its own enclosure from which one cannot
escape.
Stern suggests a connection between the process of free association and the state
of original unity out of which the ego develops. This connection returns us again to the
concerns of Chapter Two. He writes:
On a certain primitive level of the unconscious, we might conjecture that free
association represents the full reign of the polymorphous perverse activity of a
child which at one time was all-pervasive and ego-syntonic. To achieve in
psychoanalytic treatment the capacity for the optimum in free association means
recapturing that childhood state when reality was almost indistinguishable from
fantasy and differences were usually irrelevant. It means again attaining the
feelings of that early period of our life when words, any words, were greeted like
the first bloom of spring, and before the first frost of the fear of the social
consequences of these words were felt. This was the pre-Oedipal period before the
enormous filtering process began which has left so many people stifled of free
expression or imagination and in a world with too sterile a sense of reality. (1966,
p. 146)
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Stern’s comments, taken into consideration alongside Avenburg and Guiter (whom I
reference above), allow us to connect psychoanalytic truth and free association. As I
argued in Chapter Two, for the agoraphobic, something has gone awry in the process of
creative differentiation, which is to say in the development of the ego out of an original
unity. To return to, as Stern writes, “that childhood state” in phantasy provides the
agoraphobic patient another opportunity to re-evaluate the relationship between internal
and external realities “by pointing precisely to those moments upon which such
distinctions between psychical reality and external reality was founded” (Avenburg &
Guiter 1976, p. 17). The agoraphobic remains inhibited by “the fear of the social
consequences of [...] words”; the analyst, then, and as I developed in Chapter Two, must
encourage the development of the analysand’s free associations by assuring her that the
analyst will not be destroyed in external reality.189

4.3. Free Association and Transference
It is perfectly true that psychoanalysis, like other psychotherapeutic methods, employs the
instrument of suggestion (or transference). But the difference is this: that in analysis it is
not allowed to play the decisive part in determining the therapeutic results.
(Freud 1925a, p. 11)
As I indicate above, Milrod’s (2007) discussion of the clinical case studies she presents
emphasizes the transference relationship and implies (as she argues elsewhere: see Milrod
et al. 2000, 2001, 2007) that it is this particular element of psychoanalysis that
distinguishes it from the temporary effects of the psychiatric treatment of agoraphobia. I
argue that the limitations of interpreting the transference in effecting change –
particularly in relieving the agoraphobic’s “persistent emptiness” – is evident in Milrod’s
(2007) description of her patient’s progress. To reiterate, the substitutive relationship with
the analyst allows for higher everyday functioning, but it fails to relieve the patient’s
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See also Fink 2010, p. 272: “The neurotic is often afraid of the hostility that inhabits him, but if we face
it openly, often he can too, and this opens the door to exploring it through speech, destroying neither
himself nor others in the process.”
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psychic emptiness. While it is necessary to understand both the fundamental rule of
psychoanalysis and the phenomenon of transference, the relation of the one to the other is
equally important in the practice of psychoanalysis. Following Freud (1914a, 1925a),
psychoanalysis is defined by the particular method of free association: free association is
the method; transference is a tool.
There are two trends within the (scant190) literature on free association. The first
(and historically earlier) trend, which assumes that the concept is familiar enough that it
hardly bears repeating,191 concerns exceptions to the fundamental rule. Laforgue (1937),
for example, suggests a less strict adherence to the rule for those who obsessively attempt
to follow the rule to the letter, with the inhibiting effect of not allowing any associations
to develop; and, for those analysands who refuse to follow the rule, that their refusal be
analyzed as a symptom rather than forced to comply.192 The rule is a therapeutic rather
than an orthodox one, which ought to be followed insofar as it does not impede the aims
of analysis. Scott (1958) follows Laforgue’s argument and provides his own version of
the rule. Scott begins an analysis with, “Try to lie down and talk about anything and
everything” (1958, p. 108). He suggests, however, that speech can become a defense
against noise. Like Stern’s patient, who needed permission to “lie,” Scott indicates that
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Mahoney (1979) provides a review of contributions to the psychoanalytic literature on free association.
Although Kris suggests that the psychoanalytic literature on free association is “especially rich” (1982, p.
ix), contemporary emphasis has shifted. A “Title” search on pep-web.org (Psychoanalytic Electronic
Publishing) for “free association” returns 229 matches. 78 matches actually have “free association” in the
title; the remaining 151 returns were published by Free Association Books, but are not concerned with the
concept of free association. By contrast, a similar search for “transference” returns 1013 matches. Bollas
notes this theoretical shift: “From Dora onwards the analytical literature reveals an increasing
preoccupation with the Transference and correspondingly there is a dramatic decrease, not only in the
literature on free association but, more tellingly, in the intellectual exploration of this division of function”
[i.e., of “the free associating analysand and the evenly suspended analyst, a relation specifically designed to
elicit unconscious lines of thought with the aim of discovering some of the latent mental contents”] (2013,
p. 88; p. 85).
191
Laforgue, for example, writes: “By the fundamental rule of psycho-analytic treatment we mean, as you
know, the injunction which we give to our patients that, during the analytic hour, they are to tell us
everything which comes into their minds and to conceal none of their thoughts, whatever they may be”
(1937, p. 35; my emphasis).
192
This force would clearly not serve the aims of analysis as contemporary analysts understand it, which is
beyond the “revelation” or simple unearthing of unconscious material. And yet, this argument needed to be
made; see infra note 163.
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some patients may need permission to communicate extra-verbally – with sounds that are
not quite yet speech – as he observed in some regressive patients. In these cases, he reformulated the rule: “Try to talk, etc., and if you can’t talk, try to make some kind of
noise, and if you don’t know what kind of noise to make just guess” (Scott 1958, p. 108).
Scott points to the ‘pre-verbal’ infant, to whom a mother makes many sounds, both
stimulating and comforting, that are not words and from whom babbling necessarily
precedes speech. Noises can communicate something the analysand is not yet able to put
into words. As I suggest above, there are times when the analyst must bear the
analysand’s nonsense.

The second, more recent, trend in the literature on free association concerns its
centrality in the psychoanalytic session. Some (e.g., Adler & Bachant 1996; Bollas 2013;
Busch 1995; Fink 2007; Kris 1983, 1992) consider that free association and the analyst’s
encouragement of free association (by way of, for example, “analytic neutrality”) form
the pillars of the psychoanalytic situation. Others (e.g., Hoffman 2006; Smith 2001,
2004) emphasize the relational aspects of the analysis. Although each side specifically
disagrees with the other, both highlight words’ powerful psychological effects. Hoffman,
for example, writes: the “idea that words are a completely different category of ‘action’,
protected by the sacrosanct rule of ‘free association’, denies the enormous power that
words have in the construction of human experience” (2006, p. 59). For Hoffman, the
enormous power that words have means that they must be moderated. The sentence
quoted above is immediately preceded by: “No one would think twice about telling a
patient who was starting to undress to keep his or her clothes on” (Hoffman 2006, p. 59).
Hoffman implies that some words spoken out loud are akin to a patient undressing: in
some sense inappropriate.193 Adler and Bachant, from the opposing point of view, make a

193

Hoffman provides the clinical example of a “patient who suddenly turns hostile” (2006, p. 57),
responding to all of his [Hoffman’s] interpretations with various sarcastic replies such as: “‘If you say so’
or ‘I guess you know’ or ‘Whatever you say, Hoffman’ or ‘Sure, that must be it, sir! You’re the boss’” (p.
56). Hoffman suggests the following might be an appropriate reply: “‘You know you’re being awfully rude.
I want to understand what this is about, but I don’t think I deserve to be treated this way, so I wish you’d
find another way to express what you are feeling. In fact, I wish you would tell me more about what you
are feeling more directly’” (p. 58). This suggestion is, of course, an interpretation that explicitly request
further associations. Some analysts might suggest that it is precisely Hoffman’s insistent “attempts to
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similar point: “expressive freedom is not an unconditional privilege”; to the contrary,
“there may be times when a patient engages in verbal acts which violate the safety or
dignity of the therapist” (1996, pp. 1028-1029).194 But, for those who privilege free
association as the method particular to psychoanalysis, it is precisely the power of words
that differentiates them from other kinds of “actions.” The transformative potential of
psychoanalysis is in “the enormous power that words have in the construction of human
experience.” As I state above, I argue in line with those who consider free association
part of the fundamental rule, distinctive to the method of psychoanalysis. Given the
agoraphobic’s problematic engagement with language and her limited ability to
symbolize (that is, to put her feelings into words), an overemphasis on interpreting the
transference to the detriment of the development of the analysand’s associations
entrenches the relational aspects of the disorder. In order to break through this relational
dilemma, the analyst must clear an appropriate space – an emptiness; a silence – to make
room for the unconscious. Interpreting the transference repeats what the agoraphobic
already knows and leaves no room for what neither the analyst nor the analysand have yet
to discover of the analysand’s psychical reality. In light of this argument, I turn now to
the specifics of the fundamental rule, including both free association and the analyst’s
role in relation to the analysand’s free associations, variously conceived of as “evenly
hovering attention” or “neutrality.”195
Lichtenberg and Galler (1987) conducted a survey, which asked analysts how
they presented the fundamental rule to their analysands and what considerations led to
their choice of initial guidelines. A number of respondents indicated that they did not
interpret and understand” (Hoffman 2006, p. 58; my emphasis) that led to his patient’s trenchant hostility.
If he could set aside the desire to understand, it might be more possible for the patient to say more about
what he is feeling.
194
I draw attention to the different connotations between Hoffman’s sense of inappropriate words and
Adler and Bachant’s explicit concern for the analyst; unlike some straw-men arguments against “analytic
neutrality” (which Adler and Bachant argue for), Adler and Bachant demonstrate a clear recognition of the
analyst as a person involved in the progress of the analysis. See also infra note 195.
195
I suggest that both “analytic neutrality” and the analyst’s “evenly hovering” or “evenly suspended”
attention refer to the same analytic stance in relation to the analysand’s free associations. I refer specifically
to Adler and Bachant’s explication of analytic neutrality, which includes three specific aspects: “neutrality
with regard to conflict, neutrality with regard to sequence, and neutrality with regard to transference”
(1996, p. 1021). Analytic neutrality, in this technical sense, “does not imply the eradication of the analyst as
a person from the interaction” (1996, p. 1032). Clinically, analytic neutrality helps to maintain the analytic
stance of evenly suspended attention and serves to encourage the analysand’s free associations.
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make a point to articulate the fundamental rule to candidates (those patients training to be
psychoanalysts themselves) or to so-called sophisticated patients who already knew what
was expected of them (Lichtenberg & Galler 1987, p. 59). These analysts seem to have
overlooked the rather basic point of psychoanalysis that saying something aloud has an
effect; knowledge is not sufficient, nor can it be assumed. That is to say, it is not enough
that an analysand knows what is expected in the psychoanalytic clinic, at least in part
because the fundamental rule – distinct from the process of free association – is the
“pact” to which Freud (1940, p. 174) and Lichtenberg and Galler (1987, p. 48) refer. The
fundamental rule is an agreement that must be negotiated between the analyst and the
analysand and not just ‘understood’: nothing ‘goes without saying’ in analysis!
Something left unsaid is at least as significant as what is said aloud.196 And, as
Lichtenberg and Galler’s survey makes clear, the formulation of the fundamental rule,
and therefore the pact between analyst and analysand, is far from uniform.
The specific words one uses to describe the fundamental rule are, as I imply
above, important. Freud, for example, provides this formulation:
We tell the patient that without further reflection he should put himself into a
condition of calm self-observation and that he must then communicate whatever
results this introspection gives him - feelings, thoughts, reminiscences, in the
order in which they appear to his mind. At the same time, we warn him
expressly against yielding to any motive which would induce him to choose or
exclude any of his thoughts as they arise, in whatever way the motive may be
couched and however it may excuse him from telling us the thought: “that it is
too unpleasant,” or “too indiscreet” for him to tell; or “it is too unimportant,” or
“it does not belong here,” “it is nonsensical.” We impress upon him the fact that
he must skim only across the surface of his consciousness and must drop the last
vestige of a critical attitude toward that which he finds. (1920b, p. 130)197
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See Lacan (2006a, 2006c). And see Dor 1985/1998, p. 152 for Lacan on “the said,” “the half-said,” and
“the saying.” See also Harari 2004, p. 76: “Lacan wanted to convey that the only thing truth can do is
speak, that what we may attain of truth can be reached through speech, into whose bosom truth slips. Truth
is said, but it is not fully said. […] In order for something to be said, something else must inevitably remain
unsaid. This is where the register of the Real appears. Truth is real because it cannot be fully said.”
197
This passage is repeated almost verbatim in Freud 1923, p. 238, with the additional note: “It is uniformly
found that precisely those ideas which provoke these last-mentioned reactions are of particular value in
discovering the forgotten material.” Bollas draws attention to this latter note (2013, pp. 86-87).
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Lichtenberg and Galler describe the deceptive simplicity of the rule thusly: “Analytic
patients are to put into words all their thoughts, feelings, and perceptions” (1987, p. 48).
The entirety of Freud’s version of the fundamental rule is implicit in Lichtenberg and
Galler’s formulation, but is certainly not explicit. Their description beyond this sentence
explicates the effects of following this rule, but is not integral to the rule itself. The rule
of psychoanalysis is not just that the analysand will follow the method of free association,
but refers more precisely to the pact between the analyst and the analysand.198 The second
essential aspect of the fundamental rule, Bollas draws attention to Freud’s description of
the analytic role:
The attitude which the analytic physician could most advantageously adopt [is] to
surrender himself to his own unconscious mental activity, in a state of evenly
suspended attention, to avoid so far as possible reflection and the construction of
conscious expectations, not to try to fix anything he hear[s] particularly in his
memory, and by these means to catch the drift of the patient’s unconscious with
his own unconscious. (Freud 1923, p. 239; qtd. in Bollas 2013, p. 86)
The fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, then, is the pact between the analysand and the
analyst that each will fulfil their particular role in the analytic session. Bollas calls this
fulfillment the “Freudian Pair,” referring specifically to this division of function: the
freely associating analysand who has the evenly suspended attention of the analyst.199
Milner, in her important work on symbolism, indicates something of the
relationship between free association and the transference:
The analytic rule that the patient shall try to put all that he is aware of into words
does seem to me to imply a belief in the importance of symbolization for maturity
as well as for infancy; it implies the recognition that words are in fact symbols by
means of which the world is comprehended. Thus in the daily battle with our
patients over the transference we are asking them to accept a symbolic relation to
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Only several writers (e.g., Mahoney [1979] and Kanzer [1972]) have noted the distinction between free
association and the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis. Free association is the method of psychoanalysis
and, as Kanzer notes, “predisposes to withdrawal and narcissistic states”; this method is complemented by
the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, the pact between analyst and analysand, which “involves a twoperson relationship” (1972, p. 265).
199
See also McDermott: “In the analytic situation, the evenly hovering attention of the analyst is as
important as the analysand’s free associations” (Hoffer; qtd. in McDermott 2003, p. 1349).
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the analyst instead of a literal one, to accept the symbolism of speech and talking
about their wants rather than taking action to satisfy them directly. (1952, p. 194)
The transference influences the patient’s free associations; the transference may even
determine the patient’s associations – or, more precisely, it may determine which of the
patient’s associations she is able, or not able, to articulate out loud. Lichtenberg and
Galler suggest that the rule, insofar as they have expressed it here (as above), is
“deceptive” since “all analysts know that no patient can or will be able to follow [it]”
(1987, p. 48). Green expands on the “deceptive” element of the rule: the “fundamental
rule of not filtering and not selecting is transgressed consciously and unconsciously”
(1999, p. 270). Note, Green’s negative formulation: not filtering and not selecting. Anna
Freud clarifies the therapeutic value of both the rule and its transgressions: “what
concerns us is not simply the enforcement of the fundamental rule of analysis for its own
sake but the conflict to which this gives rise” (1937/1966/1993, p. 15).200 Just as the
analyst’s mistakes often lead to transformation (namely, the possibility of new thoughts
and new feelings),201 the analysand’s “transgressions” of the fundamental rule provide
openings for further explorations. Adler and Bachant note that the conflict frequently
concerns associations concerning the analyst: “the burdensome aspects [of expressive
freedom] will come to the fore first as patients attempt, one way or another, to circumvent
or circumscribe the radical implications of this invitation” (1996, p. 1024).202 Thus, the
relationship between free association and the transference is once again highlighted as
method and interference/tool.
200

See also McDermott, who refers to Scarfone: “the principle of free association as he understands it is
neither descriptive of what goes on in the session nor prescriptive of what can be turned on and off. He
proposed that it may be an index showing that thinking is not free, a probe as to where resistance lies. In his
view, free association is a challenge we artificially put to the patient to show how unfree associations are”
(2003, p. 1355).
201
See my discussion of Wilson on lack in Chapter Three. Faimberg (1997), whose work I discuss below in
respect to the concept of Nachträglichkeit, considers misunderstanding – both the analyst’s and the
analysand’s – to be an integral aspect of the psychoanalytic process that leads to the discovery of the
analysand’s psychic reality.
202
See also Meerloo 1959, pp. 75-76: “What originally was called ‘free' association appears to be not at all
free; it is bound to numerous limitations and is modified in various ways. The flow of ‘free association’ is
hampered by an infinite combination of feelings of shame, guilt, fear and hostile attitudes and unique
inhibiting factors usually combined under the name resistance. The therapist plays an immediate role in the
patient’s form of censorship, even though apparently ‘everything’ may be said. The initial rapport and
transference determines what the patient dares to say.”
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The movements between speech and silence in the clinic provide further evidence
of the connection between free association and the transference. As I indicated in Chapter
Three, emptiness and silence are analogous insofar as silence, like emptiness, can be used
to defend against, for example, an unsayable truth. At the same time, silence can also be a
pause between the insistence of speech, a pause that makes room for a new thought, a
new word, or a new feeling. Silence may simply indicate a moment of rest; a lack of
silence may indicate the impossibility of rest. The analyst’s silence, Lacan writes,
“implies speech, as we see in the expression ‘to keep silent’ which, speaking of the
analyst’s silence, means not only that he makes no noise but that he keeps quiet instead of
responding” (1955/2006j, p. 291; original emphasis). Reik (1963/1968) discusses the
analyst’s silence – the analyst’s keeping silent – and the effects this silence has on the
analysand; the analysand interprets the analyst’s silence in various ways according to his
emotional state in that particular moment. The analyst’s silence may be experienced as
comforting or as persecuting, and all things in between:
Slowly the analyst’s silence changes its meaning for the patient. Something occurs
to the patient which he does not want to tell, or whose telling is difficult for him.
He talks further of other things, but what he is suppressing keeps forcing itself upon
him and allows him to discuss other things only with difficulty; now he is silent like
the analyst. It is as if the analyst’s silence has spread to him, as if he has become
infected with it. (Reik 1963/1968, p. 176)
The analyst’s silence, then, encourages the analysand’s “free” associations insofar as that
which the analysand does not want to say becomes more and more insistent in his or her
mind. If the analyst interrupts silence with speech, the analysand is able to respond to the
analyst’s comments rather than attend to that which he is attempting to suppress. This
point, that the analysand interprets the analyst’s silence in various ways according to his
or her own fantasies, indicates the development of the transference. The transference, as a
tool, may be used to encourage further free association, but the point of both the analyst’s
silence and any transference interpretations is to aid the analysand in saying more: saying
difficult things more freely and saying new things that he or she has not previously been
able to say aloud. Or, the analysand does not become “infected” with the analyst’s silence
and instead uses a wall of words to defend against silence. Reik writes: “In analysis we
have become familiar enough with patients whose continuous speech has the sense of not
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saying precisely the most important things” (1963/1968, p. 183). That is, “people often
speak because they cannot bear silence” (p. 184). If there is no silence, nothing new can
emerge. Speech can be mobilized as a defence against everything that silence, as Reik
says, “betrays” (p. 186). This relationship between silence and the development of the
transference also indicates the relevance of structural emptiness, which is a necessary
aspect of the process of the analysis and, specifically, in the development of free
associations. Emptiness, as I detailed in Chapters Two and Three, is the basis of learning
and of all new experiences.
Lacan describes the two conditions that constitute the free association of
“‘analytic experience’”:
[I]ts first condition is formulated in a law of non-omission, which promotes
everything that “is self-explanatory,” the everyday and the ordinary, to the status
of interesting that is usually reserved for the remarkable; but it is incomplete
without the second condition, the law of non-systematization, which, positing
incoherence as a condition of analytic experience, presumes significant all the
dross of mental life – not only the representations in which scholastic psychology
sees only nonmeaning (dream scenarios, presentiments, daydreams, and confused
or lucid delusions), but also the phenomena that are not even granted a civil status
in it, so to speak, since they are altogether negative (slips of the tongue and
bungled actions). (2006a, p. 66; my emphasis)203
Bollas argues that “the psychoanalyst’s preoccupation with the Transference” causes the
“suspension of the division of mental function central to the Freudian Pair” (2013, p. 88;
my emphasis). Arguing in the tradition of Mahoney (1979) and Kanzer (1972) in
distinguishing the method of free association from the fundamental rule of
psychoanalysis, Bollas pays particular attention to the analyst’s role as listening with
evenly suspended attention in order to counter what he sees as a privileging of the
conscious work of the analyst in interpreting the transference.204 Bollas argues that the
203

See also Lacan 2006e, p. 462.
Fink (2007) criticizes short-term psychotherapy for its “normalizing” aims (implicit in concepts like
“high functioning”). See especially Chapter 9 (pp. 206-230), “Non-normalizing Analysis,” connected to his
critique of transference interpretations existing in the realm of the imaginary. Fink notes the connection
between an over-emphasis on transference interpretations and short-term psychotherapies (which Milrod’s
PFPP entails – usually 12 week clinical trials). One of the problems with “normalizing” therapeutic
practices, focused on promoting “high functioning,” is that it overlooks the deeper unconscious forces at
204
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Transference need not interfere with the analytic process so long as free association is
allowed to develop. Bollas repeats Lacan’s emphasis on free association as constituting
psychoanalysis and also draws our attention back to Freud’s description of the
analysand’s position and function. Like Lacan, Bollas highlights the analytic value Freud
places not so much on the ideas the analysand finds most disagreeable to say, but on the
ideas that he deems “too unimportant” or “irrelevant to what is being looked for” (Freud
1923, p. 238; qtd. in Bollas 2013, p. 85). While the Transference might include material
that the analysand finds particularly disagreeable to speak aloud, this need not interfere
with the analytic process so long as the analysand continues in her function of free
associating to other ideas: “Whatever wish, memory, or internal relation the patient may
project on to the analyst – that is whatever content it reveals – does not shut down the
mind that thinks it” (Bollas 2013, p. 89). Further, he writes:
The patient might think that by not reporting a troubling idea he or she was not
talking about what was really on the mind. However, that will only be true of the
manifest content. The patient may not have been talking about what was
consciously in mind but, as we know, the Freudian definition of what is on the
self’s mind is determined by the complexity of the unconscious – by all the
interests occurring at any moment in psychic time driven by unconscious desires,
memories, anxieties, curiosities, and so forth. (p. 90)205
While some (for example, Fonagy, in McDermott [2003]) believe that focus on one small
part of an analytic session reveals the greater meaning of the whole, Bollas returns to
Freud’s description of the free associative process and reiterates Freud’s theory of
play. As I suggested in Chapter Three, Milrod’s (2007) patients (Rita and Deborah) have become more
“independent,” but the kind of dependence situated in the realm of love is entirely absent from their psychic
lives; in fact, that kind of dependence is now consciously avoided (even as they unconsciously strive
towards it) just as previously any kind of independence was anxiously avoided. For another critique of
“normalization” in psychoanalysis, see Molino & Ware (2001).
205
Bollas emphasizes Freud’s description of analytic communication occurring between the unconscious of
the analyst and the unconscious of the analysand. Jacobs indicates that Isakower also emphasized this
analytic communication: “Isakower’s notion of the analytic instrument, with its emphasis on the coming
together of two minds to create one instrument, the unconscious transmission of thought and feeling that
takes place between patient and analyst, and the shift in levels of consciousness in both that makes possible
the grasping of the unconscious, appealed to me as one of the most imaginative and creative ways of
conceptualizing the kinds of communication that take place between patient and analyst. In his
formulations, Isakower made an effort to extend and develop Freud’s seminal idea that unconscious
communication between the minds of patient and analyst is an inherent feature of analytic sessions.” (2002,
p. 17) Jacobs, too, explores this aspect of analytic experience. See also Jacobs (1983, 1987, 1992, 1993).
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sequential contiguity: the sequence of one’s associations reveals their unconscious
relevance.206 It is not, then, any single part of the analysand’s associations that is
significant but rather the sequence of associations:
Unconscious thinking is not held in any single mental idea, but takes place as a
logical process. It is revealed not in one narrative unit [...] but in the links between
narrative units. In the caesura one finds the logical possibilities. It is exactly in
and through these gaps that the logic of thought occurs which is never subordinate
to the Transference. (Bollas 2013, pp. 90-91).207
Any theory, and any clinical work, that purports to take the unconscious as its object
cannot, therefore, neglect these gaps, these experiences of emptiness, and these inevitable
incoherencies – or, worse, attempt to fill them in.
The entirety of psychoanalysis as a practice and a methodology is founded on the
power and force of speech, and the ambiguities and malleability of language. Lacan
emphasizes this point: “the analyst is different in that he makes use of a function that is
common to all men in a way that is not within everyone’s grasp [portée] when he
supports [porte] speech” (1955/2006j, p. 290). In the cases of Milrod’s (2007)
agoraphobia patients (discussed in Chapter Three), for whom interpreting the transference
has led to some “higher-functioning,” the point of the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis
seems to have been lost, especially if the analyst takes protestations of emptiness as
statements of fact. What does the emptiness hide? Is it anger, or grief? Is it something
else entirely that neither the analyst nor the analysand will ever begin to approach if it is
taken literally?208 The meanings of emptiness necessarily vary among analysands, and
therefore must be explored with each individual guided by the fundamental rule of
206

Bollas quotes Freud: “In a psychoanalysis one learns to interpret propinquity in time as representing
connection in subject-matter. Two thoughts that occur in immediate sequence without any apparent
connection are in fact part of a single unity which has to be discovered; in just the same way, if I write an
‘a’ and a ‘b’ in succession, they have to be pronounced as a single syllable ‘ab’” (Freud 1900, p. 247; qtd.
in Bollas 2013, p. 18).
207
Lacan also draws attention to this particularity of the psychoanalytic setting: “If we wish to recognize a
reality that is proper to psychical reactions, we must not begin by choosing among them; we must begin by
no longer choosing. In order to gauge their efficacy, we must respect their succession” (2006a, p. 65).
208
I refer again to Ellonen-Jéquier’s (2009) work with a psychotic patient, which I discussed in detail in
Chapter Three. She writes: “I was able not to fall into the trap of believing that there was a real emptiness
or that some aspects were actually missing” (p. 864; original emphasis).

147
psychoanalysis, the pact that the analysand will ‘try to say everything’ and the analyst
will try to listen. The analyst cannot know what the analysand will say and cannot know
what the emptiness hides. The analyst must learn to bear her own ignorance in order to
discover the analysand’s truth. As Loewenstein writes:
[A] commitment to the pursuit of the Freudian unconscious entails a commitment
to forego the temptation to supply our patients or ourselves with reductive but
coherent histories. The curative effect of our praxis may be accounted for by its
very refusal to offer the analysand yet another false sense of unity but rather
increase the analysand’s capacity to withstand the ambiguity, contradiction, and
discontinuity that marks our present experience and our past. (1991, p. 26;
emphasis added)
For the agoraphobia patient, in particular, who lacks a clear and stable sense of the
boundaries between self and other, the process of trying to say everything can push the
analysand up against her limits. The agoraphobia patient for whom emptiness covers over
aggression will be able to experience the reality of her aggressive limits as she articulates
her rage and destructiveness, putting it into words, and watching as everything around her
does not, as she feared, fall apart.209 The patient for whom emptiness covers over grief
(which can, of course, be the same patient) will be able to experience the limits of her
loss; that, although it feels as if she has lost a world (and, indeed, she has, as any
significant loss renders us bereft, torn asunder, in its destruction of the illusion of shared
space), she is capable of rebuilding an inner world around what she has lost, integrating
her loss into her new world. This rebuilding, building anew, is only possible if the patient
is given the opportunity to say it all aloud and only if the analyst is not too afraid of what
emerges out of the patient’s emptiness; that is, only if the analyst is not too afraid of
being overwhelmed by the analysand’s grief and/or aggressiveness.
As I argued in Chapter Two, following Busch (1995), the analyst must create the
analytic frame with each patient, in part by communicating that the data produced by the
analysand’s free associations is the raw material upon which the analysis is based. Thus,
the method of free association is utilized to produce a therapeutic frame distinctive to the
209

This is not to say that aggressivity is not dangerous, or that it is impotent. To the contrary, aggressivity’s
force must be utilized. The fear of aggressivity’s danger renders it impotent. See also Eigen (2002) on the
plurality, force, and dangers of rage.
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psychoanalytic method. This frame, as I argued in Chapter Two, provides the analysand
with some boundaries against which she may begin to define herself. Part of the process
of putting it all into words is the re-transcription, so to speak, of past events:
Nachträglichkeit, which, as I discuss in the following section, is a phenomenon based on
speech that depends on the “timelessness” of the unconscious.

4.4. Nachträglichkeit and the Logic of the Unconscious
The symbolic not only means an order which structures the ineffable and helpless world
of infancy, but also an order which brings up to date the inarticulable infantile
experience. That is the Freudian ‘deferred action’ [Nachträglichkeit] where what
happens later reinterprets and shapes what had happened before. For Freud, as for
Lacan, psychoanalysis is the reinterpreting and reordering of one’s own history, one’s
own trauma and one’s own destiny through the power of language. This is the heart of
the psychoanalytic rite.
(Benvenuto 1999, p. 30).
As I argue above, the agoraphobic’s repetitive use of narrative resembles a repetition
compulsion. Dahl parenthetically notes that the compulsion to repeat follows the same
psychical mechanisms as the phenomenon of Nachträglichkeit210:
Nachträglichkeit manifestly entails the action of a force, analogous to that of the
compulsion to repeat, that seeks to symbolize the unfamiliarity and confusion of
the original experience – whether as a real event that was not understood or as a
diffuse primary-process scene – so that it can subsequently [nachtraglich], in
accordance with the reality principle, be structured, thought, understood, and
perhaps also mastered. (2010, p. 741; my emphasis)
Narrative is most commonly contrasted with a repetition compulsion.211 However, as I
argue above, for individuals with agoraphobia, the process of narrating and narrativizing
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For arguments connecting repetition compulsion and Nachträglichkeit, see also: Casoni (2002);
Faimberg (2013); Marion (2012); and, Perelberg (2006, 2008).
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See, for example, Kliman, Rosenberg & Samples (2007). See also Bornstein 2012, p. 75: “…she was
expressing herself partially through a repetition compulsion, not a narrative….” Bornstein correspondingly
argues against free association. He argues that it is “impossible” for the patient to tell her story, not because
we, as subjects, are too complex and conflicted to fit within the narrative of a “story,” but because “she
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their experiences seems to be a compulsive aspect of the disorder that serves to entrench
the symptoms of anxiety and avoidance into the individuals’ lived experiences. This use
of narrative limits the agoraphobic’s experience of the world as much as her physical
avoidance of space does.
I refer above to Capps and Ochs, who argue that “agoraphobia is in part kept alive
through [...] repeated psychological reconstructions of panic” (1995, p. 21). I turn now to
the details of this three-year case study on language and agoraphobia. Capps and Ochs’s
case study of a principally housebound agoraphobic, “Meg,” offers an example of the
practical implications of the problem of persistent primitive anxieties212 coupled with
language. Meg uses narrative to keep her primitive anxieties alive, fearing what may
happen if she were to venture out of her safe space without recognizing that what she
fears most has already occurred. Meg’s first experience of overwhelming panic is
precipitated by a near-drowning experience: she is unable to breathe, literally engulfed by
water. Throughout her narratives, including her defining moment of claustrophobic panic
while stuck in a highway traffic jam, Meg’s stories are peppered with references to
needing to escape without knowing what she needs to escape from. It would be easy to
suggest that all of Meg’s agora-claustrophobic experiences are a retroactive defence
against her childhood experience of near-drowning; that is, to suggest that Meg continues
to relive that first anxiety in the attempt to psychically gain mastery over it. However,
Meg not only recounts her traumatic anxiety experiences; she also reframes her
autonomous and successful experiences into helpless, potentially anxiety-inducing ones.
She (re-)frames her narratives in such a way as to cast herself as fundamentally prone to
anxiety and worry, as a weak person overwhelmed by life rather than as a person who has
suffered from anxiety in particular situations because of a limited set of experiences, with
the potential for new and positive experiences.

experiences fear of humiliation, rejection, and too much affect and understanding” (2012, p. 71). This
“impossibility” leads him to abandon the pursuit of free association. Cf. Adler & Bachant (1996).
212
See Chapter Two for my discussion of primitive anxieties and their relation to ego development. Briefly,
I argued that insofar as agora-claustrophobic anxieties are a necessary structuring experience for the
development of the infant’s psychic life, they are not pathological; however, the inability to move beyond
primitive anxieties in adulthood becomes pathological.
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Nachträglichkeit is the term Freud uses to describe the temporal dimension, the
delay, in the aetiology of neuroses.213 Lacan (1988) argues that subsequent experiences
filter into our past and into our memories so that what we experience next affects how we
experience our past more than our past determines or even influences how we experience
our future.214 Meg utilizes this aspect of language in a pathological way, to de-structure
her past and to reconstruct herself as helpless rather than masterful, ensnaring herself in a
trap of impotent anxiety, the only way out of which is, paradoxically, increasingly
overwhelming anxiety. Meg’s problematic use of language does not centre on a lack of
narrative coherence; rather, she uses narratives to limit her experiences of the world. Her
narratives become walls that she builds around herself, more impenetrable than any
physical walls could be. While it is clear that Meg’s past anxiety experiences are
affecting her future, it is also true that her memory – which she rewrites – of her past
213

Freud writes: “I admit that this is the most delicate question in the whole domain of psycho-analysis.
[…] According to this view [that early childhood ‘memories’ are retrospective phantasies], wherever we
seemed in analyses to see traces of the after-effects of an infantile impression […], we should rather have to
assume that we were faced by the manifestation of some constitutional factor or of some disposition that
had been phylogenetically maintained. On the contrary, no doubt has troubled me more […]. I was the first
[…] to recognize both the part played by phantasies in symptom-formation and also the ‘retrospective
phantasying’ of late impressions into childhood and their sexualisation after the event” (Freud 1918, p. 103,
ft.). He also mentions the “deferred effect” of a threat of castration in the case of Little Hans: “At the time
it was made, when he was three and a half, this threat had no effect. […] It would be the most completely
typical procedure if the threat of castration were to have a deferred effect, and if he were now, a year and a
quarter later, oppressed by the fear of having to lose this precious piece of his ego” (1909, p. 35).
Furthermore, Freud indicates the regularity of this deferral in the formation of neuroses: “In other cases of
illness we can observe a similar deferred operation of commands and threats made in childhood, where the
interval covers as many decades or more” (1909, p. 35). See also infra note 214.
214
For example, Lacan writes: “It’s not what happens afterwards which is modified, but everything which
went before. We have a retroactive effect – Nachträglichkeit, as Freud calls it – specific to the structure of
symbolic memory, in other words to the function of remembering” (1988, p. 185). While this is only one of
the meanings implicit in Freud’s use of the term, it has become the most salient of meanings (and effects)
for French psychoanalysts, for which the French translation, après-coup, allows. Strachey’s English
translation of the term, deferred action, implies the opposite temporal movement: an original event becomes
traumatic at a later, second event. This traumatic process is effected due to the biphasic nature of human
sexual development. Freud uses the term most frequently in his discussion of Emma (1950/1895), letters to
Fleiss (1985/1895), and the Wolf-Man case (1918). Regarding the aetiology of Emma’s neurosis, Freud
writes: “The change in puberty had made possible a different understanding of what was remembered. This
case is typical of repression in hysteria. We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only
nachträglich become a trauma. The cause of this state of things is the retardation of puberty as compared
with the rest of the individual’s development” (1950/1895, p. 356). For more on the history of the concept
of Nachträglichkeit, see Laplanche (1999), Laplanche & Pontalis (1967/1973), and Thomä & Cheshire
(1991).
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experiences is coloured by her expectation of future anxiety. Meg spends a great deal of
her time sitting in her home retelling her panic narratives to herself; she becomes
retroactively overwhelmed by her past experiences, even by experiences which were not
at the time problematic. For example, when Meg recounts her pregnancy, she tells it in
the present tense and emphasizes her helplessness: “I’m nine months preg--- almost nine
months pregnant…I can’t---If I wanted to leave I couldn’t” (Capps & Ochs 1995, p. 62).
Using language, Meg traps herself into her anxiety, reframing past successes as anxious
experiences, fearing the impossibility of doing something she does not even want to do.
Via Nachträglichkeit, Lacan explicates (and complicates) the relation of speech
and truth:
[I]t is present speech that bears witness to the truth of this revelation in current
reality and grounds it in the name of this reality. Now only speech bears witness
in this reality to that portion of the powers of the past that has been thrust aside at
each crossroads where an event has chosen. (2006c, pp. 212-213)215
It is not narrative that speaks the truth, but simply speech that speaks it. Truth is, as I
imply above, mutable, depending on which reality we are concerned with. Historical –
material – reality has one kind of truth; narrative truth corresponds to a different kind of
reality. These truths and these realities are, however, interdependent elements. So, unlike
Holmes, who suggests that narrative truth may reflect historical truth, and unlike Spence,
who suggests that the two are completely distinct, Faimberg (2014) argues that, if we are
listening, we are always surprised to discover in what individual ways these truths are
intertwined in psychical reality. We are always surprised to discover something new
about the psychical reality of an other. As I argued in Chapter Two, one can only be
surprised by an other subject in this way if one recognizes the subject’s otherness
(Zachrisson’s [2013] “actual other”), which is also to say that one can only be surprised
by the other if one is open to being surprised and is able to tolerate not being “sure” about
how history has been mediated by the other. Whatever knowledge one may have about
history or material truth, the only access to psychic reality – an other’s and even one’s
215

Freud, as Faimberg draws attention to, also connects language and psychical reality: “‘Indications of
discharge through speech are also in a certain sense indications of reality – but of thought-reality, not of
external reality’” (Freud 1950, p. 373; qtd. in Faimberg 1997, p. 441).
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own – is via this openness to being surprised. The phenomenon of Nachträglichkeit
demonstrates that the nature of psychical reality demands a certain degree of incoherence
in order for any event to have psychical effects. Clinically, then, and as I write above,
when coherence is demanded, fewer feelings and thoughts are possible; when
incoherence is tolerated, new and unanticipated feelings and thoughts can develop. When
coherence is taken to be the aim of psychoanalysis, there is no room for the flashes of
insight216 that allow the agoraphobic to reexamine, unconsciously, the distinction
between internal and external realities.
Faimberg argues that Nachträglichkeit “gives us a conceptual frame of
unconscious psychic temporality with which to explore and understand how
psychoanalysis produces psychic change” (2007, p. 1223). Nachträglichkeit includes the
work of a dual-process: the first aspect is in the formation of neuroses; the second aspect
is in the relief from neuroses. Faimberg’s (2005) broader conceptualization of
Nachträglichkeit emphasizes the complexities of the temporal dimension in the work of
analysis, which is never merely a historical reconstruction, or re-ordering, and never
purely a question of the here and now (that is, the transference relationship). Faimberg
argues that this broader conceptualization – that is, not just at work in the development of
the neurosis, but also characterizing the work of analysis – is implicit in Freud’s work,
even though he never articulates it explicitly.217 Faimberg refers to Kardiner’s (1977)
exposition of his analysis with Freud, and an example of Freud’s interpretation of one of
his dreams. Freud interprets that a figure in Kardiner’s dream “…was a projection into
the future of what you actually feared in the past. What you feared was therefore not what
was going to happen but what actually had happened, and which you not only forgot, but
feared to recall” (Kardiner 1977, p. 55; qtd. in Faimberg 2005, p. 1230). Faimberg’s
analysis of this moment in Kardiner’s analysis with Freud, as well as other moments in
the analysis, supports her argument that Freud was working with a broader
conceptualization of Nachträglichkeit. That is, Freud was not only interpreting the
216

See Wilson (1998).
Some (see, for example, Sodré 1997) argue that British psychoanalysts utilize the concept of
Nachträglichkeit without calling it such. This argument finds support in Winnicott’s essay “Fear of
Breakdown” (1974), (which I discussed in Chapter Two), and which details the process implied in the dual
temporality of the German word without direct reference to the concept (in any translation).
217
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material, but was also constructing218 new meanings that did not previously exist for the
analysand. There is a new connection made, based on relations of affect and meaning,
between past and current experiences.219 As I express above, this is the process by which
Meg reconstructs her past experiences as coloured by anxiety; only this process, then, can
be effective in the relief of Meg’s agoraphobic symptoms and the emptiness that, we
infer, her agoraphobic symptoms cover.
Thomä and Cheshire point out that this process of reconstruction is not a
retroactive causality: it is unnecessarily confounding, they argue, to “contemplate
revising our standard ideas about time-sequences and time-relationships (‘temporality’)”
(1991, p. 413). Rather, the “causal inter-actions involved in Nachträglichkeit [take] place
between the mutually contemporary contents of a storage-system” (Thomä & Cheshire
1991, p. 413; final emphasis added). As Freud states in a letter to Fliess, “the material
present in the form of memory-traces [is] subjected from time to time to a rearrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances – to a re-transcription” (1985/1896,
p. 233; original emphasis). Put laconically, things happen over time; time is continuous,
in some fashion or other, so things that happen in the past have an effect on present
happenings and on possible futures; perhaps most importantly, they have an effect on our
experience of the present and on our experience of the possibilities of the future. Our
memory of things past is alterable, even though the past itself is inalterable220: we can add
layers of meaning to our experiences and construct new meanings for experiences that
were previously inassimilable. Our memory of the past – and the meaning we ascribe to
past experiences – changes our way of experiencing the present and our present changes
our way of anticipating the future. Our expectations for the future affect our way of
experiencing in the present through relations of meaning and relations of affect. Meaning
can be added, but not eradicated; that is, like a palimpsest, the unconscious records
218

See also Freud 1937, pp. 258-259: “His [the analyst’s] task is to make out what has been forgotten from
the traces which it has left behind, or, more correctly, to construct it” (original emphasis).
219
For Kardiner, the past experience is the unresponsiveness of his mother after she died while he was
alone with her (at three years of age) and a subsequent childhood phobia of masks (Kardiner 1977, pp. 6162; qtd. in Faimberg 2005, p. 1232). The current experience was a recurring dream of his own immobilized
face reflected back at him in a mirror, and the distress and anxiety accompanying the dream.
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As Eickhoff writes, “Nachträglichkeit provides the memory, not the event, with traumatic significance”
(2006, p. 1453).
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meaning and any erasure leaves behind an imprint.221 We cannot unknow, so to speak; we
can only know more. The desire to unknow (which is impossible) prevents the acquisition
of new knowledge, which is necessary to move beyond trauma. As I argued in Chapter
Three, the agoraphobic’s loss of her anxiety and other phobic symptoms entails a
significant encounter with the “utter not knowing” of who she is. The unconscious fear of
not knowing is complicated by this desire to (impossibly) unknow. The analyst does not
know what the analysand cannot say, does not have words for, or is trying not to say; the
analyst can only encourage the analysand, in various ways, to follow his or her
associations and say more and, thus, to know more. Without incoherence, the
interpretation of the transference can only be a repetition of what is already known.
Faimberg adds an important dimension to the psychoanalytic process beyond free
association and evenly suspended attention that Bollas describes occurring between
analyst and analysand, which she calls “decentred listening,” or “listening to listening”
(1997, p. 442).222 The function of this additional dimension is precisely to create
connections between psychic reality and historical truth using the phenomenon of
Nachträglichkeit. Specifically, the concept of ‘listening to listening’ that Faimberg
describes includes four aspects:
(a) listening out for how the patient hears the analyst’s interpretations or silences;
(b) retroactively assigning meaning to the analyst’s interpretations and silences on
the basis of this listening to listening; (c) allowing the process of listening to
listening to appear in the interpretation; and (d) ensuring that the patient can listen
to the way the analyst listens to him so that he can become able to listen to
himself: we shall then have two subjects whose listening is decentred. (1997, p.
442)223
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For the most pertinent of Freud’s essays concerning repetition, see Freud (1899, 1914b, 1919, 1920a,
1926). For some significant (post-Freudian) additions to the literature, see Bass Alan (2006), Felman
(1982), Green (2003), Künstlicher (2010), and Loewald (1971). Lacan more or less replaces the concept of
the repetition compulsion in his theorizations with the insistence of the signifying chain. See, for example,
Lacan (2006d, 2006h); also, Lacan 1993, p. 242: “Repetition is fundamentally the insistence of speech.”
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See Faimberg (1996) for her early formulation of “listening to listening” and Ferro (2002) for his
clinical application of listening to the analysand’s associations to his interpretations.
223
Faimberg’s description of this decentred listening recalls Busch’s argument that the specificity of the
analytic frame depends on communicating to the patient that the patient’s free associations are the data
upon which analytic understanding is based, which I discussed in Chapter Two.
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As Faimberg explicates via a clinical vignette, the process of listening to listening
indicates that the patient’s “psychic reality is connected with a certain historical truth”
(1997, p. 447). As I argued in Chapter Two, the nature of agoraphobia in particular,
characterized by an unconscious confusion of self and other and the boundaries between,
requires a theoretical perspective that takes into consideration real – namely, external –
experiences and the patient’s representation of these experiences. From this connection
between perception and representation, Faimberg describes psychic truths, which “are the
consequence of the psychic work resulting from the demands of reality that are fashioned
by the unconscious wish and the unconscious fantasy” (1997, p. 449). In psychic truths,
Faimberg argues, there is an “insistent residue, a dimension of the ‘real’” (1997, p. 449)
that remains. Again, as I argued in Chapter Two, the real resists symbolization; but only
through the symbolic dimension can the real be apprehended, again underscoring the
clinical use of language (rather than, for example, a clinical focus on the therapeutic
relationship as the mechanism of change). Like Hanly, who suggests that “we are obliged
to live with uncertainty” (2009, p. 371), Faimberg indicates the necessary capacity of the
analyst to “listen from a position of not knowing” (1997, p. 450).224 This (limited)
uncertainty and not knowing is a partial guarantee that the “(re)construction of historical
truths is not a mere intrusion of the analyst’s theory” (Faimberg 1997, p. 450).225
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Winnicott (1971), Bion (1970, 1984), and Lacan (2006e, especially p. 471) also consider this capacity to
linger in uncertainty to be an essential aspect of the analyst’s function. See also infra note 108.
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Guralnik (2014a, 2014b) powerfully depicts the impact and insistence of historical reality in her case
history of Nyx, a German woman whose parents were both children of Nazis. Guralnik’s own parents were
both children of Jewish Zionists who lost most of their family in the Holocaust. Guralnik writes: “Working
psychoanalytically with this kind of background invite[d] the ongoing manufacturing of an illusion that we
[were] simply two individuals, doing our own thing, and not subjects of history and nationhood. Yet this
illusion was bound to crack under the weight of material seeking meaning” (2014a, p. 129). Although not
every individual is directly bound to an event as historically significant as the Holocaust, every individual
is part of History: a human history filled with all manner of real horrors often beyond imagining. As
Faimberg writes in her commentary on Guralnik’s article: “In the psychoanalytic process, we are trying to
construct a time and a space to discover with surprise in what way material reality has impinged in the
psychic makeup of our patients. In other words, for the particular situation at hand, we come to see how
History has been mediated. In psychoanalysis, then, we discover in a fragmentary way, in a contradictory
way, always with surprise, how History appears mediated by links between parents and grandparents in
relation to the patient’s psychic way of functioning as is (re)constructed in the history of the transference.
This is so because the psychic makeup of the patient is made of all this” (2014, p. 157; original emphasis).
Wolff, much earlier than Guralnik and largely against the grain of his contemporaries, argues similarly that
“the patient’s neurotic suffering in the present has its roots as much in the experience of social history as in
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The concept of Nachträglichkeit is implicit, as Eickhoff (2006) and Faimberg
(2005, 2007) argue, in Winnicott’s ideas about the fear of breakdown. As I discussed in
Chapter Two, the fear of breakdown is caused by and invokes primitive anxieties, which
are overwhelming and unthinkable because the object of fear is a breakdown that has
already happened. That is, Winnicott describes the complicated subjective experiences of
time and trauma, wherein what is past causes a present anxiety about the future. In his
discussion of primitive agonies, Winnicott refers to experiences that occur prior to the
development of the ego, and, as such, no subject existed, so to speak, to have the
experience (in order to organize it). As I argued in Chapter Two, experiences for which
the subject has no words might also cause the (re-)emergence of primitive anxieties and
contribute to an on-going fear of breakdown. That is, it might be that the problematic
insufficiency of (some particular element of) language persists beyond ego development.
Therefore, the subject may experience a debilitating anxiety perceived to be futureoriented but caused by a previous experience that the subject is unable to put into words.
Winnicott connects the fear of breakdown and primitive anxieties with the
experience of emptiness. We are thus able to recognize the connections between the
agoraphobic’s experience of emptiness and her anxiety, as well as agoraphobic anxieties
and psychic development, fear of one’s own aggression, and the task of putting it all into
words. As I argued in Chapter Two, the psychical experience of emptiness is derived
from the physical experience of hunger. The infant will necessarily experience hunger;
the very experience of hunger’s emptiness, no matter how temporary, is perceived as a
deprivation. The experience of emptiness stimulates aggression and leads to the further
development of the ego. This emptiness is constitutive in ego development and is thus
connected to the primitive anxieties that belong to the time before the ego properly
existed. For the agoraphobic, something has gone wrong in the process of ego
development; I argued in Chapter Three that, for the agoraphobia patients Milrod (2007)
describes, persistent emptiness indicates the presence of unmourned traumatic losses. As
I introduced in Chapter Two, the fact of the lost object’s existence in external reality is
the residues of infantile wishes and fantasies” (1988, p. 380). More emphatically, he argues that in order to
“distinguish absurd from possible valid constructions, criteria of coherence and good fit in the ‘narrative
tradition’ are unhelpful, if not meaningless” (p. 389).
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only reaffirmed insofar as others acknowledge the real loss of that object. The analyst
must return to these real experiences of loss in order to address the agoraphobic’s
emptiness. Only when these real losses are symbolized will the agoraphobic be able to
develop clearer boundaries between the internal and the external, and create the world
that is waiting outside for her to find.
The logic of the unconscious is different from the logic of the conscious mind,
which corresponds more to what we might understand as a narrative logic.226 In order to
achieve the goals of psychoanalysis, to increase unconscious freedom, psychoanalytic
work must follow the logic of the unconscious. Green describes the main characteristics
of the unconscious:
[I]t ignores time; it does not take negation into account; it operates by
condensation and displacement; and it does not tolerate any expectation or delay.
It succeeds in expressing itself by turning around the obstacles which would
attempt to prevent it from making itself known; in other words, it permits our
unconscious desires to experience a certain form of realization. (1986, p. 18)
Building on Green’s first point, that one of the main characteristics of unconscious logic
is that it “ignores time,” Schubert writes:
Every psychoanalysis contains contradictory relationships to time. The indefinite
duration of the complete analysis and the monotonous rhythm of the recurrent
sessions create in the analysand an illusory eternal time perspective. This is
contrasted by the reality of the analytic contract, which is time-limited and entails
separate analytic sessions with distinct time-frames. The timeless perspective
stimulates regression and dependence, while the time-limited perspective requires
development, process and the setting of goals. It is under these diametrically
opposite conditions that the psychoanalytic work takes place. (2001, p. 93)
The phenomenon of Nachträglichkeit functions according to unconscious logic,
specifically the temporal dimensions. Psychoanalytic work takes advantage of the
226

See Matte-Blanco (1988) for an elaboration of asymmetrical, symmetrical, and bi-logic. Asymmetrical
logic is conventional and follows familiar principles of reasoning, including, for example, the concept of
two-valued logic: either A or not A (either proposition A is true or it is not true). These principles do not
hold according to symmetrical logic – the logic of the unconscious – whereby A can be both true and not
true. Most thinking combines these two logics in what Matte-Blanco calls “bi-logic.” See also infra note
164.
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timeless nature of the unconscious, reproducing it in a sense with the “illusory eternal
time perspective” and simultaneously creating a conflict with that perspective with the
“reality” of the analytic frame. In order to effectuate unconscious change – that is, to
increase unconscious freedom – analytic work must utilize the logic of the unconscious.
Analytic work must follow the movement of the dream work, the movement of free
association, and the movement between coherence, incoherence, and back again.

4.5. Conclusion
The fantasy inherent in the pursuit of coherence ignores and displaces the centrality of
aggression in creative psychic life and in the freedom for that creativity, as well as
denying the influence of the unconscious in psychic life. The exact (and exacting)
repetition of specific narratives (like those of Meg) forecloses the possibilities of
aggressivity and of creativity, which concurrently prevents the establishment of
externality. Denying one’s own aggressive impulses is to imprison oneself in
consciousness insofar as the limit of unconscious feelings has not been established. It is
not that the unconscious becomes less influential in psychic life; rather, the agoraphobic
‘wards off,’ so to speak, the reality of the unconscious through repetitive narrative. The
agoraphobic does not have the freedom to “crack up,” the freedom needed for and
expressed in the free associative process of analysis. Again, the agoraphobic is able to
cohere, but not to disseminate227; the agoraphobic is overwhelmed by the nature of the
associations, the (passionate, intense) feelings experienced in the freedom of associating.
This freedom is, as a number of authors have pointed out, both an opportunity and a
burden.228 Bollas refers to the overdetermined psychic moment as an intensity; the
intensity of that moment is only recognized after the fact (nachträglich) through the
second movement of the unconscious dialectic. The feelings that comprise that psychic
intensity can be repressed if association is foreclosed, discouraged, or even not explicitly
encouraged. Bollas writes, “[h]uman mental life does not have such a compositional unity
to it, although narrative unities can be constructed about people’s lives. Instead,” he
227
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Disseminate refers to the “cracking up” of conscious and coherent intensities. See also infra note 184.
See infra note 179.
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argues, “we endure millions of psychic intensities in our life” (1995, p. 68). Mental life,
then, involves the experience of psychic intensities and, in relative health, the “cracking
up” of these intensities through discursive free association, as opposed to narrative
coherence. The ability to free associate – to experience unconscious freedom – is
requisite for developing a coherent narrative about life events that belongs to the
individual’s psychic reality and not to some other reality.229 The feeling comes first and
then the thoughts about the feelings. In order to effectuate unconscious change, analysis
must work with – not against – the logic of the unconscious, the logic of the dream, the
logic of free association. In the psychoanalytic situation, the fundamental rule supersedes
the demands of coherent narrative. As Bollas (1995) argues, the two processes are
opposed: one cannot ‘say everything’ and construct a coherent narrative simultaneously.
One aspect of psychoanalytic work, then, is creating a coherent narrative; but the other
aspect, which is distinctive to psychoanalysis, is the invitation to 'say everything'. The
aim of psychoanalysis is beyond either of these aspects: as Phillips argues, “the cure”
psychoanalysis ideally offers is the cure for self-knowledge, not of self-knowledge; the
cure for one’s “wish to know [one’s self] in that coherent, narrative way” (Holdengräber
2014). Via the movements between narrative and free association – coherence and
incoherence – the analytic frame grows, so to speak and, I argue, along with the frame
grows an accompanying sense of the boundary between self and other (in other words, a
sense of one's limits). The experience of these limits is necessary for the agoraphobic to
live in the world (so that she no longer feels she is risking the existence of the world, or
of her self, by being in it, by engaging with it). Part of the psychoanalytic experience,
with the invitation to “say everything,” is learning to negotiate the chiasmic gap between
self and other; this experience is not available within the paradigm of narrative therapies
or narrativist psychoanalysis. The structure of the frame, which the analysand participates
in constructing and is able to experiment with destroying (because of the analytic rule),
offers the possibility for the agoraphobic to experience new ways of relating to objects
(including destructively). Once the agoraphobic has developed a faith in the distinction
between self and other and between internal and external realities, she can begin to
creatively inhabit the spaces between rather than anxiously avoid them.
229
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5.0. Conclusion: To Calm Anxiety
A phobia, in other words, protects a person from his own curiosity.
(Phillips 1993, p. 14)
In this thesis, I have responded to Milrod’s (2007) article, in which she describes a
phenomenon of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients for whom the symptoms of
anxiety and avoidance have remitted. Milrod’s findings have important implications for
the long-term efficacy of agoraphobia treatments, offering a possible explanation for the
limited efficacy of standard treatments of CBT and pharmacotherapy. As I indicated in
Chapter Three, her findings have not been addressed in the literature subsequently.
Milrod’s findings opened up an avenue to further our understanding of agoraphobia; in
this thesis, I have used these findings to contribute to the theoretical understanding of
agoraphobia and I have developed the clinical implications of these theoretical
contributions.
I have attempted to explicate the complexity of the phenomenon Milrod
encounters in her patients by connecting the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness with the
pathological experience of emptiness well-noted in other disorders (e.g., Kumin 1978)
and the structural phenomenon of emptiness experienced in the development of the ego.
My explication of psychic emptiness supports an alternative interpretation of the clinical
material Milrod provides counter to Milrod’s suggestion that her patients’ persistent
emptiness can be attributed to a weak reflective function (RF). I suggested that assertions
of emptiness in the analytic situation precisely indicate the unconscious presence of
strongly warded-off emotional or cognitive experiences; specifically, the subjective
experience of emptiness in agoraphobia patients commonly indicates the presence of
significant losses that have yet to be mourned. I proposed several explanations as to why
agoraphobia patients, in particular, defend against mourning.
At the same time, Milrod’s findings contributed to my elucidation of the nature of
agoraphobia and added to our, heretofore limited, understanding of agoraphobic anxieties
in the process of ego development. The psychoanalytic paradigm of mental life uses an
examination of psychical disorder to deduce the nature of all psychical processes,
including pathological and ‘normal’ processes. The nature of agoraphobia, inflected with
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Milrod’s findings, offers an exemplary model of disorder to augment our understanding
of both normal and pathological psychical processes. This augmented understanding,
which includes the agoraphobic’s pathological uses of language in the service of avoiding
emotional experience, provides support for the argument that language is the fundamental
tool of psychoanalytic treatment in the alleviation of mental suffering. Milrod’s (2007)
discussion of the clinical case studies she presents emphasizes the transference
relationship and implies (as she argues elsewhere: see Milrod et al. 2000, 2001, 2007)
that it is this particular element of psychoanalysis that distinguishes it from the temporary
effects of other treatments of agoraphobia. However, the limitations of this emphasis are
evident in her description of her patients’ progress. As I argued in Chapter Three, the fact
of structural emptiness provides a technical counterpoint to this emphasis on interpreting
the transference as a means of addressing the agoraphobic’s experience of persistent,
pathological emptiness; likewise, as I argued in Chapter Four, the agoraphobic’s
pathological use of language – in producing narratives that are either too coherent or,
alternatively, producing ‘empty’ narratives – can be countered through the fundamental
rule of psychoanalysis. This rule, that the analysand ‘try to say everything,’ is sustained
by the analyst’s commitment to listening to what the analysand tries not to say in addition
to what she is able to say.
I have suggested that the agoraphobia patient performs an emptying of the
emotional valences of her psychical life in order to protect her ego from overwhelming
affect, principally rage and/or grief. The banishing of such affect does not, however,
result in an experience of calm. It is an anxious emptiness. We think of calming anxiety:
one’s task might be to calm one’s own anxiety, or one might seek another to calm one’s
anxieties. Is calm the absence of anxiety? If anxiety, even in the form of an anxious
emptiness, hides overwhelming affect, then it would follow than an absence of affect
would result in calm. But this is not the case. Calm is filled with feelings, not absent
them. Calm is the potential to feel all of the feelings one might have. Phillips suggests
that a phobia “protects a person from his own curiosity,” (1993, p. 14); we might thus
think of curiosity as an antidote to the anxiety that phobias both hide and highlight. The
guiding question might change from ‘how does one relieve anxiety?’ into ‘how does one
cultivate curiosity?’. Rather, these questions might be two sides of the same coin insofar
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as curiosity is not possible where there is too much anxiety and the true relief of anxiety
makes room for curiosity. I believe the resolution of this paradox is connected to the
movement between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions that I have described
in Chapters Two and Three. That is to say, we are able to develop a zest for life when we
begin to have faith in our capacity to mourn (Scott 1981); similarly, we are able to
develop our curiosity when we have faith in our capacity to survive wherever it is our
curiosity may lead us. While we may all be familiar with the proverb ‘curiosity killed the
cat,’ the rejoinder is probably less familiar: ‘but satisfaction brought it back!’ That is to
say, curiosity might be deadly but also worthwhile and, further, one might be able to
survive the destruction that curiosity entails.

5.1. Limitations of Current Project
In this thesis, all of my clinical data is derived from the published clinical work of other
psychoanalysts. There are two limitations that follow from this circumstance. The first,
which I discuss in more detail below in my recommendations for further research,
concerns the very issue of writing and reading clinical case studies. There is a well-noted
impossibility of translating what occurs in the psychoanalytic session to the
comparatively brief case study and, even more so, the case vignette. This impossibility
has to do with the physical limitations of transcribing, describing, and analyzing an
analysis that itself likely spanned (at least) hundreds of hours. The impossibility is
compounded by the task of trying to account for the ineffable effects of the unconscious
communication between analyst and analysand. As little as has been published on writing
clinical material, even less has been written on commenting on them. There are a few
preliminary warnings, so to speak, such as Samuels’ (2000) note that it never feels “easy”
commenting on someone else’s clinical material: it is both a difficult task and the attempt
results in no small amount of unease. For me, this unease follows not only from the
attempt to comment and critique someone else’s clinical material, but from my own lack
of clinical training and expertise. I have attempted to focus my commentary on clinical
material on the theoretical discussion surrounding it, but, of course, the clinical
implications are significant. I have attempted to draw out those implications without
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assuming the position of clinical surety that no one, and certainly not myself, can claim,
and especially not regarding someone else’s clinical work.

5.2. Questions for Further Research
There are a number of avenues for further research; some of these I have indicated
throughout. Most urgently, a comparative investigation of the phenomenon of emptiness
in agoraphobia, borderline, and psychotic patients is called for. One aspect of this
comparative analysis would consider the various psychoanalytic concepts that might
include a subjective feeling of emptiness, including Deutsch’s (1942) “as if” personality,
Winnicott’s (1965) False Self, and McDougall’s (1984) concept of “dis-affection.”
Importantly, this comparison could elucidate the meanings of emptiness in all patients
and lead to more efficacious techniques for the alleviation of, what is for some, a very
painful experience. Singer (1977b) has noted that borderline patients who experience
both a feeling of emptiness and an acute fear of emptiness are at risk for suicide. It
remains to be studied whether agoraphobia patients with persistent emptiness face the
same risk.230
Secondly, there is an emerging sense in the literature of the complexity of
psychical reality, and an emerging sense of the complex relationship between history and
subjective experience. As I have made clear throughout this thesis, the realm of
psychoanalytic influence is psychical reality. The question that remains to be explored
further is: what of “history” needs to be taken into account in the analysis of psychical
life? As I have indicated in Chapter Four, this question develops out of the work Wolff
(1988) began on the influence of “social history” in the development of the neuroses and
has most recently been considered by Guralnik (2014a). As commentary on Guralnik
(2014a) clearly indicates (see: Bohleber 2014; Faimberg 2014; Wolff Bernstein 2014;
and, Guralnik 2014b), there is a lack of consensus on what level of “history”
interpretations in the psychoanalytic clinic are valid. The mutual influence of an
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individual’s psychic functioning and social life is understood in only a very limited sense;
the possibility for psychoanalytic work to address broader social problems thus remains
underdeveloped. The need for such development is also indicated in the topic of one of
the most recent issues of Psychoanalytic Inquiry 34(7), “Analytic Lives in a Wounded
World,” published in October 2014.
Thirdly, in working on this thesis, a question has presented itself to me that is
tangentially connected to the questions of truth and psychical reality: what do we take for
“truth” in reading case histories? In reading case histories, how do we interpret – and thus
change – what we read? These questions have a lengthy history in the literature on
interpretation and literary analysis, but have been rarely addressed in the psychoanalytic
literature. Theoretical articles on writing case histories in psychoanalysis tend to address
the question of patient confidentiality (see, for example, Aron 2000; Goldberg 1997). As
an example of the complexity and clinical relevance of writing and commenting on case
histories, I refer again to Guralnik (2014): Bohleber, in his commentary on Guralnik
(2014a), is summarizing Nyx’s (Guralnik’s patient) history; he writes: “The patient is the
fifth and last sibling; the third child died after eight weeks, while the fourth was a
miscarriage” (Bohleber 2014, p. 146). Guralnik’s original statement is as follows: “Nyx
was the fifth child to be born. The two eldest siblings thrived, but the third died at eight
weeks. Her mother got pregnant again, but a few weeks prior to her due date decided to
lift a heavy table, which ultimately caused the baby to die in utero” (2014a, p. 130).
Guralnik’s paper is entitled “The dead baby,” and so my mind was attuned to these
issues, but I was struck by Bohleber’s characterization of a (nearly?) full-term loss as a
miscarriage. Even medically speaking (which is not concerned with the individual’s
subjective experience of the loss), any loss after 20 weeks gestation is classified as a
stillbirth; only losses prior to 20 weeks gestation are classified as miscarriages. Further, I
question with what certainty Guralnik can state that the baby died because of the
mother’s decision “to lift a heavy table.” The connection between those two statements is
not immediately apparent from a medical or physiological perspective. Given that much
of Nyx’s conscious suffering circles around her guilt at drinking during her pregnancy
and her fears of having irreparably damaged her young daughter (despite what Guralnik
reports of pediatricians’ assurances of her normal development), an unconscious
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identification with a mother “responsible” for the death of her unborn child in this way
may have compounded Nyx’s own feelings of shame. Nevertheless, the “truth” of the
“miscarriage” evades us; all one can do is remain aware of its evasions and attempt to
account for the specific ways in which it slips out of our minds. Further research would
approach the analysis of writing and reading case histories from the perspective of
literary analysis and interpretation. Case histories with published commentaries would be
particularly useful in this analysis. Michels (2000), Scharff (2000), and Coen (2000), with
commentaries (Pulver 2000; Bernstein 2000; Rubovitz-Stein 2000; Szecsödy 2000;
Tuckett 2000; Wilson 2000), begin to address these questions and note both the relative
paucity of such discussions and the absolute imperative for them.
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